The first is the expulsion of the terrorists from North Waziristan
Air strikes are the first phase of the war against TTP and are likely to entail no casualties on the part of the military. The shock and awe effect has already stunned local and foreign militants. Their leadership has been dispersed and lost contacts with one another and with the lower ranks.
The real fight will begin with the troops entering in force in a few days. The terrain will pose difficulties. So will an alienated population as people have lost relatives and friends and have been deprived of the means of livelihood. The tribesmen could be less than cooperative and in cases hostile. The militants would take recourse to IEDs and landmines and launch surprise hit and run attacks. The graph of the casualties in the army will start rising.
Despite all these ups and downs, the army will finally prevail on account of its training, better weapons and air support. Compared to the next three stages the physical occupation of NWA would be the easiest.
The next fight will take place in urban centers of the country. The terrorists here would have the advantage of invisibility. Acting from the shadows they will try to destroy major installations and target law enforcement personnel. As soon as the TTP high command is out of shock and is able to renew contacts with its functionaries in the interior of the country, it will take the battle to areas which constitute the state’s Achilles heel. The TTP would thus try to reverse the gains made by the army in NWA by attacks on urban nerve centers.
The interior minister, who was supposed to ensure an effective security system, failed to carry out the assignment. Being a man of a limited vision he had no understanding of the global terrorist threat and the connections of the TTP with Al Qaeda and other violent networks. Ch Nisar’s total stress was on talks with the militants. Every attack launched by the TTP was explained away by him as an effort by some dissident group to sabotage the peace talks. The TTP, according to him, was not against the state of Pakistan. The interior minister simply refused to entertain the possibility of a military operation against the militants.
Despite all these ups and downs, the army will finally prevail on account of its training, better weapons and air support. Compared to the next three stages the physical occupation of NWA would be the easiest.
What is likely to facilitate the terrorists is the interior ministry’s failure to evolve a security system ensuring coordination between the numerous intelligence agencies and their cooperation with law enforcing agencies. While Ch Nisar talked about setting up a National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) as a centerpiece in the national security strategy, the body was allowed to remain dormant. Among other things that stood in the way of activating NACTA was the dispute about its status. Ch Nisar wanted the organisation to be under his thumb, but other stakeholders desired it to be directly controlled by the prime minister.
The PML-N government remained committed to peace talks as a one point counter terrorism policy till the start of the ongoing operation. With a blind commitment to peace through parleys, the government did little to evolve a comprehensive security policy that it could rely upon in case military operation had to be undertaken. Security for the cities thus remains a soft spot.
The third milestone is the transfer of the population from NWA to the IDP’s camps, providing them with basic amenities and protection so that they realise that the state cares for them. That hundreds of families have already moved to Afghanistan to live with relatives indicates a lack of confidence in government agencies running the IDP’s camps. While in Afghanistan, many are likely to come under the influence of the Taliban, or affected by anti Pakistan propaganda launched by the Karzai government.
Media reports tell of thousands of IDPs facing difficulties in arranging private transport to reach Bannu soon after the curfew was lifted. Some reportedly had to walk all the way. The IDPs who had been confined to their homes for three days feared starvation and were keen to get out of the agency. Some couldn’t collect their belongings. This indicates a lack of concern on the part of the government, which does not promote patriotic sentiments.
Why couldn’t the IDPs from NWA be evacuated through transport provide by the government? Was it due to the usual lack of coordination between concerned government departments or due to sheer irresponsiveness?
In the final analysis, the success of the operation will depend on the loyalty of the local population, currently forced to turn into IDPs. Loyalty cannot be enforced through lectures or by taunts or threats. The common tribesmen consider what has befallen them as an undeserved misfortune. After all, the hordes of terrorists had not come to NWA on the invitation of the common people of the area. The IDPs need all the help to minimise the disruption they will face and the hardships they will suffer.
Media reports tell of thousands of IDPs facing difficulties in arranging private transport to reach Bannu soon after the curfew was lifted. Some reportedly had to walk all the way.
The fourth milestone is the formulation of a policy to ensure that militants expelled from the agency are not allowed to use Afghanistan as a base to launch attacks inside NWA or other parts of the country. Mullah Fazlullah and Omar Khorasani, who are currently enjoying Afghan hospitality, have launched some of the deadliest attacks inside the country. Kabul has provided them sanctuaries after demanding for years the expulsion of the militant networks which launched attacks on Afghan and coalition forces from North Waziristan.
Those still considered good Taliban by the administration include the Haqqani network, Mullah Nazir group, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, and Sajna. All these groups maintain that they are waging jihad in Afghanistan. Mullah Fazlullah and Omar Khorasani on the other hand claim they are conducting jihad in Pakistan. This seems to be a neat arrangement among the two types of jihadis. Once foreign troops are out of Afghanistan, there is a likelihood of both joining hands to form a version of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in tribal areas on both sides of the Durand line. They could call it Islamic State of Afghanistan and Pakistan (ISAP).
There is a dire need to put an end to cherry-picking among the militant groups. Equally important is to reach an understanding with the Afghan government over zero tolerance for those posing as religious militias. Unless this is done the two countries might soon face the fate of Syria and Iraq.
