Interview: Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi
It wasn’t a big deal to time the military operation
One of the more interesting parts of journalism is information gathering; in order to process information it must first be acquired. That brings one across numerous shades of opinions, and sometimes some things stand out. For example, all through the talks with the Taliban and the follow up to Operation Zarb-e-Azb, there were different sorts of predictions. From ruling out the military option to a strike any day, pretty much everything did the rounds. But Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi was always precise about the timing. He was sure it would come, and he was sure it would be before Ramzan, with or without the civilian government’s consent.
So when the operation did come, and that too just before Ramzan, we requested he let us pick his brains for the interview segment. He wasn’t surprised the operation had started, of course, but he was quite surprised that nobody read the timing as easily as he could.
“It’s simple reasoning”, he says. “Just take emotions and political affiliations out of the equation and it becomes clear. The operation had to begin before Ramzan. Otherwise the army would have lost five precious weeks, which would have been very costly. Now the major offensive will last a few weeks, then you will see small, more restricted, activity”.
Internal security breakdown was one thing, but a major deciding factor, according to him, must have been the American drawdown due later this year. If not addressed in time, it will result in a security nightmare on the border.
“Of course the US drawdown is the decisive factor”, he stresses. “It has changed the military’s position altogether. Go back two years and the army was resisting an operation in the same agency”.
It is important to know the difference between counter terrorism and counter insurgency (COIN), he quickly adds. “This one’s about counter insurgency, which must come first. This will result in control of the area and deprive militants of their main base of operations.
But this time around, they have been clear, especially since Gen Raheel took over. They have, in fact, been pressing for a military sweep since the winter, when a strike would have been more advantageous, he says, but were held back because of resistance from the civilian government.
Throughout those days, whenever I approached Dr Rizvi for comments, he would repeat that the operation would come, and if the civilians did not agree, they will simply be made to agree.
So, breaking it down, is that what really happened? Was the PM forced into it?
“The decision was definitely led by the military”, he explains, and “after Karachi there was no choice left really. The talks lobby had clearly lost the initiative, and the civilian leadership simply had to go along”.
Gauging success
It is important to understand the nature of this offensive, he says. The army chief’s claim that this war will be fought till the last terrorist is removed is technically correct, but the present operation in North Waziristan has very clear objectives.
“This is indeed meant to secure North Waziristan and the border, which is extremely important”, he adds. “It is, without doubt, the epicentre of terrorism in Pakistan, besides being a launching pad for foreign militants. It would have been much harder to take after 2014, when the influence of both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban will be on the rise”.
It is important to know the difference between counter terrorism and counter insurgency (COIN), he quickly adds. “This one’s about counter insurgency, which must come first. This will result in control of the area and deprive militants of their main base of operations”.
The problem is that everybody is against terror, there is a clear understanding to that point, but there is little agreement about dealing with terrorism”, he points out.
Once the “epicentre” of terrorism is controlled, the operation can be expanded into different parts of the country, involving different strategies and tactics. “Additionally, a quick and authoritative assault in North Waziristan will not only demoralise the enemy, but also score an important psychological victory for the state”, he rightly says.
The narrative
Slightly drifting from the topic, I ask him how it could be that it is easier to sell the narrative that polio drops cause impotency in males and help drone strikes track targets than the argument that they are an essential preventive medicine for all children. When and how did we become a country where such things happen? Wasn’t their (Taliban) outreach and ability to leverage technology becoming apparent by the time of Swat’s Mulla FM days? What has the state done to counter it, what can it do, and what should it do?
He accepts that the state has completely failed in building a national narrative. Part of the reason is complete confusion in ruling circles. There are different opinions everywhere. Even the ruling party, and at times parts of the military, is divided.
“The problem is that everybody is against terror, there is a clear understanding to that point, but there is little agreement about dealing with terrorism”, he points out.
And decision is indeed split. Even after the Karachi incident, according to reports, not only was the government still reluctant about the operation, but the other main pro-talks party, the PTI, also wanted to persist with negotiations. Even the fact that the Fazlullah group accepted responsibility for the airport attack split opinion instead of uniting all political forces.
Building a national narrative, though extremely important, is easier said than done in such times. And it does not help, of course, that the military and the government have been at odds through most of this government’s first year in office, especially with regard to the insurgency.
The overall COIN policy has been one largely of confusion, according to him. Even the good and bad Taliban approach is an extension of that confusion. And this confusion has played into the hands of all groups of terrorists.
He does not believe that this terrorism is of the variety where we can still afford to take a liking to some groups and reject others. The threat confronting us is terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. And both the government, and the military, must be clear about short as well as long term objectives.
Zarb-e-Azb is a good start. It has set clear targets, and brought everyone on the same page. And public response is excellent. Now this success must be built on, step by step, to mark the beginning of a long process that, if successful, will see Pakistan coming out strongly from its present stage of internal destruction. But what direction the country itself seems taking, in the long term, is a different story, he says, so all that another time.
