Is National Intelligence Directorate the solution to our perennial intelligence sharing problems?
Decisions were taken at a high level security meeting on pooling of intelligence resources and the capacity building of the security forces. Many will watch how the government copes with the several knotty issues involved.
Relations between agencies, like the military controlled ISI and civilian controlled IB, have been historically marked more by rivalry than cooperation. At times both have worked at cross purposes. The agencies have hesitated to share with each other the intelligence gathered by them. An attempt made by the previous government to bring the ISI under the control of the interior ministry led to such a strong reaction that the notification had to be withdrawn forthwith.
This time a novel arrangement is going to be tried to ease ISI’s apprehensions of being subordinated to the civilian administration. A wing of the agency dealing with issues related to domestic terrorism alone would report to the newly created National Intelligence Directorate. As the prime minister has agreed to personally supervise the functioning of the new setup for the time being, this might elicit a modicum of cooperation from the ISI. But with the chief executive required to deal with more pressing matters, the arrangement may not be feasible over time. The novelty could be interpreted by ISI as a piecemeal absorption of the agency into the civilian setup thus making it less cooperative once the PM hands over the matter to someone else.
Provinces are required to undertake additional responsibilities under the new system. The arrangements being suggested were in fact long overdue. The police in various provinces has neither the training nor the weapons to fight the terrorists. A few months back Balochistan government detailed a small police contingent to receive basic training from the army. Punjab already has an Elite Force but instead of performing the task for which it was created the Force is most of the time looking after the security of the VIPs and VVIPs. In case the newly trained and better armed policemen in other provinces were also required to perform protocol duties, they won’t be able to fight the terrorists. Provinces are also required to set up high security prisons. Unless the federal government allocates adequate funds for new weapons and equipment required by police and for other activities to fight terrorism, the scheme cannot succeed.
The national anti-terrorism policy is by and large of a defensive nature. While the country needs to overcome the internal weaknesses of the police system a reactive policy alone cannot cope with the menace of terrorism. To deal the terrorists an effective blow, there is a need to take the battle to their home ground, destroy their command and control system, dismantle their training centres and take out their prominent leaders. Only a two-pronged approach can rid the country of the terrorist menace.
