The first aspect that is being widely emphasised is positive; the negative is being ignored
The split is a major setback to the TTP. With its largest single component seceding amid acrimony and a bloody infighting that took toll of nearly 70, the umbrella organisation has suffered a deadly blow. Khalid Mehsud, known earlier as Khan Said Sajna, is the new chief of Taliban in South Waziristan which supplies the bulk of TTP fighters. Another jihadi veteran Azam Tariq is the spokesman of the group
The split will definitely lead to reduction in terrorist attacks. Serious accusations levelled by the Khalid Mehsud group would tarnish the image of TTP in public eyes. Many people had believed that the attacks taking place under names never heard before like “Ahrarul Hind” which killed a judge and ten others in an Islamabad court and “Janudul Hafsa” which took responsibility for killing foreign trekkers were in fact conducted by TTP but had no solid evidence to prove it. The perception is now supported by Azam Tariq’s charge that the group used assumed names to continue terrorist activities while providing opportunity to its supporters to deny the militant network’s complicity.
The charge sheet against the TTP is extremely damaging. The new group has accused the TTP leadership of killing religious scholars, indulging in extortions and carrying out bombings at public places on payment of money “from outside”. The charges also include sectarian attacks, kidnappings, bombing of shrines and killing of Mashaikhs to try to impose its own creed and beliefs on others.
When parties split amid acrimony, demoralisation among the cadre is the normal outcome. In days to come, more components are likely to leave TTP. Besides theological differences, issues of a more mundane nature have also caused the infighting that has led to the split.
Khalid Mehsud was an aspirant for the leadership of TTP’s South Waziristan chapter, the most powerful section of the terrorist network, after the death of his patron Waliur Rehman. He was however ignored by Hakimullah Mehsud, which he resented. Again he was one of the claimants for leadership of the TTP after the death of Hakimullah but the office was given by the shura to Mullah Fazlullah, a non-Mehsud.
Khalid Mehsud was an aspirant for the leadership of TTP’s South Waziristan chapter, the most powerful section of the terrorist network, after the death of his patron Waliur Rehman. He was however ignored by Hakimullah Mehsud, which he resented. Again he was one of the claimants for leadership of the TTP after the death of Hakimullah but the office was given by the shura to Mullah Fazlullah, a non-Mehsud. The element of rivalry cannot therefore be ruled out in the split.
But the trickiest factor that causes concern and can create problems in days to come is that of the new group’s view about jihad. There have been two different views within the TTP leadership about the strategy to enforce Sharia in the region.
Khalid Mehsud was a trusted aide of Waliur Rehman who unlike Hakimullah Mehsud supported talks with Pakistan. Not that Waliur Rehman accepted the constitution or the institutions of the state like parliament and judiciary or wanted to be a part of mainstream politics. He was as much in support of the enforcement of sharia in Pakistan as any other leader in the militant network. His strategy however was different from that of Hakimullah. It required giving priority to jihad against the US in Afghanistan. Once the remaining American troops had been forced to leave the country, and Mullah Umar ensconced as the Leader of the Faithful, the stage would arrive of turning Pakistan, through violent means, into a primitive theocratic state practicing sharia.
Khalid Mehsud is known to have been the mastermind behind the attack on PNS Mehran in 2011, and Bannu Jailbreak in 2012 but later spent most of his time on the other side of the Durand Line. When Waliur Rehman died in a drone strike, Khalid Mehsud was fighting in Afghanistan. He naturally had close contacts with the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban leadership.
The ISI would have been naturally keen to use the differences between the two groups to cause a split and thus seek a reduction in attacks inside Pakistan. Did it alone manage to win over Khalid Mehsud’s group or help was extended by the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani group also?
Hakimullah’s sights on the other hand remained fixed on Pakistan rather than on Afghan jihad. To achieve his aims he was willing to seek help from other countries also. Mullah Fazlullah and Omar Khalid Khorasani, who shared the view, had already reached an understanding with the Karzai government which was keen to start a proxy war with the help of militant groups in Pakistan. Hakimullah Mehsud was also mulling to join hands with Karzai. He was in fact negotiating with the Afghan government through his confidant Latif Mehsud weeks before his death.
The ISI would have been naturally keen to use the differences between the two groups to cause a split and thus seek a reduction in attacks inside Pakistan. Did it alone manage to win over Khalid Mehsud’s group or help was extended by the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani group also?
Khalid Mehsud leads the largest and the fiercest militant group now in control of a big arsenal of modern and deadly weapons. Will the group withdraw support to TTP, lay down arms, hand over lethal weapons at the nearest levy or army checkpost and seek whatever opportunities are available to earn their livelihood? Does anybody have a plan to rehabilitate thousands of fighters?
Or will the militant group seek new pastures? Will the Mehsuds led by their new leader turn their attention to jihad in Afghanistan using Pakistan’s territory as a launching pad?
Is there someone who considers them yet another asset in the post US withdrawal Afghanistan?
