Was the government caught with its pants down?
The present army leadership took a courageous step by initiating the operation in NWA which former chief Gen Kayani had delayed too long for reasons known only to him. The government is trying to cope with the nearly 900,000 IDPs that have sought shelter in a number of districts in KP.
There are meanwhile questions regarding the handling of the IDPs that remain unanswered. For instance, did the army have any plan for safe and hassle free evacuation of the IDPs?
The army had conducted a number of operations and dealt with over 20 population displacements. One had expected in view of its vast experience that it would have prepared an immaculate plan for the evacuation of the affected population. Hadn’t the ISPR assured on the day the operation was launched that “announcements will be made for local population to approach designated areas for their orderly and dignified evacuation out of the Agency”? Further that “necessary logistics and administrative arrangements for IDPs have been made by Political Administration and Disaster Management Agency”. On the second day of the operation the ISPR again announced that “an orderly and dignified evacuation of civil population out of agency ‘is being ensured.’
Military operations are prepared months ahead of their execution. The wording ‘is being ensured’ instead of ‘has been ensured’ indicates the arrangement for orderly and dignified evacuation was not put in place before launching of the operation. Why was the procedure of evacuation not settled at the planning stage?
At the end of the three day long shoot-at-sight curfew, the entire non-combatant population left their towns and villages in panic for fear of starvation. Some could not even take their belongings with them. Those who could afford private transport had to pay extraordinarily high fares. Those who couldn’t, had to walk for 60 plus kilometres on foot.
The situation in NWA had sufficiently deteriorated in May and there were enough straws in the wind to show that an operation was imminent. The month started with the killing of a prominent pro-government tribal chief followed by the death of eight security personnel in an IED blast.
The scene was aptly summed up in a newspaper report. “People on foot, women and children in tow, dragging their cattle and those riding motorbikes carrying luggage on their back, all trying to get out and arrange a vehicle to take out their families still stuck there. Thousands stranded on Bannu road.”
The evacuation was therefore neither orderly nor dignified. It was in fact chaotic and highly painful for the IDPs. Did the government have a plan to deal with the after effects of the operation? Was there coordination between the federal government and KP government? Was there coordination between civilian government and the army in dealing with the IDPs?
The situation in NWA had sufficiently deteriorated in May and there were enough straws in the wind to show that an operation was imminent. The month started with the killing of a prominent pro-government tribal chief followed by the death of eight security personnel in an IED blast. Jet fighters and helicopter gunships had pounded several suspected positions in Miramshah, Mirali and Datakhel, killing about 80 suspected terrorists. The COAS visited field formations in the agency at the end of the month. Events in May and early June clearly indicated that the operation was imminent.
The government however remained wedded to the idea of peace through talks. The budget presented weeks before the start of the operation contained no allocations for the IDPs. This showed a total lack of foresight.
The government was caught pants down when the operation began. It thought there were around 400,000 people living in the agency. They turned out to be 900,000.
The way people were evacuated and the mismanagement at the distribution points showed lack of coordination between the law enforcement and disaster management authorities. The shoddy arrangements at the hastily set up IDP camps speak volumes about the government’s indifference.
Food distribution process was extremely slow. People came early in the morning and stood in queue for the whole day. With temperatures sometimes touching 47 degrees in the last week of June many displaced persons had to wait in sizzling heat since early morning for their turn to get food. The treatment was humiliating. The mismanagement at the distribution centres at one point led to violent protests by the IDPs. Why couldn’t the government set up several food distribution points? The arrangements seemed to have been made in haste without caring for their adequacy.
Delay in the registration of IDPs in Peshawar also led to protests. After an incident in which IDPS and FDMA staff scuffled, authorities banned the entry of media to the centre.
The cash distribution showed absence of a well thought out plan. After the initial cash disbursement which was done manually, the process of disbursement through Subscriber Identity Modules (SIMs) was launched. Soon this too hit snags. By Tuesday only 1,100 of 45,000 families had received the cash grant.
As a newspaper report pointed out, “To the displaced that were forced to leave their homes, this first appeared as indifference and then ‘a deliberate attempt to strip us of our dignity’… The provinces’ reluctance to welcome the displaced indicated they were not prepared to give the same status to people from Fata that a common Pakistani enjoys.”
To keep the militants permanently out of NWA, there is a need to win the hearts and minds of the IDPs. Is the way the IDPs have been treated really conducive to achieving the aim?
But is there a satisfactory coordination with the army? The way IDPs were evacuated as well as the mismanagement at the distribution points clearly indicated a lack of coordination between law enforcement and disaster management authorities. The lack of preparedness on the part of the FDMA has led it to relegate its functions to the security forces and restrict itself to file work and here too making blunders.
As if this was not enough all this time the PMLN leadership remained engrossed in countering the moves of the PAT and PTI. Imran Khan meanwhile paid no attention to anything other than the march on Islamabad.
There are other questions that need to be answered.
To keep the militants permanently out of NWA, there is a need to win the hearts and minds of the IDPs. Is the way the IDPs have been treated really conducive to achieving the aim? Will the IDPs, who had become refugees in their own country, forget the type of treatment they received in Bannu, DIK or Lakki Marwat or the way the various provinces shut their doors on them?
For three weeks the media was disallowed access to NWA and the camps. Even later the media was taken there on short and conducted tours. Why was it necessary to adhere to a policy of non-transparency?
Again, does the PMLN government visualise any timeframe for rebuilding human habitations destroyed in the operation? Where are the funds for reconstruction to come from? It took a few months to resettle the Swatis displaced by the military operation in 2008. How long will a similar exercise take place in the case of North Waziristan IDPS?
There are opponents to the operation in the right wing parties and media. They are all waiting for an opportunity to come out with, ‘Didn’t we say…”
