Two identities and their mutual antagonisms

September 20, 2014

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Hindutva and its fallout on Indian Muslims

The book is a sociological study of the Hindu-Muslim divide in the subcontinent. It is a nuanced investigation of a volatile issue where maintaining critical balance is not easy.

Mujeeb Afzal analyses the issue in its multifarious dynamics. Hindus and Muslims are not perceived as absolute identities but as communities led by elite middle class groups who compete to preserve their respective identities. As he puts it, “The BJP, as the proponent of Hindutva, and the Indian-Muslim minority, as the advocate of Islam-Urdu attempt to protect their Brahmin and Ashraf value systems, respectively” Both identities were constructed during the Raj. .

The book is a study in three phases: the Raj era, the post independence Congress dominated era and the post Congress dominated BJP era. The discussion is preceded by a chapter describing the conceptual framework of the study. It also takes up the issue of why the masses respond to the elite- middle class constructs crucial in the study.

According to Mujeeb Afzal “the antagonistic relationship of Hindus and Muslims is neither natural nor perennial.” This in fact represents two modern identity groups “whose proponents have not been religious figures.” The two identities and their mutual antagonisms developed “in a complex interaction between the processes of modernisation that the Raj introduced and the local response.” This led to a competition between the ‘local elite middle classes’ which used the opportunities in education, economy, politics and administration available under the Raj to maintain their influence among the masses.

The book describes the development of modern educational institutions by the elite-middle classes of the two communities during and after 19^th century as instruments of competition. Competition in electoral bodies and securing government jobs came next.

The chapter on the BJP deals with the evolution of Hindu identity under the Raj and after independence. Various Hindu nationalist organisations constructed the myth of the Hindu nation.

The chapter on the BJP deals with the evolution of Hindu identity under the Raj and after independence. Various Hindu nationalist organisations constructed the myth of the Hindu nation. “This constructed myth attempted to respond to the challenges of foreign occupation, the initial process of modernisation and ideas of both the raj and modernity.” The myth asserted that like any other nation Hindus as a people had all the reliogio-cultural and political attributes of a nation.

The definition of Hindutva excluded anyone from the community who did not have Hindu blood in his veins or spoke a language of non Indian origin or followed a religion whose birthplace was outside India.

The Muslims were constructed as the ‘other’ against whom the differentiation of the Hindu ‘in-group’ was established. The rule of the Muslims who invaded India was supposed to be characterised by loot and plunder that brought to an end the mythical Vediv Golden Age.

Another chapter focuses on the Indian Muslim community’s quest for a communitarian identity construct and politics. The need to create the construct was initially felt in Muslim minority provinces. It later spread to Muslim majority provinces also.

The Muslim elite and middle class was divided on how to respond to the social challenges in the wake of the end of the Mughal rule. The Muslim clergy, which enjoyed a privileged position in the pre British period, felt marginalised. Syed Ahmad Shaheed, Titumeer and mujahideen in NWFP advised the Muslims to preserve the Islamic tradition in its pure form, turn their back to the world and go for jihad. The tradition continues to bedevil Muslim psyche in different forms now.

The Indian Muslim landed elite and educated middle class on the other hand that wished to participate in the Raj initiated processes of modernisation in order to tap new sources of power and prosperity. They went for modern education, created Aligarh College and several other educational institutions. They made an attempt to ‘reinterpret-invent the tradition to suit it with the new demands.” As they felt threatened from the Hindus they sought a privileged position on account of the past social supremacy through demands for special quota and separate electorates.

The modernists thought Urdu language could play a vital role in the construction of the Indian Muslim identity. This brought them into clash with the Hindu elite-middle class who supported Hindi.

Another trend was established by the liberal, secular modernist Congress, which attracted most of the Hindus, but fewer Muslims. The Hindu nationalist organisations had a limited impact on the pre-independence Indian politics because a majority of the Hindus supported the inclusive and composite-secular nationalist ideology of the Congress.

Afzal’s view about the partition of India being greatly disadvantageous for the Indian Muslims is shared by many. He does not however go into the details of their post partition plight.

Another trend was established by the liberal, secular modernist Congress, which attracted most of the Hindus, but fewer Muslims.

A number of other scholars have dealt with the issue in detail. It is widely understood that much of the Muslim elite left for Pakistan. The poor and culturally backward section of the community remained in India. The leaderless masses were left to the care of the ulema, who were totally out of sync with the times. The ulema fed the community on illusions. Urdu spoken nowhere in India except the northern provinces was declared the symbol of Islam that must be protected. An outmoded Muslim Personal Law (MPL) that militated against women was declared the other symbol of Islam. Preservation of the minority character of the Aligarh Muslim University was another ideal pursued by the Indian Muslims after partition.

In July 1947 Jinnah had advised the Muslims who remained in India to “be loyal to India, concentrate on education and politics, and avoid confrontationist politics” and that “they should not seek to ride two horses.” The ulema however opposed modern education, calling upon Muslims to join the madrassahs which multiplied after partition. Had the then Muslim leadership made sincere efforts to make the Indian Muslims reconcile with the new situation, where belief in two nation theory could be disastrous, they would have done positive service to the Indian Muslims.

The Muslims supported Congress as its secular polity was seen to be helpful in preserving their identity. But as their social backwardness and poverty increased, mostly due to lack of modern education, opposition to family planning and to women going to workplaces with men, they turned against Congress towards the mid sixties. The Congress had failed to give Urdu the status of second official language in Northern Indian states, and did not allow Aligarh Muslim University a minority status. A new grievance was created after the destruction of the Babri mosque.

During the second phase of BJP’s coming to power in 1999 as a part of the NDA coalition, it could not fully implement its policy that included cow protection, imposition of common civil code, and the reconstruction of Ram Mandir. It could thus introduce only a soft version of Hindutva.

The book ends with the Vajpayee period. It leaves out issues that are bound to be created now that the BJP is again in power. The BJP rule under Narindra Modi is no more encumbered with allies having a moderating influence. Will it go for full fledged Hindutva? By refusing to recognise plurality and focusing on conformity and assimilation, it could follow racist policies. It is difficult however to follow this path in the presence of so many languages, cultural and ethnic and religious identities in India.