Interview: Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri
Diplomacy is a protocol conscious world
Whatever one’s views about the Musharraf era, Pakistan was quite the rage in those times, especially in the international press. There was 9/11, the war against terrorism and everything it entailed, the ‘major non-nato ally’ level interaction with Washington and Brussels, and an expanding economy that always kept the country high on investors’ minds. And for the most part Khurshid Kasuri was the face of that turnaround.
I meet him at the Beaconhouse office. He is obviously very well read. The entire bookshelf – running all the way behind his writing desk and on the side-wall – is stuffed. The table, too, boasts a good two dozen books, piled on top of each other – everything from fact to fiction, Afghanistan to the Middle East, and more. What’s more, these days he keeps busy writing one of his own. It will be out soon apparently, and much of what he has to say will be in it. But here are still some things he’s ok talking to the press about.
‘It’s a pity’
This is an interesting time to talk to a former foreign minister, especially on as proactive as Kasuri sb in his day. We are, after all, one year into the present government yet still without a proper foreign minister. No disrespect to Sartaj Aziz’s age or Tariq Fatemi’s credentials, but is it really possible for the prime minister to retain the foreign ministry portfolio indefinitely?
“It’s a pity, really”, he says, clearly trying not to be overly critical. “And it’s unfortunate because the foreign office needs to take cue from its leader, and the prime minister simply does not have the time for it”.
A hands-on foreign minister makes all the difference, he believes, because the chain of command is then clearly defined. And in a situation where the ministry’s top decision-maker – in present day Pakistan, the prime minister – can attend to it only part-time, that chain is compromised, which causes needless inefficiency. But it is not easily understandable why Nawaz avoids a full-time foreign minister, especially since this is his third term as PM. Does he really intend to keep this arrangement permanently?
“It might be because Nawaz feels such positions give people prominence, and he is not willing to trust others with such high position just yet”, he thinks.
“The world of diplomacy is very protocol conscious”, he adds. “It not only involves being up to date, but also requires a lot of travelling and interaction with counterparts. This is crucial for the foreign minister to have visibility in the international world”.
And a part time minister simply cannot do justice to the many requirements of the position.
A hands-on foreign minister makes all the difference, he believes, because the chain of command is then clearly defined. And in a situation where the ministry’s top decision-maker – in present day Pakistan, the prime minister – can attend to it only part-time, that chain is compromised, which causes needless inefficiency.
‘To-ing and fro-ing’
Nowhere was the foreign minister’s centrality to important government initiatives more obvious than the progress made with India. Few expected Gen Musharraf’s administration – headed by a former army commando – to initiate a historic thaw with New Delhi. Yet Pakistan’s diplomacy effectively put the Indians on the back foot, where not responding to Islamabad’s initiatives became increasingly embarrassing for New Delhi. The efforts of those days won the Pakistani government, especially the foreign minister, valuable points in the international press.
“The most important part of the peace process with India was the back channel, especially on Kashmir”, he remembers.
The details will come in his book, but he gives an interesting preview of the complicated process that finally broke the ice. It involved lots of drafts and proposals, and counter-proposals. Indian demands would be debated at length, first between himself and Foreign Secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan, then among a wider circle involving President Musharraf (assisted by his Chief of Staff Gen Hamid Javed), ISI head Gen Kayani, and Vice Chief of Staff Gen Hayat.
After lengthy deliberations, and a lot of “to-ing and fro-ing”, drafts were then sent, via Tariq Aziz, Gen Musharraf’s closest aide, to the Indian side, and the process would be repeated endlessly.
And, of course, this process required a very active foreign minister, the main interlocutor. Needless to say, such progress would not have been possible with a headless ministry.
“It would be fair to say that we had approximately 80-85 per cent details settled on most outstanding issues, even Kashmir”, he adds. “Sir Creek was practically a signature away. There was considerable progress on Siachen, and a very prominent Indian confided in me that our roadmap was ‘doable’”.
Cracking Kashmir
Kashmir, along with most Pak-India problems, has been caught in a logjam for so long that claims of progress, from either side, are never taken without the proverbial pinch of salt. So what did Musharraf, and his foreign minister, do that raised hopes of cracking the status quo?
“First of all, it is important to understand that any solution to Kashmir must first be acceptable to Kashmiris”, he points out, implying that previous approaches never took off primarily because they revolved around Pakistani and Indian interests, not Kashmir’s.
So, to start, the Pakistani government investigated all strands of opinion coming from Kashmir. Hurriyat leaders began visiting Islamabad far more frequently, and more meetings were arranged at other places, till a broad outline was established.
One, Kashmiris were tired of Indian army presence in urban centres. Long years of occupation had scared the people, and many had developed psychological problems. Two, far from expecting a just end to their suffering, Kashmiris feared being reduced far below their special status agreed between Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Nehru. And three, since the Pakistani government took the initiative, it was important to keep local political opposition from unravelling the progress, especially if there was success on the external front.
“Hence the joint mechanism was reached, which meant India, Pakistan, and Kashmir would jointly look after specified matters”, he says. “This was a landmark achievement, we made more progress on Kashmir in those few years than 60 years of our history”.
If only Manmohan Singh had honoured his commitment to visit Pakistan in Aug-Sep 2006, he says, “we would have clinched a deal on Sir Creek”. But he delayed at the last moment, citing elections in UP states, and how the opposition in India might exploit his visit for political gains.
Kashmir, along with most Pak-India problems, has been caught in a logjam for so long that claims of progress, from either side, are never taken without the proverbial pinch of salt. So what did Musharraf, and his foreign minister, do that raised hopes of cracking the status quo?
Pakistan invited him again in March the following year, but by then the lawyer movement had erupted, and the government’s attention turned inward. Then there was hardly any opportunity of reaching out till the government changed in the ’08 election.
“But we made unprecedented progress”, he points out. “Whenever these countries talk again, they will begin where we left off. Previously neither side knew the other’s limit. But we explored each other’s flexibility thoroughly, and now both countries are better placed to pursue peace”.
And the Middle East?
Much has changed in the Arab world, and its immediate surroundings, since his time as Pakistan’s foreign minister. Saudi Arabia and Iran are locked in an existential proxy war which has taken sectarian connotations, not to mention hundreds of thousands of lives in the past few years.
“Pakistan has always been very close to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey”, he says of the three principal countries in the worsening Middle East situation. “But their own internal dynamics can create dangerous situations”.
He speaks of Iran’s historic rivalry with the Turks, going back to Byzantine, Ottoman and Persian empires. Saudi and Iran are at daggers drawn, with a very disturbing sectarian dimension that threatens the stability of the entire region, and beyond.
“During my interaction with all these countries I was very clear”, he remembers. “Pakistan is always willing to lend a hand, especially in terms of bringing its fiends closer. But we will never allow a situation that threatens our own inner peace. That is our red line. We simply cannot facilitate much if it means sectarian strife inside Pakistan”.
Pakistan has already paid heavily by indulging in matters that did not concern us. And now, with sectarianism and terrorism plaguing Pakistan, our friends must understand our limitations. And considering the ramifications for our internal security, Pakistan is unfortunately not in a position to go beyond a certain point in its efforts to diffuse tensions between Muslim countries opposed to each other.
“I cautioned the Americans very seriously against bombing Iran back in the day”, he says. “I told them such an adventure would have grave consequences inside Pakistan, and other Muslim counties”. His opposition to US designs was later revealed when the WikiLeaks scandal broke, implying he played more than a minor role in keeping the Americans from entertaining thoughts of expanding their war of terror into Iran.
Around this time I realise I’ve taken up too much of the former minister’s time. It’s the final stretch of Ramazan, and the fast is taking its toll on him. He continues to follow national, and international, developments very carefully. And though for now he’s committed to his book, he remains vague about his plans ahead. He likes to talk just about foreign policy for now, perhaps saving the rest for his book. He remains a valued member of PTI, but that is all he offers for now.
I wanted to ask more, about internal government debates in those last months when opposition pressures were increasing, the election was drawing near, and it became difficult and then impossible to translate external gains into tangible returns. But that another time.
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