N’s democracy, constitution and int’l affairs
Big of Sartaj Aziz to offer mediating for harmony (tawazun) in Iran-Saudi relations. But what common ground he hopes to achieve remains a mystery, especially if you consider Pakistan’s position since N came to power. Just like the $1.5b was a mystery, till it turned out we’re giving them select military hardware in return. And then more pieces of the puzzle fell into place.
Perhaps that’s why Gen Raheel flew to Riyadh not long after becoming chief. The foreign office says there is no link between the Americans falling out with the Saudis over Syria, Riyadh openly looking for sophisticated weapons to smuggle into Syria, Pak army chief going to Riyadh, Suadi royalty paraded across Islamabad, defence deals signed, and Pakistani weapons being flown to Saudi Arabia. But good luck convincing the Iranians.
The Iran-Saudi proxy war in Syria has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and made tens of millions homeless. And no matter how much foreign office spokesmen belittle journalists asking probing questions, Aziz will embarrass himself if he points to ‘end user certificates’ to address Tehran’s concerns. The Iranians remember the Soviet jihad of the ‘80s pretty well, when Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and America wrote the book on breaking, bending and bypassing local and international laws. They smuggled Russian, Egyptian, Chinese, Swiss, even Israeli and American (stinger) weapons into Afghanistan, all the while denying any participation. And if you’ve read Charlie Wilson’s War, you’ll know that Gorbachev took Gen Zia and Yaqoob Khan aside at the Kremlin during Konstantin Chernenko’s funeral, and threatened to destroy Pakistan if Zia didn’t stop support for the mujahideen. The fearless leader of the fort of Islam “looked Gorbachev straight in the eye and insisted that his country was not involved. With that, the CIA’s key ally left Moscow for Mecca, where he prayed to Allah for courage to continue the jihad.”
But back home N’s policies are caught in their own crosshairs, and there’s a lot more to explain. His obsession with the constitution, for example, and how Musharraf can’t be forgiven for violating it, but its okay to talk to the Taliban even though they reject the document.
This was 1985, when Brig Imtiaz ran Gen Akhtar’s Afghan cell, which reported directly to Gen Zia. So the foreign office will have to do a better job of explaining Islamabad’s support for a country openly aiding al Qaeda rebels like the ones threatening Pakistan’s own survival. Already the idea that Zia’s protégé Nawaz is engineering a similar adventure with the Saudis, this time aiding Saudi’s holy war against pro Shi’a Syrians, is finding increasing attention in the Arab press. Back home, the government must also explain why Saudi pressure pushed it to abandon the IP pipeline and alienate Iran, a country sharing a thousand-plus kilometer border with Pakistan. And does it have sense of blowback? If Iran finds signs of Pakistan involvement in the Syrian war, will the FO’s certificates prevent retaliation in Balochistan?
But back home N’s policies are caught in their own crosshairs, and there’s a lot more to explain. His obsession with the constitution, for example, and how Musharraf can’t be forgiven for violating it, but its okay to talk to the Taliban even though they reject the document. And while the government claims fighting for the very spirit of democracy, perhaps someone will explain just when electoral mandate allows taking crucial decisions that alienate the most important institutions, not to mention the bulk of the population. The Musharraf and Taliban talks game is right-wing jugglery few believe Nawaz has the hands for. He shares the lal masjid shuhada foundation’s disgust for Musharraf, and it helps that the general had given the judiciary’s its share of reasons not to like him. And so far he’s been willing to offend the military to get his revenge. But soon the Supreme Court will let Musharraf leave, and the more N’s rightist affiliations are exposed, the more his confrontation with the army will deepen.
The GHQ will not give the talks forever, not while it keeps paying in blood and money. And whenever military action comes, it will cause an immediate backlash in the right wing religious lobby, which is also N’s principal support base.
That brings us to the talks, another sticking point with the military. The GHQ will not give the talks forever, not while it keeps paying in blood and money. And whenever military action comes, it will cause an immediate backlash in the right wing religious lobby, which is also N’s principal support base, further deepening the cleavage. But there’s more than just the military here. The talks started abruptly, just when the government had built the case for action. They caught everybody by surprise, especially persecuted minorities who have lost most of the 50,000 plus killed by the Taliban. And they are not, and never have been, fine with a settlement that lets killers of thousands not only walk free, but be held in esteem by the highest offices.
Now it would have helped if, like N promised on the campaign trail, his government could have got the economy back on track fast. But except for the sudden dollar injection, which triggered a slight uptick in the rupee, all claims of improvement have been dismissed as irrational exuberance by most observers. And so we have a heavy mandate government, facing an active existential insurgency, but openly calling for the fall of another sovereign government facing a similar yet more savage uprising. It is also provoking a confrontation with the military when the forces are the only institution capable of successfully confronting the wolf at the door. And by openly leaning towards the regressive right wing religious lobby, it is choosing to deliberately isolate itself from the majority of the people, who want insurgents checked for their crimes.
As far as common ground goes, N’s inner circle seems inviting a situation where all strands of opposition can gather in defiance of its policies. Perhaps that will also be a win for democracy.
