Riyadh growing closer to Islamabad and Tel Aviv at the same time?
Covering the Arab Spring as recently as last summer, it was difficult to find many correspondents or analysts noting an increasing convergence of interests between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The Syrian civil war was in its second year, a hundred thousand civilians had been killed, and the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis, despised by Riyadh and Tel Aviv alike, seemed collapsing. Yet much has transpired in the last ten or so months that has stood an already changing Middle East on its head, and little is even remembered of the revolutions that brought hope to Tunisia and Egypt. Even Pakistan is emerging as a crucial player in the conflict.
Israeli concerns about the three have been relatively easy to understand. They are, after all, the anti-Israeli axis. Iranian logistics and training, and Syrian rockets and land routes were essential in preparing Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia for the ’06 confrontation with Israel. Hezbollah celebrated the 34-day stalemate as a victory; Israel’s invincible air power myth was destroyed, and its land forces were forced into an embarrassing retreat from Southern Lebanon.
Israel is also understandably concerned about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Tehran has maintained peaceful nuclear ambitions throughout the standoff, but all the time hardliners of the Amhadinejad type promoted a carefully timed belligerence, a counterweight of sorts to Israel’s own nuclear policy of ambiguity.
But Riyadh fumed at both Hezbollah’s victory and Iran’s nuclear program for very different reasons. Its sunni-shi’a differences with Iran have played out in proxy skirmishes through much of the Muslim world over the decades. With 9/11, though, things began to change. Saddam’s ouster allowed the country’s shi’a majority into power, with subsequent Iranian influence, and an emerging shi’a crescent seemed among the many unintended consequences of the war. And the Spring brought more complications, and unprecedented points of convergence with the Jews.
Riyadh fumed at both Hezbollah’s victory and Iran’s nuclear program for very different reasons. Its sunni-shi’a differences with Iran have played out in proxy skirmishes through much of the Muslim world over the decades. With 9/11, though, things began to change. Saddam’s ouster allowed the country’s shi’a majority into power, with subsequent Iranian influence, and an emerging shi’a crescent seemed among the many unintended consequences of the war.
Hosni Mubarak’s ouster was a landmark event in more ways than one. He was friends with Israel and guarded the Gaza border to everybody’s satisfaction but a majority of the Palestinians. The Saudis supported him too, and poured billions to prop up his subsidy dominated economy. And Hillary Clinton called him “practically family” the day before his fall, a hint of how strongly the American ruling class feels about heads of states that do multi-billion dollar arms deals with Washington. Then the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood worried both Israel and Saudi Arabia, the former because of its hatred for the Yahood and the latter because of its opposition to monarchical rule.
Things changed more when the Spring rolled into Libya. It provided the first instances of nato airpower partnering with Saudi sponsored al Qaeda like militants on the ground. Of course this happened when US/nato had just wound up the war against al Qaeda in Iraq, while there were still droning similar militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Apparently the strategic aim overrode lesser concerns. These were, after all, times of monumental change. So when the unrest spread to Syria, Riyadh and Tel Aviv, it now seems all but certain, played a daring gambit.
The international media paraded Syrian exiles as leaders of an opposition movement demanding change, rights, privileges, etc, while the Free Syrian Army fought on ground. But the Saudis also funded and armed extremist Islamic militias including some they had just successfully deployed in Libya. The Israelis had a ball seeing the Syrian Arab Army consumed in internal rebellion. The Americans didn’t draw nato into the fight, not while Moscow continued to back Bashar al Asad, but also had no problems with the typical Saudi game; funneling mujahideen to fight infidels, using al Qaeda proxies, etc.
There were also reports and pictures, prominently in the Beirut based newspaper al-Akhbar, of Israeli weapons among the rebel armoury. The Israelis also helped arm the mujahideen of the anti-Soviet jihad, but intelligence agencies involved were more careful in covering tracks. The famous book and movieCharlie Wilson’s War shows a troubled Zia ul Haq agreeing to the Israeli role, but insisting, “I don’t want to see the ****ing Star of David on any of the boxes”.
But the Israelis grew wary when rebels briefly overran the Golan border post late last summer, and began immediate mortar fire across the frontier. They even expressed public relief when a government air raid reclaimed the check post. The Americans, too, became increasingly suspicious as the spread of al Qaeda across Syria suddenly seemed to threaten the shaky status quo of the whole region. More recently, upon undeniable proof of the Saudi role in strengthening al Qaeda in the Levant, there have been reports that the Americans threatened Riyadh with calling off President Obama’s tour due shortly, and even sanctions for sponsoring terrorism if the Syrian program was not rolled back.
This, and the measured American thaw with Iran, has pushed Saudi and Israel closer again. The Israelis are clearly unhappy with the American nuclear deal with Iran. And the Saudis understand that the days when the Americans shielded its wahabi regional policy, in addition to providing security to its monarchy, are drawing to a close. And this realisation has now pulled Pakistan into the mix.
It was natural for the Saudis to turn to Islamabad for the security umbrella. They know how badly Pakistan needs their petrodollars, and how close the ruling N-League is to the al Saud hierarchy. But no matter how much the foreign office denies it, the Saudi embrace comes with a price to pay with regard to Syria.
It was natural for the Saudis to turn to Islamabad for the security umbrella. They know how badly Pakistan needs their petrodollars, and how close the ruling N-League is to the al Saud hierarchy. But no matter how much the foreign office denies it, the Saudi embrace comes with a price to pay with regard to Syria. The prospect of Pakistani weapons eventually finding their way into Syrian rebel hands is very strong, especially since Saudi injections have already started strengthening the Pakistani rupee.
Most Pakistanis have been cut off from developments preceding this strategic embrace and do not understand the implications of playing alongside Riyadh. Since the Iran-Saudi proxy war has already cost hundreds of thousands of lives in Syria, it is not likely that the two will reconcile their differences anytime soon. And with its long border with Pakistan, alienating Iran may come with blowback lessons in Balochistan. It has already cost us the IP pipeline.
It bears noting that Riyadh has also upset other friends recently. Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood initially led to GCC foreign policy differences with regard to the new military regime in Egypt. But now it has grown to produce the first public schism in GCC history, with Saudi Arabia and UAE recalling ambassadors from Doha. It is interesting that Saudi pushes away old friends and comes closer to Pakistan just when its partnership with America is weakening, Iran is again gaining legitimacy, and Riyadh continues to get closer to Tel Aviv.
According to the Arab press, Saudi Arabia’s grand mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Baz, disagreed with the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, on whether there could be a truce with the Jews. Bin Baz argued that a truce (hudna) with Israel is allowed and even an exchange of ambassadors is permitted, if it serves Islam’s interests. In a fatwa he issued, Bin Baz endorsed the Middle East peace process, according to al-Akhbar.
And now that Riyadh has termed the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation, there might be some concern within our own religious-political parties about how times are changing. No such debate in the government, though, and we are set to side with the world’s largest state sponsor of al Qaeda and the like just as we are deeply involved in an existential battle with the same enemy ourselves.