But will it help Iraq?
It was only a matter of time before Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki caved in to pressure for his ouster. Of late, even Tehran began agreeing with Washington that a change at the helm had become necessary. But whether his chosen successor, Haider al-Abadi from the same Dawa party, can put a more inclusive government in place by the mid-September deadline, or even if such toggling can arrest the country’s implosion, remains to be seen.
There is no denying that the Islamic State (IS) – al Bagdadi’s caliphate – is a merciless sectarian outfit for which Baghdad’s politics holds little relevance. But there is weight in the argument that a government even marginally more sympathetic to the Sunni minority would have been able to halt IS advances long ago. And the bet is that it might still not be too late.
Al Qaeda was a continuous thorn in the US side in all the places where IS now holds sway. In fact, places around Anbar, especially Mosul, Tikrit and Fallujah, had to be taken and re-taken from militants during the US occupation. In the end, it was only by coaxing indigenous Sunni tribes that local militias were formed and al Qaeda driven away. The local population stood by Maliki’s regime for a while – while it was promised a sizeable sum of the oil spillover – but changed sides once it became clear Baghdad was not going to honour its promises, and two different types of sectarian battles began. One was in Baghdad, where Maliki and friends, still upset over long years of Sunni rule under Saddam, pushed out the sectarian minority from practically all places of influence in the capital. The other was in the Sunni hinterland, where local tribes decided not to fight for the government any longer, and stopped resisting Baghdadi’s thugs as their power and influence grew.
Washington is clearly counting on a return to the old ways. With Sunnis more empowered, they would be encouraged to oppose militants since their own interests would be tied to the government. But such things are often easier said than done. It might be too late to turn the tide on IS. And even if the Sunnis are willing, it will take a bigger, and bloodier, fight to win this time than any during the Americans’ stay.
For the moment the Americans are happy pulling strings from afar. But if the situation worsens further, active involvement might once again become necessary. It’s not just human rights that is at stake, there is also Iraq’s oil. And if Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi’as can’t help each other, it might take the US to protect oil fields in the south.
