The political will remains woefully missing
Like everything else that the incumbent government has set out to do in its current controversial stint in power, the policy to fight the cancer of terrorism and militancy in the country is riddled with more confusion than clarity. This is clearly symptomatic of the duality of approach that the government has followed in matters requiring both seriousness of purpose and approach. In the process, the immediacy of the scourge has been completely lost as the government continues to vacillate between the possibilities of dialogue and military action, or both.
The dialogue that was initiated a good few months after the holding of the All Parties Conference (APC) was followed by a vicious upsurge of violence in the country targeting the military and the security personnel as well as civilians. This elicited a sharp response from across the country calling upon the government to stop engaging the militants in fruitless negotiations and launch the much-delayed military operation to eliminate them. The government, showing heartless insensitivity to the increasing list of casualties, waited for the inhuman severance of heads of security personnel in custody by the Taliban, before allowing some precision strikes on the militant strongholds in the FATA region.
The choice given by the government to the militants should have been clear: if they lay down their arms and surrender before the writ of the state by accepting its constitution and all that emanates from it, there would be negotiations. But, if they don’t do so, they will have to face the full might of a military operation. This offer should also have been time-bound after which the prospect of negotiations should have been shelved completely.
But the mantra of dialogue has not been shelved and there are repeated calls to the militants to announce a ceasefire for the process of negotiations to commence again. May be this is being used by the government as a political ploy to keep everyone on board and reduce the prospect of dissensions to the minimum regarding the forthcoming operation. But, there is a catch here: the call is only for the militants to announce a ceasefire, not lay down their arms, as a precondition to the recommencement of negotiations. This, I believe, is counterproductive.
The key question is whether keeping the option of negotiations with the militants open would serve any constructive purpose other than trying to keep the religious and the neo-religious parties on board with the government? While this may well be the only positive of this short-sighted policy, the negatives are numerous and gruesome. First and foremost, it would reflect adversely on the government’s resolve, if there is one at all, to combat militancy without compromise. It would make the militant leaders think that the government, or some quarters therein, are still interested in a negotiated settlement and the threat of an operation is only a ploy to push them to the negotiations table. It would, consequently, be construed as a weakness of the government which would be fully exploited by those who are not interested in a permanent settlement of the deadly militancy in the country.
The choice given by the government to the militants should have been clear: if they lay down their arms and surrender before the writ of the state by accepting its constitution and all that emanates from it, there would be negotiations. But, if they don’t do so, they will have to face the full might of a military operation. This offer should also have been time-bound after which the prospect of negotiations should have been shelved completely.
The government also remains unclear on the fate of the peace talks. There have been statements from numerous government functionaries including members of its negotiations committee that the peace talks cannot be pursued unless terror attacks cease. Others from the government’s side have opined that the path of negotiations has been aborted altogether. There has also been a demand from the government that the militants should announce a cease fire for the dialogue process to reconvene. This only adds to the mammoth confusion that is already there.
This has not been the case. Instead, the government has shown both immaturity of purpose and lack of political will to tackle the scourge that is posing existential challenges to the country. Keeping of option of talks open with the militants is like conveying a message of co-existence with their regressive and degenerate mindset – a prospect that springs from the inherent weakness of the incumbent leadership when it comes to dealing with militancy. This may have a lot to do with numerous skeletons hidden away in their closets regarding support extended to some elements within the broad framework of militant groups operating in the country, particularly in the province of Punjab. The visible lack of clarity and purpose are indications of not only an alarming level of confusion, but even complicity with some gangs of militants.
The proposed Security Policy carries forward these and other ambiguities. While speaking in the national assembly, the interior minister claimed that there had been a basic ‘policy shift’ reflected in the draft Security Policy, the contents of which were not revealed to the legislators. This so-called ‘policy shift’ relates only to ‘targeting the source of terrorism in response to acts of militant violence anywhere in the country’. Based on information that has been made available so far, that reduces the proposed Security Policy into a reactive mechanism that would become operational only when acts of terrorism are committed somewhere in the country, but there is nothing in it that proposes to take on the scourge of terrorism head on with intent to eliminating it and its nurseries completely. This is evident from the plethora of options that are being continually discussed in the country as part of the proposed anti-terror policy: the dialogue process alone leading to some deal with the militants, targeted strikes in response to militant attacks, suspension of the dialogue option and undertaking a full-fledged operation to eliminate the scourge of militancy, dialogue and the military operation undertaken together and so many more permutations and combinations. It is like offering a platter of options to the militants and asking them to take their pick for the government to do its bit. It reflects an alarming level of reluctance to deal with a scourge that has inflicted indescribable damage on the country and its people. No wonder the leader of the opposition accused the government for having created more confusion than clarity.
The PPP rule was symptomatic of its gross unwillingness to own up an army operation to eliminate terrorism. Consequently, acts of violence continued to flourish. The current government, publicly willing and eager to eliminate terrorism from the country, is dithering in the formulation of a clear-cut policy regarding how to do so. This is evident from the precious time that has already been lost as a consequence of a lack of consensus within the government echelons regarding the matter as well as the political and the military hierarchies not being on the same page with regard to the broad contours of an anti-terror policy. While the military appears eager to launch an operation, the political leadership, because of an inherent weakness of purpose and other allied factors, is unable to make up its mind. Leading up to the US drawdown in Afghanistan, this uncertainty is making the scourge more daunting and the launching of any future military operation even more challenging.
Comprising the secret, the strategic and the operational parts, the proposed Security Policy remains an enigma. Its draft was not even shown to all the cabinet members and they were asked to wait. This is contrary to the announcement made earlier that its contents would be revealed in the national assembly. The only factor that has come forth is the operationalising of the National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NECTA) and the setting up of a Joint Intelligence Directorate to coordinate effectively among the multiple spy agencies of the country. What all this would lead to and how remains unknown.
Like I have always said, the fight against terrorism is a battle between two mindsets. The terrorist mindset believes in imposing its regressive and obscurantist writ by employing violent means encompassing imposition of draconian punishments and mauling of human dignity and respect. The democratic mindset, in principle, believes in the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law as envisioned therein. The conflict course is there for all to see except those who have continually propounded the option of negotiations as a means to compromising with the cancer.
The government also remains unclear on the fate of the peace talks. There have been statements from numerous government functionaries including members of its negotiations committee that the peace talks cannot be pursued unless terror attacks cease. Others from the government’s side have opined that the path of negotiations has been aborted altogether. There has also been a demand from the government that the militants should announce a cease fire for the dialogue process to reconvene. This only adds to the mammoth confusion that is already there.
Like I have always said, the fight against terrorism is a battle between two mindsets. The terrorist mindset believes in imposing its regressive and obscurantist writ by employing violent means encompassing imposition of draconian punishments and mauling of human dignity and respect. The democratic mindset, in principle, believes in the supremacy of the constitution and the rule of law as envisioned therein. The conflict course is there for all to see except those who have continually propounded the option of negotiations as a means to compromising with the cancer.
The negotiations and the dialogue mantra together will not deliver the desired results. It would only embolden the terrorists further and they would exploit the government’s weakness to their advantage regarding failure to formulate a clear and crisp policy. Then there is no guarantee either that a deal with one or some of the militant groups would end the scourge of militancy completely as there would be other factions within the larger militant network which would continue the battle of imposing their degenerate writ.
The desire to keep the contents of the proposed security policy under the wraps is also incomprehensible. What is it that the government continues to mull over and is not able to make up its mind about even after almost eight months’ of its coming into power with an avowed proclamation to end the spate of violence in the country? Is it confusion, complicity, or a bit of both? Whatever it may be, it is at the cost to the national interest that continues to bleed as the government procrastinates inordinately on the proclamation of a clear policy to combat the scourge of militancy. Each day lost is a bonanza to the militants and their evil intentions to block out all prospects of Pakistan taking the arduous steps to reclaiming its enlightened, egalitarian and progressive ethos.