The monkey business

Talks with Taliban: At what cost?

Despite reservations from different quarters, the first meeting of the negotiation committees was held on February 7 in what Irfan Siddiqi described ‘a more than cordial’ atmosphere during which, according to him, both the government and Taliban committees (true to its critics’ description) seemed like one and the same. A ‘promising’ joint communique was also issued following the first round; promising because it consisted mostly of good recommendations – violent acts ‘should’ be stopped, talks ‘should’ be held within the framework of the constitution, a conducive atmosphere ‘should’ be created, etc – and not any commitments.

Many serious leaders and onlookers mistook the said statement as a serious official commitment from some serious stakeholders who were holding serious dialogue about some serious situation their country was faced with. Imran Khan was one among those serious leaders who, while jumping before thinking on February 8, tried to open the eyes of those who held the ‘unfounded’ view that Taliban wouldn’t agree to hold talks within the parameters of the constitution.

But it wasn’t a long wait for such wishful thinkers, who were fancying burying the dead body of terrorism in the tribal areas, to see the ghost of Talibanisation and terrorism rear its ugly head in the capital Islamabad once again. Maulana Abdul Aziz, surrounded by gun-toting innocent students of who-knows-which-seminary, didn’t take even a couple of hours to clear any misconception about Taliban’s real motives. He very rudely awakened the simpletons amongst Taliban sympathisers who were daydreaming that the misunderstood brothers will submit to the parameters of the constitution this time around. Late in the evening the same day (Feb 8), the official video statement of the TTP dashed the remaining hallucination/s of Mr Khan and his likes and “exposed those who had repeatedly said in the past that the Taliban terrorism was related to the…” American forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan and cessation to US drones’ attacks. Bad luck!

But to begin with, the composition of committees from both the sides had already given a fair glimpse of what the expected course of developments could be. What most of the observers feared was that this monkeys business, called peace negotiations, will multiply problems for the government and the armed forces to establish the writ of the state. What will be the final outcome of these outlandish talks is not so difficult to guess but what this process has already done is something like this:

1)      It has practically opened all the media to the terrorists and their supporters and sympathisers to propagate their inane ideology against the state with impunity.

2)      It is compounding the prevailing confused narrative – look at Imran Khan, for example.

3)      The talks process is helping in mainstreaming terrorists and their causes.

4)      The composition of both the committees has narrowed down the debate about the future of the state among different shades of the Right only.

5)      It is helping re-incarnate the Lal Masjid ghost – Maulana Aziz sitting under the shadows of the guns, pledging disobedience to the state and its constitution in the full glare of the media in the heart of the capital.

These are but only some of the initial and more obvious negative ramifications of the talks process which the government has started in all earnest but which the other side still considers as a joke. And whether Taliban take it as joke or not, the government committee seems bent upon turning it into some gallows humor.

First, it was none other than a government nominee, Rustam Shah Mehmand, who soon after his becoming the government’s committee member, demanded of the government to ‘clarify’ its position regarding Taliban prisoners, US forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan [sic], and Pakistan Army’s pullout from tribal areas. But as the euphoria about talks was running so high, nobody gave full attention to these shenanigans and both the committees went into this exploratory meeting. But the nation was in for some bigger surprises; the government’s committee agreed to restrict the scope and outcome of talks only to the troubled or ‘insurgency-affected areas’.

If what the respected journalist said reflects even an iota of the government’s thinking then it is clear that it has reached the conclusion that the state is unable to establish its writ beyond River Indus and has decided to surrender those territories to Taliban in the garb of peace talks; and to give away what the army had won from the terrorists after great sacrifices. But why and how does it mean so?

This was like a bombshell. The first questions that came to mind were: What can be the definition of troubled areas? Who is going to decide which the ‘insurgency-affected’ areas are? Why can’t any future peace agreement be about the whole of the country? Why can’t Sharia be good for the gander if it is good for the goose? And what will be the reaction of the people of the areas which the government – or whoever else – will ultimately declare as insurgency-hit to be handed over to more pious Muslims?

As critics and independent political observers were yet contemplating to question this preposterous proposition and preparing to interpret it in a less damaging manner that it might be meaning North Waziristan, a bolt came, not from the blue but, but from the most respected and seemingly informed member of the government’s negotiations committee, Mr Rahimullah Yousafzai. He said that the phrase meant ‘tribal area and Malakand Division’ because these areas were largely considered to be associated with the militancy problem. Kudos, Rahimullah sahib, kudos!

If what the respected journalist said reflects even an iota of the government’s thinking then it is clear that it has reached the conclusion that the state is unable to establish its writ beyond River Indus and has decided to surrender those territories to Taliban in the garb of peace talks; and to give away what the army had won from the terrorists after great sacrifices. But why and how does it mean so?

It is because in many of the tribal agencies the military has made substantial dents in the militants’ dominance and stranglehold. Translating ‘insurgency-affected’ areas into the whole of tribal areas is akin to throwing the won areas back into the lap of terrorists, thus giving them greater leverage and advantage than what can be physically claimed by them.

Then there is the curious case of Swat which is an altogether different story. Including Malakand Division into the list of troubled areas factually means surrendering to the terrorists on the table what the army literally won on the battlefield through force and after rendering of great sacrifices by both the military personnel and civilian population. Keeping aside the negative propaganda of the religious parties and PTI, Swat today is the most peaceful and secure place in the whole of Pakistan. If it cannot be handed over to civilians completely, it is not that military operation was not successful or that military action is not a solution to the religious terrorism phenomenon; it is because Swat has become a symbol of victory and defeat for the armed forces and Taliban respectively and, given a chance, Fazlullah-led TTP will make it a point to show to Pakistanis and the world as a whole that Pakistan Army has failed and that military operations are no panacea for militancy. Furthermore, Swat still exists in a muddier pool which the government has not yet cleansed and it needs to be protected till the surroundings are cleared.

Now, including Malakand Division in the scope of current peace talks on the pretext that it was the area which was once associated with the insurgency problem (or that is what Rahimullah Yousafzai thinks) is not only presenting the same to Taliban on a platter when they themselves have not asked for it, it will also bring in more areas into the troubled areas’ list, like Peshawar, for example. Does it need any elaboration why Peshawar can’t be excluded from that fanciful categorisation of insurgency-affected areas? But frankly, how much body-count, how much savagery and how much VIP’s heads are required for any tribal or settled place to be included in that list of areas which the government’s negotiations committee desires to hand over to the terrorists for good?

It seems the present government has reached the conclusion that the state cannot establish its writ in KP and tribal areas. Nor can it retake its territories or protect its people. And any effort in that direction can jeopardise peace and tranquility in the Punjab. So, let’s have a farce through which sovereignty can be shared with religious thugs in a seemingly face-saving circumstance.

But the farce has already gone too far. It has damaged the government position already as in public perception the other side is fighting for the glory of Islam. Continuation of the talks further will help the terrorists’ narrative make deeper inroads into society in the disguise of imposition of Sharia. It will help the Lal Masjid hooligans to let all hell break loose on the capital on much greater scale than what we saw last time – a glimpse of it can be seen in the video clips of the media talk of Abdul Aziz on February 8. And it will encourage the people in future to openly pledge disobedience to the state and stand in revolt against it.

Two clerics have succeeded in reaching out in 12 days to the ‘unknown’ terrorists which the state and its entire security apparatus failed to find a clue to in 12 long years. Taliban committee members, JI’s Mohammad Ibrahim and JUI-S’s Maulana Yousaf Shah, reached an ‘undisclosed location’ in North Waziristan Agency on Saturday for an overnight stay and held talks with the syndicate of evil, aka the Taliban Shoora. It is hoped that secret agencies have resisted the temptation of trailing them this time too because that can derail the negotiation process and the nation can lose an unprecedented opportunity to capitulate without violence and acquire peace in return.