More problems from Afghanistan

And more unsavoury solutions

The Pakistani prime minister flying an emissary to Kabul, to diffuse Afghan plans of some sort of cross-border “action”, must be a first in the many twists and turns of Pak-Afghan history. That is why Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party leader Mehmood Khan Achakzai’s revelation that Nawaz Sharif sent him to Hamid Karzai to do exactly that has raised some concerns, not just in Islamabad. There was also chatter in the capital that the Afghans have not responded to Zarb-e-Azb as their formal international position would imply. After insisting for years that Pakistan take action against militants, especially in North Waziristan, Karzai’s administration has refused to help its Pakistani counterpart by not only allowing TTP hordes to enter Afghanistan, but also by not cracking down on Mullah Fazlullah and company seeking refuge in their country. There was even intelligence, it was reported, of a possible Afghan incursion in the Bajaur area.

Karzai’s hatred for Pakistan has won him many political points, especially over the last year. It goes back to his refugee days in Quetta. Back then, despite being accommodated by Pakistan, he accused the ISI of having his father killed. Years later, as Afghan president, he went out of his way to accuse Pakistan of practically every problem facing Afghanistan. Last summer he even managed to win Taliban sympathy, however briefly, by presenting the ISI as Afghanistan biggest enemy, a sentiment he was able to have echoed in the Afghan parliament. Under him, Afghan intelligence has created a wide web of intel and espionage agents throughout Pakistan, leveraging the same ethnic and language cards that Pakistan used to advance its strategic depth doctrine through intelligence operatives for years. It has also become clear, over the years, that elements in his security structure actively aid and arm Pakistan’s insurgency, complicating our own fight against terrorism.

Nawaz’s response, though, has left a little to be desired. Shuttling a peace envoy, secretly, was hardly the right approach. Already Pakistan has been unable to express its frustrations with Afghanistan effectively, especially since the onset of the NW operation. The slightest help from Kabul would have made the operation a lot more potent. Those fleeing to Afghanistan should have been caught, and those operating from there returned to Pakistan. But Karzai’s plans are very different and it can only be hoped that his successor will be more prudent. Pakistan, meantime, should take a more front-foot approach with signs of trouble from Afghanistan. At stake is the very survival of the state. If militants are able to regroup and return, especially with Afghan help, problems will multiply for both countries. It’s best to let Kabul know as much, and not from a position of weakness.