The Taliban’s actions continue to speak louder than the government’s words
The government-TTP ceasefire has pushed negotiations into “a decisive phase” (Nawaz Sharif), yet as incidents of violence continue, the optimism seems confined to a shrinking group around the prime minister. And the government’s handling of the talks so far, especially its response to increased violence, has led many to question its threat perception credentials.
The PM’s committee hailed the TTP’s ceasefire offer last week as a success, after it broke off negotiations to protest the Feb16 Mohmand beheadings. But even as terrorist attacks continued, especially the high-profile hit in Islamabad, the government defended its decision to call off airstrikes to push negotiations forward.
The government has also taken the TTP’s detachment from these attacks at face value, hence the “decisive phase”. But others are not so convinced, and the public is increasingly skeptical about the legitimacy of a ceasefire that cannot contain terrorism.
Symbolism is important
There is also growing anger that the government will go to any length to keep its talks initiative from faltering. And the prime minister is avoiding probing questions, like the fate of those responsible for killing thousands of Pakistani citizens once a more binding cessation of hostilities is implemented.
“It seems more blood must flow before the government is satisfied”, said Haji Muhammed Adeel, senior vice president of the Awami National Party (ANP), and member of senate standing committees on interior, defence, and defence spending.
“Remember, the so called ceasefire was followed by terrorism activities in Islamabad, Landi Kotal, Kurram, Jamrud, and Hangu. And the government still tries to portray the talks as a success”.
The ANP has lost hundreds of party workers to Taliban attacks and feels the government’s poor performance in the talks has vindicated its position that the insurgency cannot be brought to a negotiated settlement. Having agreed to give talks one last chance at the APC, the party now believes the national leadership is incapable of exercising muscle.
The Taliban chose to behead 23 FC personnel captured in ’10 to avenge alleged military executions of its members instead of the more usual attacks on important individuals and buildings. Then, just after the ceasefire, previously unknown Ahrar al Hind chose a strike in the heart of Islamabad, at the courts, sending a strong message.
“This government does not have the backbone to order a military operation”, Haji Adeel added. “They are more likely to drag the army into these talks as well”.
All attacks following the ceasefire announcement bore a near unmistakable Taliban fingerprint, yet were claimed by different outfits, implying either TTP inability to control its rank and file, or duplicity in dealings with the government.
There is also very strong symbolism. The Taliban chose to behead 23 FC personnel captured in ’10 to avenge alleged military executions of its members instead of the more usual attacks on important individuals and buildings. Then, just after the ceasefire, previously unknown Ahrar al Hind chose a strike in the heart of Islamabad, at the courts, sending a strong message.
“This symbolism is important”, said an intelligence officer, asking not to be named. “These attacks are a calculated part of their (TTP’s) dialogue, and they are aimed at sending psychological messages”.
Their perception of conflicting intentions of TTP splinter groups, too, seems to imply a position of weakness for the government, from where it will be difficult for it to establish its writ, as opposed to simply trimming down the fighting.
“We know for sure that some groups in the TTP are a hundred per cent committed to this ceasefire”, another official said.
These groups, intelligence believes, are willing to fold the jihad in Pakistan, and either roll back into mainstream society or take their wars elsewhere, perhaps to India or wherever nato forces are deployed.
“But we are also sure of other splinter groups that will fight the ceasefire tooth and nail. And we are also a hundred per cent sure that these groups receive funding, training, and even arms from outside intelligence agencies, including NDS, RAW, and CIA”, he added.
It is the latter group, according to them, that the TTP’s Mohmand commander, Abdul Wali (who ordered the FC executions), belongs to. And more importantly, unlike the government, intelligence believes the TTP’s new commander Mulla Fazlullah, and his Swati group, also fall in this category.
If true, this claim backs speculation that the TTP is simply playing for time. And recurrent attacks, suddenly claimed by allegedly non-TTP groups, are meant to weaken and confuse the government while insurgents redeploy and consolidate sleeper cells.
Misreading the threat
“There’s no doubt talks are an important part of counterinsurgency (COIN), but the government seems to have completely misread the threat”, said Safdar Hussain, research analyst at the Islamabad based Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies.
“Their understanding of the situation shows an over simplification of the real problem”, he added. “It is clear that they are stressing too much on negotiations, and insurgents are exploiting this weakness to re-position”.
This increasing accommodation of militants is now alienating even those that believed that swift military action will follow once talks were unable to control militancy. And while the Taliban’s symbolism is one of terror, both physical and psychological, the government has emerged as a timid follower, increasingly following TTP diktat instead of laying tough conditions for established enemies of the state.
PIPS is also unsure about the government’s conflict management techniques. Firstly, it has not explained its case well enough to those that have borne the worst of TTP’s terrorist attacks over the years, especially sectarian minorities. Then it chose not to elaborate on what it considers an amicable settlement – is ending active fighting its aim, or does it extend to ceasefire followed by comprehensive establishment of state authority across the country? Its posture, too, has been mostly reactionary.
“The government seemed almost apologetic in the beginning”, Mr Hussain added. “It was only after strong media pressure (after the FC killings) that it adopted a somewhat bold stance. But even now, it seems willing to brush almost everything under the carpet, after a little hue and cry, just so the talks can continue”.
This increasing accommodation of militants is now alienating even those that believed that swift military action will follow once talks were unable to control militancy. And while the Taliban’s symbolism is one of terror, both physical and psychological, the government has emerged as a timid follower, increasingly following TTP diktat instead of laying tough conditions for established enemies of the state. Neither minorities, nor military targets, are any safer than before peace talks began, and with every successful strike militants expose state security apparatus in cities as incompetent and incapable, besides instilling more fear in society. Yet the prime minister and both negotiating teams seem convinced there is enough goodwill on both sides to build on, and the “decisive phase” that has now commenced will make significant advances towards lasting peace.
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