An ironic soap opera coming full circle?
So we finally come to the final round of the talks that never really began. No surprise, really, since the TTP’s principal demand was, and is, “supremacy of (their) sharia” while the government was bound by the constitution, and never the twain could meet. N’s boys boast the 50-something day ceasefire as a major achievement, even if other groups, allegedly no longer aligned with the TTP, continued with high profile attacks. But the Taliban’s gains are more remarkable.
Remember Mian sb’s option for talks was something of a surprise, not the least because he himself had indicated military action in no uncertain terms? And, interestingly, since then the religious lobby has been paraded on primetime media, influencing the orthodox periphery, particularly the deobandi lobby. The Taliban have also gained precious time to regroup. They never believed the military was behind the talks, and said so throughout the sea-saw, so they probably didn’t ask their donors to suspend arms and monies while they gave talks a shot. And they have emerged as the figurehead of all things sharia and khilafat, which is a major achievement for an insurgent group at open war with the state, with 50,000-plus casualties to its credit. All religious organisations, including the Jamat, have given them their stamp of sharia approval, and even a growing section of the press seems to echo Molana Sami ul Haq’s understanding of the TTP, that they are “not at war with the state, but at war for the state”.
Yet for some reason, as important as the sharia factor remained throughout the negotiations, the TTP’s reading of it was never explored in any detail on popular media. They are, after all, a proven proxy of the NDS, Afghanistan’s security service, and there have been numerous charges, in the local and foreign press, of Indian and even American intelligence aiding their cause. The NDS link was first raised by the New York Times when it broke the story of Afghan intelligence cajoling Hakeemullah’s number-two Lateef Mehsud shortly before the former commander’s Nov1 assassination in a drone strike in North Waziristan. There were also reports, and pictures, of present TTP head Mulla Fazlullah’s second tier commanders being briefed by NDS officials in Kunar in a prominent Hong Kong based online newspaper. Yet within Pakistan nobody – government, military, and especially media – debated sharia credentials of cross-border sponsors.
What now?
The TTP’s most impressive gain in these talks, however, has been hoodwinking the government into releasing some of its personnel, that too without informing the military, deepening the civ-mil cleavage at a very crucial juncture for Islamabad. And as much as the army has been upset with the government, and, for all intents and purposes, is all set for a military sweep of North Waziristan over the coming months, there is still much confusion about what might follow, especially since the government continues to attach hopes with the talks, TTP spokesmen openly rubbish the government’s position, and both soldiers and civilians continue to die in attacks not claimed by the Taliban.
As important as the sharia factor remained throughout the negotiations, the TTP’s reading of it was never explored in any detail on popular media. They are, after all, a proven proxy of the NDS, Afghanistan’s security service, and there have been numerous charges, in the local and foreign press, of Indian and even American intelligence aiding their cause.
“I don’t think there is much practical sense in remaining committed to the talks anymore”, said Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi, a prominent defence analyst. “The government will raise the issue of the constitution, etc, in the next round, and if the Taliban still avoid a firm commitment, there is no option left but military action”.
The next few weeks are crucial, according to Dr Rizvi. The army will not give the talks anymore time because it needs to secure the tribal area before the Americans depart later this year. And considering any operation must be wound up by September at the latest, or snow will begin to set it, the only suitable time is the window before Ramadan, so something will happen in the next month or two.
But as talks have lingered another argument has gained strength, especially in Punjab. The sudden pullback from the strike, and the bending over backwards to reach a settlement, is also because the TTP’s expansion into urban centres, especially in southern Punjab, has raised the prospect of deadly reprisal attacks in big cities. And if the TTP has regrouped, military intelligence has also revised contingency plans to limit blowback.
“Swift action in Waziristan, which is the militants’ main hiding place, can limit urban blowback to a matter of 2-3 weeks”, added Dr Rizvi. “Jamat ud Dawa would never support attacks on the military, nor would Jaish e Mohammad in Punjab. The Jamat is belligerent on occasion, but differences are not so acute anymore. So the military definitely has leverage in the provinces.”
Too theoretical?
But are things really this straight forward? Granted, N clearly played APC unanimity to strengthen his core right wing constituency in the garb of peace talks. And precisely how the ruling party has conducted these talks is one of the biggest sources of friction between the government and the military. Secular parties, along with religious minorities who have been persecuted the worst during TTP’s sharia campaign, also do not share the government’s appetite for talks, and demand action. Yet it is still unclear what might be achieved.
“The either/or approach can be very misleading in such circumstances, and simply concluding that talks have failed so action must follow is too theoretical”, said Gen (r) Hameed Gul, former ISI chief and president of the Ex-Servicemen Society, the most credible pulse of retired officers, who invariably remain in contact with the present brass.
“This is an intricate war and the Taliban are very clever. There are clear divisions even within the Mehsuds, with the Sajna group advocating reaching an amicable settlement with the government. So there is still much to be squeezed from these talks”.
Also, Nawaz’s, and the TTP’s, sincerity notwithstanding, it was perhaps natural for the talks to be delayed. Just as much as the military needs to secure tribal agencies ahead of the American drawdown from Afghanistan, both the government and military intelligence need a clear indication of what will really follow across the border once the election result emerges, which complicates the timing.
At the heart of the problem is the establishment’s relationship with the mullah lobby. As far as history goes, Nawaz is himself as much a product of the military’s power machine as these religious militias gone rogue and masquerading soldier clerics fighting for the old caliphate.
And there are signs, Gen Gul belives, that the Americans might have finally had it with Afghanistan. The Indians arranging logistics with the Russians, and offering to bear the cost, is an indication that New Delhi might have been hinted to go its own from here to protect its arrangements with Kabul, especially its intelligence agencies.
Abdullah Abdullah seems in the lead, which might also change Pakistan’s calculus with Afghanistan, and open another avenue of cutting off support for the TTP from the outside.
Much irony
But whether or not the talks were delayed intentionally, they have failed to take any conclusive shape, and there might really not be much more time. And whether the government was cleverly playing for time by getting insurgents to cease fire, or the TTP has been cleverer and gained a window to recalibrate, there can be little denying that officially the government has come out weak, and needs to impress its authority on insurgents, whether through reason or muscle.
“From here, we will either end up a country like Somalia, or one where the centre takes its writ very, very seriously”, said Dr Rizvi.
At the heart of the problem is the establishment’s relationship with the mullah lobby. As far as history goes, Nawaz is himself as much a product of the military’s power machine as these religious militias gone rogue and masquerading soldier clerics fighting for the old caliphate.
There was once a time, when the jihad franchise was first market-tested, that the lobby was the darling of the military as well as the US, and now they are at daggers drawn. There was also a time, not long ago, when secular circles detested the military, especially its powerful intelligence services, but now see the military as their only hope of crushing regressive forces once and for all.
But despite the long years of both talk and action, it is still unclear how clearly new battle lines have been drawn between the mullahs and their masters. And no matter how inconclusive these talks remain, even if they never properly take off, this question is sure to be answered sooner rather than later.