The emperor wears no uniform

The ever narrowing line between the passable and the extraordinary

There are fewer subjects in psychology more interesting than the Stockholm syndrome. This is a particular cognitive bond that afflicts victims of kidnappings, wherein the latter develop positive feelings, even fall in love, with their captors. One could find whole tomes of peer-reviewed psychology journals documenting the phenomenon, taking it apart, crystallising its components to see what makes it tick. But the premise is the same: in that particularly sensitive state of mind, a victim notes any decrease in torture (he didn’t hit me as much as he hit my other fellow captives; he gave me more food than he did the others; he beat me every other day rather than everyday etc.) and subconsciously interprets it as proof of the captor’s kindness. That interpretation then morphs into affection. A shade of this phenomenon is found in the rationalizations battered wives provide for their husbands’ behaviour.

Do we, as a nation, suffer from the Stockholm syndrome when it comes to the army? Going by the homage paid to the outgoing army chief Gen Kayani, one would think we need professional help. The talking heads in the media and beyond were not dissecting the chief’s legacy (which we’ll get to in a while) but were praising him merely for not staging a military coup. Is this what standards have come down to? Is not calling in the Triple 1 brigade going to pass for an army chief who likes to stay away from politics? He is a good army chief because he didn’t interfere as much as he could have?

Gen Kayani might have had some plus points, and we’ll get to them, but let it be said: the army, on his watch, did not stay away from politics. Examples abound. First, there was the Kerry-Lugar Bill, where even the ISPR formally did its thing. The Bill was an American piece of legislation; a comment on it even by the elected representatives of Pakistan would have reeked of chutzpah, but here was an army, huffing, puffing and growing an angry shade of purple over the demand the US legislature was making of its executive branch to give money to Pakistan only if the politicians, and not the army, are completely in command. Then there was the Memogate episode, in which the former general’s spymaster took a personal interest. That particular fiasco rocked the boat a little too much, for a nascent democracy to bear.

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“Do we, as a nation, suffer from the Stockholm syndrome when it comes to the army? Going by the homage paid to the outgoing army chief Gen Kayani, one would think we need professional help.”

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There were many other behind-the-scenes interventions. Chief amongst these is the alleged arm-twisting of the civil setup to get an extension on his tenure at the slot. The civil government has to take responsibility for some transgressions, this one included; no civilian PM, regardless of how much the khakis are in control, can absolve himself of all crimes. But things in the polity are what they are. When our praetorian masters are unhappy, they have enough leverage to make things pretty uncomfortable for a sitting government.

These are points that definitely need to be raised the next time someone talks about apolitical army chiefs. Apolitical compared to whom? The ones who actually took over?

But what about Kayani’s other legacy? The one they call a doctrine? The shifting of the focus of the army from an India-centric matrix to one fully cognizant of the terror in our midst. True, the general might have something there. But how much is he really to be credited? Former army chief Musharraf – definitely the most flawed individual to hold the nation’s reins since the dictator before him – was the one who, it has to be said, started the operations against the militants and jettisoned some support to the groups who want to pursue adventures in India. Yes, Musharraf detractors would argue, but he only kept on attacking the ‘bad’ Taliban and not the ‘good’ ones and that the Indian threat perception remained the central point of our security calculus. True, but many would say the same about Kayani’s army as well. As you read this, militant outfits in the Punjab, the ones particularly sweet on Kashmir, have the run of the place.

What doctrine, specifically, did the man change? True, at least the era of false starts against the bad Taliban has stopped. For however diminutive their yields, at least in certain areas, the army seems determined to fight the good fight and for that he needs to be credited. Furthermore, he was unequivocal on where the real threat lies. If there is any problem there, it stems from much lower ranks, who suffer from the cognitive dissonance that has resulted from years of training, since their PMA days, on one line, and then a stark and sudden recalibration following 9/11. As the rumour goes, a concern in the US State Department is not what will happen if the generals take over but what will happen if the colonels take over? There is no huge risk of that, granted. All of Pakistan’s coups staged by army bosses might have been successful but all those staged by those lower down the line (two and counting) have been failures. But, as the Brigadier Ali case shows, the threat is most definitely there.

The new army chief has his job cut out for him. The problem is not only how to crack down against one’s own people but also how to crack down against one’s own ranks. A tough set of circumstances to navigate through, he will definitely make many enemies in the army regardless of how he goes about this.

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“The Central Command (CENTCOM) boss’ residence, the home of he who runs two major wars, would pale out in comparison to our corps commanders’ palaces. We need men of action, not pampered mandarins.”

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And, lest it be forgotten: alongside figuring out which is the best way to fight this, our war, we should also take a good look at our force. Are we a lean, fighting army? War might not necessarily be only a young man’s game because old generals have also proved their mettle in military history. But war definitely is a poor man’s game. Not in the literal sense of the word but only to imply the simple lifestyles of the men running the show. Forget their book deals, forget their lecture circuit fees and forget their fabulous pensions and compensations. Just look at the living quarters of the serving heads of command of the US army. The Central Command (CENTCOM) boss’ residence, the home of he who runs two major wars, would pale out in comparison to our corps commanders’ palaces. We need men of action, not pampered mandarins. It is all natural for the salaried middle-class to keep an eye on their nest eggs but for the fixation on plots to outstrip all other passions is disturbing.

There is a reason a popular adjective for frugality is derived from one of the best armies the world has seen, the Spartan army. You can’t have one without the other.