Contrary views about the scope of Zarb-e-Azb
After years of sustained western pressure, the Pakistan army finally launched an offensive in the tribal agency that has long been considered as the jugular of militant groups operating in Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan as well.
Mixed reviews
However, reports of/about the operation are mixed. According to the army’s media wing, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), over 400 militants, mostly foreign fighters including Uzbeks and Chechens have been killed in air raids by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). But by other accounts, mostly civilians have perished in the raids, for the militants long made good their escape.
Ali, a civilian who along with his family escaped from the bombardment in NWA to the town of Bannu says: “We don’t know who is being bombed, most of the militants left at least a month ago”.
This sort of discrepancy is expected. Pakistan’s tribal belt is a hard, dusty and mountainous region from where newsgathering is an arduous task at best. And with a porous and generally unmanned border with Afghanistan, into regions hardly in Kabul’s control, the idea that militants may have escaped into either Paktika or Khost holds credence.
Sami Yousafzai, Newsweek’s correspondent for Afghanistan and Pakistan, knows this problem all too well.
The operation’s announcement, by the army’s media wing, was broadly vague: the operation is targeting foreign and local militants who are hiding in sanctuaries in NWA. (The Army) has been tasked to eliminate these terrorists regardless of hue and color, along with their sanctuaries.
“Even under normal circumstances, credible news gathering is very difficult, due to the pressures of the military, the militants and even the political agent, you can imagine how difficult it must be in times of war”, he said.
He gives an example of US drone strikes in the region: “There have been over 200 drone strikes, but no journalists are ever allowed to even come near the sites, even local journalists who sometimes live not 500 meters away from the target are allowed”.
According to Yousafzai, it’s simply a matter of protecting one’s interest: “Each side in the conflict is cognizant of how the media is reporting. If a journalist puts something out, he gets an immediate response, either from the army or from the militants or sometimes the government – over time, they’ve learnt to keep quiet”.
The unknown enemy?
Yet, doubts remain as to who the Pakistani army is actually engaging in this military operation. The operation’s announcement, by the army’s media wing, was broadly vague: the operation is targeting foreign and local militants who are hiding in sanctuaries in NWA. (The Army) has been tasked to eliminate these terrorists regardless of hue and color, along with their sanctuaries.
As per Yousafzai, “The whole situation is rather murky: no details have been provided of the alleged militants killed in the air raids, nor their affiliations with one group or another”.
And according to Bill Roggio, from ‘The Long War Journal’, “It is unlikely that the so-called good Taliban groups such as the Haqqani Network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group will be targeted in the operation”.
Sami Yousafzai takes this further: “The Haqqanis have been weakened severely by US drone strikes that took out most of their leadership, but reports suggest that the Haqqanis and Hafiz Gul Bahadur are not part of the on-going operation and have moved west across the border into their native area of Khost, Afghanistan or towards Kurram Agency.
Yet, on the 19th of June, Hafiz Gul Bahadur’s spokesman released a statement that: ‘‘From today (19th June), we are launching a war against security forces… The military violated the peace accord and waged war against us and now we have no choice but to fight against them”.
In the eyes of Sami Yousafzai, “This is mere posturing, just for public consumption”.
What about Afghanistan?
Allegedly, both the Haqqani network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur have been part of Pakistan’s doctrine of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, but if one is to believe the foreign ministry, this may be changing. Speaking at a meeting of the standing committee of foreign affairs, the prime minister’s advisor on foreign affairs, Sartaj Aziz said, “There is no distinction between good and bad Taliban and the military operation was being conducted across the board”.
Allegedly, both the Haqqani network and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur have been part of Pakistan’s doctrine of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan, but if one is to believe the foreign ministry, this may be changing.
While Yousafzai calls it “merely a statement”, Major General Mahmud Ali Durrani, former national security advisor and a former ambassador to the United States, feels that “Pakistan has always been dragging its feet on tackling all forms of terrorists. Although the Haqqani network is part of the Afghan Taliban and historically has not attacked the state, we have no options left. But with such a porous unmanned border, they could easily slip away”.
Both Yousafzai and General Durrani point across the border to Afghanistan as a vital part of Pakistan’s strategy against terrorists. Yousafzai believes that “Afghanistan is still undecided, and perhaps Pakistan is hedging its bets”.
What Yousafzai is pointing towards is the make up of the next afghan government. He believes that “if a non-Pashtun government is formed in Kabul, Pashtuns will be marginalised and this will work in the Taliban’s favour, it will be a perfect for recruitment and for bringing them all together”.
From Pakistan’s perspective, he feels that “The Taliban have always been an ideological movement, but depending on which way the government swings in Kabul, there is the possibility that the Taliban will morph into a cross-border nationalist movement, bringing the Afghan and Pakistan factions into one”.
But General Durrani is not entirely sold. While agreeing that “Pashtun nationalism is a real fear, I’ve been telling the Americans this for a long time”, but while all Taliban are Pashtuns, not all Pashtuns are Taliban. This, the general feels, will be the deciding point in the failure of the re-emergence of Pashtun nationalism, and that the government of Pakistan must take immediate and drastic steps to “convince the tribals that we are here to stay and that they will not be left to the mercy of the Taliban”.