And yet more implications for Pakistan
Go back just a few years and it would have been impossible for an Afghan president to turn down a meeting with his American counterpart, even if it meant taking the Mazar Road some 45km north to Bagram, to entertain the latter on one of his unannounced, surprise visits. Surely, implying that Obama was welcome to visit the presidential palace in Kabul, but Bagram was out of the question, must be a first. Yet the rebuke has not been the only area where Kabul has frustrated Washington lately.
The reduced troops announcement, finally, is another. First, last year, Obama wanted Karzai to decide on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) quickly so the Pentagon could work out the logistics. Then he gave him till the end of the year, and then till the elections. And now he’s finally decided on his own – not very superpower-like of Washington. As for guarantees from the rivals in the runoff, remember Karzai too promised the BSA, then promised to abide by the jirga agreement, then said he’d think over it a little more, and eventually refused. All the better for Washington if his successor is game, but if he, too, pulls a Karzai, then there could be yet more egg on Obama’s face, and legacy.
There are more irregularities. For example, what will 9,800 troops one year and 4,900 the next do for counter terrorism and training purposes that a hundred thousand could not in the long years of the war? The Americans, most likely, are just as lost leaving as they have been staying, something the Pakistani military seems to have realised. This side of the Durand is, after all, where most violence and intrigue will focus after the drawdown. That is why the last North Waziristan sweep secured key hilltops connecting cross-border routes. This idea seems, quite smartly, to cut off as many escape routes along the border as possible, isolate militants fighting among themselves on the Pakistani side, spare whoever will lay down arms and ‘cleanse’ the rest.
The military seems to have come to a clear understanding about what it needs to do ahead of the American pullout. Having seen the limited affect of the talks, it is now more focused on employing the military approach – hammer and screw – pounding militant spaces before moving in to tighten its hold. But this approach, too, now needs APC-like consensus. The talks produced a temporary ceasefire, but failed to build anything remotely conclusive. The political hierarchy, too, now needs to come to his realisation, and there needs to be more clarity about symmetry between various political factions and the military. So far, there is confusion about the military and government being on the same page. And the unceasing right-of-centre politics of Imran Khan and the mullahs is leading to estrangement with the military at a very crucial time.
Since there is a common desired goal – peace – it behooves the leaders and the military to cross out approaches that have been tried and found wanting, and opt for solutions that are more likely to last, especially now since the enemy is weakened by infighting.
