What is missing?
With only twelve months left in the announced deadline for the pull out of US-NATO troops from Afghanistan, the prospects of peace returning to Afghanistan remain as bleak as ever. The Bilateral Security Agreement between the US and Afghan government — stipulating conditions in regards to the stay of non-combatant US troops in Afghanistan, their counter-terrorism and training assignments beyond 2014 — has not been signed as yet despite consensus reached on its draft between the two sides. Hamid Karzai’s vacillating stance on signing the agreement is a cause of worry for the US. Karazi initially said that he would sign the agreement if approved by the Grand Jirga and when the Grand Jirga gave a nod of approval and insisted that the agreement be signed before the end of 2013. He then took a somersault and said that it would be signed by the Afghan government coming into power as a result of the ensuing elections in the country. Another condition for signing the agreement preferred by Karzai is that the US stopped strikes on residential areas that result in civilian casualties.
The US is visibly irritated and wants the agreement signed immediately enabling it to plan the pull out schedule and also decide on the US assistance that would be given to Afghanistan in the post-withdrawal period. The visits to Afghanistan by National Security Advisor Susan Rice and special envoy to the region James Doben have also failed to convince Karzai about the desirability and urgency required to conclude the agreement. When Secretary of State Chuck Hagel came to Afghanistan, Karzai flew off to Iran to finalise long term friendship and cooperation pact between the two countries. The evasive stance of Karzai on the BSA also owes much to the ambience of mistrust between him and the US leadership. Reportedly, the US and Karzai government are currently conducting parleys to smoothen out the differences.
But the million dollar question is that would the signing of BSA by Karzai guarantee peace in Afghanistan? No rational soul can give an affirmative answer because peace in Afghanistan is not solely dependent on BSA between the Kabul government and the US. Taliban also need to be roped in to give their blessings to the agreement besides bringing about reconciliation between the Karzai government and the Taliban and ensuring their participation in the ensuing elections. The portents however are not very encouraging in this regard. The Taliban are deadly opposed to the BSA and want complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. They have also refused to participate in the elections and stated in unequivocal terms that they would not accept the government installed through the so-called sham elections. The US initiatives to hold dialogue with Taliban have not progressed in a desired manner.
In the prevailing scenario the danger is that even if the BSA is signed by Karzai and the US-NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan as scheduled, the country might relapse into factional fighting that was witnessed in the backdrop of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and abandonment of the country by the US. The Afghan security force raised and trained by the US is still not strong enough to resist and ward off the onslaught of Taliban. The element which makes it vulnerable is its composition in complete disregard to the demographic realities of Afghanistan. Majority of members of this force belong to ethnic communities from North and the Pushtun element represented in it is quite smaller as compared to them. Pushtuns are more than 40% of the Afghan population and have always ruled Afghanistan. Disturbing that equation and balance would never be acceptable to the Pushtuns. Reports about desertions and Afghan soldiers turning on their foreign trainers are also not uncommon. Another worrying factor in this regard is that Taliban have also penetrated the ranks of the security forces. That does not augur well from the perspective of security and stability in Afghanistan, with Taliban still going strong in launching attacks on US-NATO forces and Afghan security agencies.
As is evident, more than signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement between the US and Karzai government, rapprochement between Karzai and Taliban, reconciliation between Taliban and other factions and an understanding between Taliban and US on the future of Afghanistan is absolutely necessary for bringing peace to Afghanistan, as well as in Pakistan. Though the US has publicly stated that it favours an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process of reconciliation, its actions so far do not prove its credentials as an honest broker of peace. Its first priority should have been to ensure reconciliation among different stakeholders of peace in Afghanistan and their agreement on installation of future government through a democratic process without anybody playing favourites and then gone for BSA or any other arrangement with the collective leadership of Afghanistan.
Even now it is not too late to change the priorities. Pakistan is already actively involved in nudging and encouraging the process of reconciliation between the Karzai government and Taliban. It played a significant role in bringing the Taliban, including Haqqani group, to the negotiating table in Doha and has also released a number of detained Taliban leaders including Mullah Bradar to facilitate process of reconciliation in Afghanistan. The new Pakistani leadership has also bid adieu to the strategic depth narrative and adopted a policy of neutrality in the Afghan conflict which is a good and realistic paradigm shift that could also help in winning the confidence and trust of the Afghan government and other elements who have been hostile to Pakistan in the past. For these efforts to succeed, the US will have to show more commitment to settling conflict among the Afghan factions and persuading them to work collectively to rebuild the country. Any slackness or failure on that account is bound to undo whatever has been done so far to promote peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.
The writer is an academic. He can be contacted at: [email protected].
