INTERVIEW: Lt Gen (R) Hamid Gul
Who would know better than a prodigy of the Deep State?
Chess-like calculations of cause-and-effect were central to the Soviet mindset, but the Kremlin could not possibly have war-gamed how deeply its actions would reverberate across the globe – sounding its own death rattle, triggering fault-lines that would break the delicate sectarian balance of the Muslim world, and creating an unprecedented security vacuum – when Brezhnev ordered his army to cross into Afghanistan that fateful Christmas morning of ’79. Pakistan, of course, played the most prominent role in the Great Game that followed. CIA proxy project, Saudi Riyal-politik, and Pak army’s embrace of the jihad rhetoric, all converge at this particular point in history. Years later, Gen Musharraf would write in his memoir that “We did what Napoleon and Hitler could not do. We beat the Russians”.
While that is open to interpretation, there can be no denying that Gen Zia and his close circle achieved a number of unthinkables in those years. But the madressa model they created, which evolved into soldier-cleric creating factories, was destined to influence the world far beyond Afghanistan. Like the Russians, the Pakistanis and Americans, too, would take steps that would affect the world for a long time to come. It has been argued, with good reason, that the al Qaeda phenomenon now tearing the Middle East apart has its roots in the years when we facilitated a global super war and taught the world how to produce state-of-the-art guerrilla armies; something the bad guys would exploit with great effect.
Of course, Pakistan would suffer the blowback as well. From Musharraf’s U-turn on the Afghan Taliban, to the TTP insurgency, to Gen Raheel’s Zarb e Azb, Pakistan first gave social, then political space to religious hardliners, then lost further space to an armed rebellion, and despite the military operation the future is far from certain. Few people are more familiar with this long story than Gen (R) Hamid Gul, ISI chief when the Russians left – and the Mujahideen’s long journey to becoming bad guys began – and a prominent figure in right-of-centre politics since his retirement from the forces. He also heads the Ex Servicemen Society, which puts him in a unique position to analyse the political and military discourse.
The newest Great Game
What now, after the operation, I ask him. Securing their nest and degrading their command-and-control mechanism is understandable, but what will consolidation look like? And what about the non-military component of the operation?
The Americans are still unhappy. They still have concerns about the Haqqanis. The military’s, and government’s, decision to dump the long-time proxy, while appreciated diplomatically, was never accepted by the CIA. And now they will pressure Pakistan on this point.
“It’s a long process that will take time”, he says. “Right now it is important to understand that terrorist groups have been divided”.
This was made possible by the talks that preceded the action, he is careful to point out. Some groups that made the wider TTP umbrella split with the main body during the negotiations. And now some are actively supporting the military – feeding info, etc. So there have been clear gains.
But there is also a wider angle that must be considered. The Americans are still unhappy. They still have concerns about the Haqqanis. The military’s, and government’s, decision to dump the long-time proxy, while appreciated diplomatically, was never accepted by the CIA. And now they will pressure Pakistan on this point.
“They don’t say much about securing the other side of the Durand Line”, he says. “Now they will use the Haqqani card to ask Pakistan to do more. The reason is they want the army to be locked in the region permanently”.
And that means, of course, compromises on the eastern front, also permanently. This is designed to result in a soft eastern and hard western border situation for Pakistan, which is hardly an ideal position for the army. And those bent upon playing down the Indian threat need only read their new army chief’s first remarks about Pakistan.
Seeing is believing
But what about other non-state actors? The state’s patronage of proxies, housed in urban areas far removed from fata badlands, is no longer a secret. Neither is their turning on the state and taking up arms alongside the TTP. Surely “terrorists of all hues and colours” includes these groups, who have been involved in clear anti-state activities. What about concerns from progressive circles that until the government and the military are seen acting against these groups, their promises of a thorough sweep cannot be believed?
Most people these so called progressive circles call to be arrested, according to the spymaster, have been through the legal process numerous times. And each time they were released because of insufficient evidence.
The state’s patronage of proxies, housed in urban areas far removed from fata badlands, is no longer a secret. Neither is their turning on the state and taking up arms alongside the TTP. Surely “terrorists of all hues and colours” includes these groups, who have been involved in clear anti-state activities.
“Heads of many organisations have been arrested”, he points out, adding that “the courts let them go because the charges could not stick”.
This is like the Indians harassing us about the Bombay attack.
“We have an Anglo-Saxon legal system, just like they do. And it needs tangible evidence for convictions. It’s as simple as that”, he adds.
There are also claims that unless the education system is overhauled, particularly the controversial madressas, an ideological shift away from regression and extremism cannot be achieved.
He does not agree with this charge at all, of course. “There is no evidence that the madressas teach extremism or militancy”, he says sharply. Their teachings are confined to Quran and Sunnah, he stresses, and there is no way that rolling back the madressa project will be allowed. Period.
What then?
What, then, should be the way forward?
“After securing their base of operation, it is now crucial to look to speedy resettlement and ensure good governance” he explains.
An essential feature of COIN (counterinsurgency) strategy is ensuring a viable political system is erected after military operations. If there is a political vacuum, insurgents almost always exploit loopholes and attack the system in numerous ways. That is why good governance cannot be stressed enough.
So far there have been minimal reprisal attacks by the Taliban. But that can change quickly.
“Blowback attacks are still possible. They should not be ruled out”, he points out quickly. “It is still too early to tell what shape they might take. But right now they are isolated and will take time to reorganise”.
“Blowback attacks are still possible. They should not be ruled out”, he points out quickly. “It is still too early to tell what shape they might take. But right now they are isolated and will take time to reorganise”.
It is always important to eye the bigger picture, especially when superpowers are playing in Afghanistan, he says. And this is a twilight period not just for the insurgents. The region is about to turn another leaf. The manner of the American departure from Afghanistan will tell a lot.
“The fate of the BSA (Bilateral Security Agreement) will be the deciding factor. If there is no deal by October, then surely the Americans will leave lock, stock and barrel. The NATO conference due in September in Brussels will also debate this point”, he says.
But no matter how much the west shuffles its options, the decision rests with Kabul. And if Karzai and his lobby are to retain influence in the new government, then the deal is as good as dead. Like Iraq, if there is no BSA, the Americans will not be able to sustain their presence any longer.
“They will have to leave, which means they will again depend on Pakistan to be the principal player” (like the old days), he adds. “But till then, we must wait and see”.
There is much more a journalist obsessed with al Qaeda wars wants to ask Hamid Gul. I want to ask more about the CIA and Saudi connection of the Soviet jihad; how Bandar bin Sultan facilitated the deal where Riyadh matched the US war chest dollar-for-dollar, how Israeli weapons contribute to a Muslim holy war, who killed Gen Zia, etc. I also want to debate how the Arabs corrupted our war model and used it for political and sectarian gains, destroying the Middle East in the process. And how the Deep State takes the lead in the most sensitive decisions. But the present, Zarb-e-Azb, the TTP, and home grown militancy take precedence. So all that another time.
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