Pakistan’s own Boko Haram

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More chickens coming home to roost

Previously unknown militant organisation Al Jihad setting an English medium school on fire in Turbat and pamphlets warning parents against ‘foreign’ education is eerily similar to Nigeria’s version of the al Qaeda franchise, Boko Haram. The latter takes its inspiration, and therefore its ideology, from waging war against western education and, of course, all things contrary to its extremist interpretation of Islam. It bears noting that Nigeria’s rebellion is spreading, overrunning large swathes of land and declaring shari’a, its own caliphate, etc, while carrying out executions and atrocities for which IS takes most of the flak these days. That, however, is not without good reason. Al Baghdadi’s caliphate is proving far more successful. But now that they have executed another American journalist, their shenanigans must have finally registered in Washington, which is now forced to react.

How is it, while militant Islam is spreading so successfully across the Muslim world, that Islamabad is still without a viable, comprehensive counter-strategy? It was not very far from our capital, after all, that the model was first experimented with – when US, Saudi, and Pakistani intelligence agencies produced the ‘genius’ madrassah model and eventually flushed the Soviets out of Afghanistan. It seemed a good idea then, but it’s had disastrous second and third-round consequences. It’s long been a thorn in our side as well. Zarb-e-Azb, according to news reports (even though ISPR has been silent of late), has all but achieved military success and NW is effectively in government control. But what about the softer, and more intel-intensive, parts of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy? Instances like the Turbat school burning show that the enemy remains active, while their pamphlets show that they have a multi-pronged strategy that employs various means, in addition to violence, to spread their message.

Granted, Nawaz Sharif is too choked with political tensions to give the operation much time. But his approach has been counter-productive, and therefore much criticised, since long before the noose tightened around his heavy mandate government. Word was that he continued to push against the operation till he had to be arm-twisted into accepting it. And while rumours might be slightly exaggerated, there is no denying that better work needs to be done to control the deepening influence of militant Islam. When the writ of the state is challenged, however smartly or softly, the response must still be swift and strong. It is time for the state to show very clearly what lines will not be allowed to be crossed.