Are they really on the same page?
Operation Zarb-e-Azb came as a surprise, even though, in hindsight, all signs were in place. The Karachi airport attack had, in effect, rendered the talks useless. It was claimed by TTP proper, not some mysterious breakaway group that did not agree with negotiations. This was for Hakimullah, they proudly claimed, promising hundreds more attacks, yet leaving the options for talks still open. And even if the interior minister, missing since then, still avoided directly blaming the Taliban, the army, apparently, had no two views about it. It was just not possible for Islamabad to return to negotiations with Fazlullah’s TTP. Not after the Karachi insult.
But whether nor not the prime minister, and his close circle, also reached the same conclusion as the airport attack went down remains open for debate. And there is reason to believe that however much observers expected the military operation, the timing still caught the prime minister off guard, and his sudden “same page” solidarity is just a political turnaround to avoid getting egg on its face. Rumours doing rounds in the capital speak of a high level meeting late last week, when the military high command finally put its foot down, and informed the civilian leadership about initiating the operation over the weekend.
And it is believed that the interior minister, the driving force behind the PM’s previous about turn and sudden liking for talks, expressed some reservations. Not mentioning the Taliban among “internal and external elements” that Ch Nisar held responsible for Karachi was deliberate and calculated. He still wished, apparently, to persist with the dialogue. And the resulting exchange with the brass, some say, left the minister nursing a mild heart condition; hence his sudden disappearance from the scene. This is not to discount, of course, the other story drowning in all the noise in Islamabad. That Nawaz is simply unimpressed with the outcome of Nisar’s doctrine, and is looking to keep a different mind frame around him as the war enters a different phase.
Element of surprise
Nevertheless, with political parties and the military now firmly committed to the operation, with only the odd centre-right party still expressing reservations, expectations of a clean sweep are high. The army has been ready since mid-winter, when the PM first hinted about the military option, so it has had plenty of time to complete and revise its homework. Yet all the time the talks lingered meaninglessly also carried a geographic and logistic spillover. And a number of elements have converged that, according to some, limit Pakistan’s options and increase its problems.
The forewarning policy – announcing an attack to allow civilian migration – was debated at length during Gen Pasha’s time, but ruled out in favour of surprise for this operation.
“If there had to be an operation, it would have been better to strike in the winter”, said Gen (r) Hamid Gul, former ISI chief, president of the ex servicemen society, and part of the conservative Difa-e-Pakistan council. “The snow would have prevented militants from leaving the agency”.
Not only would it have ruled out the usual sanctuary in Afghanistan, it would also have limited movement towards urban centres. Now, both are a concern. A large number of terrorists are feared moving down to settled areas to bolster sleeper cells. And the Afghan government has predictably not helped check cross-border movement despite repeated requests from Islamabad.
And militants have been on the move since before Zarb-e-Azb. By being tough about striking back, Gen Raheel telegraphed his approach. Hardliners knew what to expect following Karachi, especially after the previous week’s sorties that left scores dead, and hordes evacuated from the badlands. There is also the question of IDPs (internally displaced persons). The South Waziristan operation of ’09 came with a clear refugee problem, and considering the government’s unpreparedness again, it seems few lessons were learnt.
And this is where the surprise element of the attack has come into question. The forewarning policy – announcing an attack to allow civilian migration – was debated at length during Gen Pasha’s time, but ruled out in favour of surprise for this operation. Militants had already gained precious time because of the talks, and many had ex-filtrated. But the military aspect being one thing, the PTI is still furious that the provincial government was not given time to prepare for the fallout.
“We were kept completely in the dark, which is ridiculous”, said Ejaz Ch, PTI’s Punjab president. “Now there are close to a hundred thousand refugees with no water and no shelter form the terrible heat (especially bothersome because these people come from much colder areas). What is more, busses that usually charged Rs7000 per trip are now charging five times as much. It’s completely out of control”.
The PTI did not agree that its government should still have made contingency plans considering there is a war going on and it could not have been given much time to prepare in the best of times. But the people of NW are clearly suffering, which compounds the government’s problems, since their hearts and minds are the most important to win.
“Local people are unhappy about a few things”, said Mansur Khan Mehsud, executive director at the fata research centre, and Islamabad based think tank that focuses on the insurgency.
“The operation, bombardment, curfew and closed roads have made things very difficult for people trying to leave. And they will face many more problems once they are able to leave the agency. The camps are inadequate, and most will head for cities”.
In ’09, when a few hundred thousand fled SW, they refused the IDP camps; they were poorly set up and the Pashtuns have a distaste for refugee living, and instead relied on clan shelter in cities like Bannu, Peshawar and DI Khan. In the process they put unbearable pressure on the cities’ limited resources. Now the problem is set to worsen, with a few more hundred thousand headed their way.
Going forward
The operation is clearly targeted, aimed at the core TTP structure, foreign militants (mainly Uzbek), and their ammo dumps and training facilities littered across the agency. Previously favoured groups, like the Haqqani network and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, are not being targeted, once again triggering the old good vs bad Taliban debate in the foreign press. Incidentally, failure to understand this peculiarity, according to analysts, was the main reason for the talks to fail.
“The talks were very badly handled”, said Gen Gul. “They did not consult with the military, and did not grab the initiative when a split emerged between the Mehsuds. Half the battle should have been won there, but the government kept talking to the wrong people. These talks were insincere”.
The good Taliban are considered agency assets not only because they did not extend the TTP’s war on Pakistan’s army, but also because they helped control terrorist excesses. Mullah Nazir in South Waziristan was instrumental in pushing out Uzbek militants and guaranteeing years of peace in his area, Molvi Faqir brought fighting to an end in Bajaur, the original birthplace of the TTP, and the Haqqanis and Gul Bahadur helped ease the TTP’s genocide against Parachinar’s shi’a in Kurram agency. Also, provoking such players into the war against the state, especially at this time, would have amounted to suicidal war policy.
Instead, people like Gen Gul believe, these forces should have been mobilised during the talks also. They would have helped identify pro-peace elements and isolate troublemakers. But that’s not the only aspect of the talks that didn’t go down well.
“The composition of the teams was unbelievable”, said Ejaz Ch. “Not only was the government’s side non-representative, but the Taliban’s team had no one from the TTP. How could the government appoint a team to talk on the TTP’s behalf? It was a joke”.
The good Taliban are considered agency assets not only because they did not extend the TTP’s war on Pakistan’s army, but also because they helped control terrorist excesses.
But, all things considered, the operation had become unavoidable, and surprise was important. Not only was the internal situation no longer sustainable but the international picture was also about to change. And time was running out.
The American withdrawal from Afghanistan will undoubtedly create a security vacuum on the Durand Line. And securing the agency was essential, which meant any operation had no later than pre-Ramzan to start at the latest. The border threat will remain elevated even if the Americans stay, of course.
“If the new Afghan government signs the BSA, which is doubtful, then we have had it”, added Gen Gul. “They are setting up India as the region’s proxy, and Modi’s foreign policy, especially its anti-Pakistan agenda, is perfectly suited for this purpose”.
But does that mean that the operation is limited to securing NW and controlling the border? Or is it really a fight to the last terrorist, which will mean extending it to the rest of the country?
COIN officials, on condition of anonymity, hint at a broader, very different sort of operation for settled areas. While the military will smash terrorist safe havens in the tribal area, depriving TTP of its nest, the cities will feature more “intel-intensive” operations. This means locating and monitoring sleeper cells, following their communications, and liaising with local law enforcement agencies for the “cleansing process”.
“There may be limited search operations in big cities, but the military sweep will remain limited to NW”, added frc’s Mehsud. “Also, most Punjabi Taliban leaders are also in fata, so the military will probably focus there”.
The coming days will show, among other things, how far the Taliban’s claims of savage reprisal attacks were true, and how prepared the government and its security agencies are for possible blowback. The highest threat level, according to security officials, is in Punjab, where the rural south has been brimming with Taliban agitation for years. So far the province’s PML-N government has displayed a sense of priorities that has baffled opposition and media circles. It’s handling of the Tahirul Qadri’ situation, especially employing police brutality for which Punjab police is notorious, betrayed an astonishing interpretation of the threats it faces. Clearly it was more unnerved by the prospect of Qadri’s sit-in than the TTP threatening ‘drowning the province in fire’.
The ruling party’s posture has not only alienated opposition parties, but also distanced the military, which could prove costly as the operation unfolds. That is another thing the immediate future will show; how much the military and civilian leadership are really on the same page.
