Squabbles on Dr Shakeel Afridi
The US has tried the carrot. And they’ve tried the stick. And they’ve tried withholding the carrot. They’re willing to go to all lengths, really, to get Dr Shakil Afridi, the doctor who allegedly helped the US gather intelligence for the Osama Bin Laden operation, free from incarceration. The US Congress recently moved a resolution to withhold thirty-three million dollars for Pakistan till the doctor’s release.
But no cigar. The Pakistani government maintains that the matter is sub judice and that Dr Afridi’s release is to be in accordance with the law, not the vagaries of international diplomacy. A valid point of view, which the US would be hard-pressed to fight.
To look at both sides of the matter, the US has a lot to lose. With the incarceration of Dr Afridi, the government, which has an ever growing set of human intelligence operatives, is going to find recruitment a tougher task than it is. The dangers of reporting to the US are already great; now it is going to be well publicized that the mighty nation cannot put you out of harm’s way when push comes to shove.
For the Pakistani government, letting the man go is going to make it look like a pushover for the US. Secondly, it seeks to discourage such activities on its soil, like all nations are wont to.
The charge that the government has against Dr Afridi is not the intelligence gathering but collusion with local militants in the Khyber agency. It is clear to all involved that this is not the real charge.
There is another stance that human rights activists take against Dr Afridi. That his use of the anti-polio campaign is what has compromised it and has resulted in the attacks on these workers. That is incorrect and as fraught with inaccuracy as the outlandish claim that terrorism is a result of drone attacks. Do they contribute? Yes, but only slightly. Correlation does not imply causation.
The US should realize that, despite the dividend it might achieve on the human intel front, the negative feedback for highhandedness is going to be several times over that in terms of public diplomacy.
Even if the two countries are to reach an agreement, the letter of the law, at the very least, should be seen to have been followed.