Zarb-e-Azb in depth and essence
Of course, the Peshawar Corps Commander, Lt Gen Khalid Rabbani, did not just present his personal views when stressing the need to expand Zarb-e-Azb to southern Punjab and Balochistan at the National Defence University (NDU) the other day. The military hierarchy does not accommodate personal viewpoints. He was, most likely, expanding on the chief’s earlier claim, that the operation would target terrorists of all hues and colours, all across the country. The elaboration is timely because the Taliban seem to have overcome the initial shock and awe of the bombardment, though still in a very limited manner, and have mounted a number of attacks on security personnel and positions.
It is interesting that the military has stared mentioning both southern Punjab and Balochistan in the context of the NW operation. Though not directly TTP, groups based there are openly affiliated with the militia now on the run in NW, and have consistently carried out sectarian attacks with the government and the military choosing to turn a blind eye. Gen Rabbani’s posturing now seems to indicate that the operation might indeed be wholesome, contrary to opinion in large parts of Punjab and Balochistan. Going after the lashkars and jaishes that served as chosen proxies for so long, it seems, will be the operation’s litmus test.
It is hoped that the military – now firmly in the driving seat as far as the operation is concerned, at least – will be swift in undertaking this extremely sensitive part of the operation that it has, for all intents and purposes, itself announced. And while Gen Rabbani might have been slightly unfair by blaming civilian governments for delaying the operation since 2011 – the army did go ahead with it when it needed to, despite civilian counter-currents – the prospect of a crackdown should serve as an eye opener for the Punjab and Baloch governments. The latter is well aware of the downside of continuing sectarian genocide and non-state proxy actors challenging the writ of state. Punjab is slightly more complex. Extremist organisations actually hold territory in the periphery and dismantling them will definitely trigger vicious reprisal attacks. Then there is the government. Not only has it been too soft with these groups, there are credible cases which prove certain sections of the government might have protected certain terrorists for quite a while. For the operation to be a thorough success, such habits will have to be broken and culprits made examples of. Nothing less will ensure Pakistan’s survival.
