Misunderstanding and mistrust galore
Husain Haqqani’s previous book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military invited the ‘wrath’ of the establishment and mustered accusations of being anti-Pakistan. Magnificent Delusions continues the journey of former Pakistani ambassador to the US on the ‘treasonous’ path.
Mr Haqqani clarifies from the onset that the book is not a memoir, despite the former ambassador being a key player in US-Pakistan ties in the year 2011, which was the annus horribilis for the bilateral relationship, with the Raymond Davis affair, the Osama bin Laden raid and the Salala attack. For that reason alone, a memoir would’ve provided blockbuster entertainment. Even so, Magnificent Delusion as a sketch of history and foreign policy is a thoroughly exhilarating read nonetheless.
While the book oscillates around the US-Pak spine, it is indubitably a well-rounded critique of Pakistan itself, from its inception to the modern day mayhem. And of course it is not devoid of its controversial moments.
From implying that Pakistan was aware of bin Laden’s presence in Abbotabad, to Asif Ali Zardari turning down President Barack Obama’s offer of a long-term strategic partnership, the book discusses all the unceremonious anecdotes in the Pak-US relationship, barring one – and no prizes for guessing which one.
The book basically kicks off with Mohammad Ali Jinnah setting the tone for Pak-US relations by exclaiming almost immediately after Pakistan’s inception that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America,” since “Pakistan is the pivot of the world.” From that moment onwards, the leaders of Pakistan almost consider American aid as their strategic ‘right’ since Pakistan’s geographical location provided a direct link with Middle East and pre-1991 was the ideal place to act as the American playground to plot their anti-communist manoeuvres. The dependence on US aid is a part of the legacy Pakistan’s founding fathers, which every one of their political offspring has clung on to wholeheartedly.
But Haqqani is harsh on the US throughout the book as well for trusting the wrong people, especially at the time when ‘India or Pakistan’ was a veritable question. While Pakistan unrelentingly clamoured for military aid, the US intermittently provided it everything that the powers that be thought would be needed in fighting the communists. While every single man taking over the helm of government in Pakistan only had one militaristic target in mind: India. Furthermore, the post 9/11 double games where Pakistani leaders announced wholehearted support for the counterterrorism policy of the US while simultaneously protecting terrorists deemed useful for Pakistan’s plan of action in Afghanistan and India, have been highlighted as well.
And it is this assortment of demands, delusions and deceit that mars Pakistan’s ties with the US and constitutes the lion’s share of Mr Haqqani’s narration in this book.
Also releasing virtually at the same time as Magnificent Delusions was Daniel Markey’s No Exit from Pakistan which not only shared its theme with Mr Haqqani’s book but also uncannily narrated many similar insights. The most notable of these was Pakistan rebuffing Obama’s efforts for a strategic partnership in 2009, with both authors discussing how the US president could’ve presented a stronger case and convinced Islamabad to let go of the extremists by “changing the strategic landscape” by committing long term to the regional security and in turn parrying away any scepticism that Pakistan might have had with regards to India dominating Afghanistan and flanking Pakistan from both wings. Mr Markey believes that the US announcing its departure date from Afghanistan was a “crucial blunder”.
Even in their conclusions Haqqani and Markey shared their opinion about the US-Pakistan ties, believing that a strong bilateral partnership might not be possible between the two countries in the near future, even though both authors have warned the US against treating Islamabad as a foe.
Magnificent Delusions is brimming with exhilarating narrations of private meetings between some of the Who’s Who of politics and how a few charismatic personalities shaped up the bilateral ties between the US and Pakistan, and in turn impacting Pakistan’s own history as well.
Mr Haqqani doesn’t play the blame game in the book and instead prefers to express how the two countries have continued to maintain for over 60 years that they are allies, even though the relationship has always brimmed with misunderstandings galore.
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Book Excerpts
“Then, less than a month after independence, on September 7, 1947, Jinnah declared at a Cabinet meeting: “Pakistan [is] a democracy and communism [does] not flourish in the soil of Islam. It [is] clear that our interests [lie] more with the two great democracies, namely the UK and the USA rather than with Russia.” His words were immediately conveyed to American diplomats in Karachi, who duly reported them to Washington. Four days later, on September 11, Jinnah announced in another Cabinet meeting that it was important for the United States and the West to ally with Pakistan against the Soviet Union
“The ill-defined ideal of a South Asian Muslim homeland was now mired in fractious feudal politics as generals and civil servants scrambled to put together plans for their country’s security and prosperity.”
(Pakistan, following Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination)
““The strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people of Pakistan make them a dependable bulwark against communism.””
(US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles)
“Even though the Americans had arranged a series of visits to US military facilities for the Pakistan army commander, Ayub stormed into the office of Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade and said, “For Christ’s sake, I didn’t come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let’s make a decision.””
“In his memoirs Nixon described Nehru as “the least friendly leader” that he had met in Asia. After returning to Washington he told the National Security Council (NSC) that “Pakistan is a country I would like to do everything for. The people have fewer complexes than the Indians”
“Ayub wanted to change what he described as Pakistan’s foundational dilemma: Until 1947, he wrote, “our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims; territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven, smaller provincial loyalties.”
“Eisenhower said that the United States was “doing practically nothing for Pakistan except in the form of military aid,” which “was perhaps the worst kind of a plan and decision we could have made.” Describing it as “a terrible error,” the president wondered why the United States was “hopelessly involved in it.” He also commented that the United States had “the same damned problem with Turkey” and that America’s “tendency to rush out and seek allies was not very sensible.””
“People were told that India attacked Pakistan and the United States stabbed Pakistan in the back by withholding crucial military materiel. The Pakistani people were not told that Pakistan’s alliance treaties with the United States did not apply to war with India or that the 1965 war had, in fact, started because of Pakistan’s attempt to militarily change the status quo in Kashmir.”
“Apparently Pakistan had not informed the Americans about getting MIG aircraft and tanks from China before the war. Komer concluded that “if there’s any history of broken moral commitments, it’s on the Pak side – not ours.”
“During Richard M. Nixon successful campaign to become the thirty-seventh president of the United States, Pakistan was not mentioned at all; the Vietnam War was the major foreign policy issue during the 1968 elections. But Nixon did feel a strong attachment to Pakistan, so much so that he visited Pakistan within the first few months of his presidency. Pakistan was also his country of choice as the intermediary when opening relations with China. And it was in defense of Pakistan that he described Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as “a b*tch” and an “old witch.” Not to be left out, Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, likewise made the unusual remark: “the Indians are b**tards anyway.”
“Nixon recognized that “The partition of Pakistan is a fact” and asked, “Now the point is, why then, Henry, are we going through all this agony?” Kissinger replied, “We’re going through this agony to prevent the West Pakistan army from being destroyed” because “the world’s psychological balance of power” was at stake. The United States could not allow a Soviet ally to defeat an American ally.”
“On December 14, as the Indian forces surrounded Dhaka, the Pakistani High Command told the besieged garrison that “Yellow and White help expected from North and South shortly,” a reference to their imaginary Chinese and American military support. At this point Nixon ordered the deployment of an aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal. The maneuver was aimed at India, but Indira Gandhi was not intimidated. In response, she directed the Indian navy, if they encountered US vessels, to invite American officers for tea aboard their ships.”
“Then, a letter from Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev provided Nixon the excuse he needed to back down. Brezhnev offered a “guarantee that there would be no attack on West Pakistan” once war had ended in the East. Kissinger told Nixon that this meant “We are home.” Nixon had wanted to save Pakistan, and he wanted to believe that he had done so. He did not see the irony that, in the end, a Soviet assurance—and not American arms supplied over two decades—saved only one half of Pakistan.”
““It is preposterous to think that in an association with a great power like Russia the great power’s interests will not prevail,” Bhutto said while commenting on Indian relations with the Soviet Union. But he did not see the paradox in his own suggestion of close defense bonds between Pakistan and the United States. If Soviet interests would prevail in that great power’s ties with India, surely Pakistan could not expect that its interests would be paramount in an alliance with the United States.”
“Bhutto then asked the rhetorical question: “Is something wrong with the basic concept of Pakistan?” Then he answered it himself, saying, “I don’t think this can be. Two million people have given their lives for the idea of Pakistan. But people keep calling it into question.” He cited the two million dead as a reference to Muslims killed during the riots over partition, which was a consequence of the idea of Pakistan rather than preplanned sacrifice for it. Bhutto had effectively proved Nehru and Indira Gandhi’s assertion that the need to justify their nationhood troubled Pakistanis most. Neither Kissinger nor Nixon knew that Bhutto’s analysis was uncannily similar with the conversation Ayub had with Eisenhower in Karachi in 1959.”
When they met on December 7, 1982, Reagan mentioned the nuclear question to Zia but did not give it a higher priority than Pakistan’s role as a frontline state in confronting the Soviet Union.
After meeting Zia, Reagan wrote in his diary for that Tuesday: “The weather turned out fine for the official greeting ceremony for Pres. Zia of Pakistan. We got along fine. He’s a good man (cavalry). Gave me his word they were not building an atomic or nuclear bomb. He’s dedicated to helping the Afghans & stopping the Soviets.”
“The most sincere reaction of the government of Pakistan to the Bin Laden strikes,” wrote Inderfurth, “is exasperation at the unneeded difficulties this event has created for them in dealing with their domestic political situation, and in particular, in keeping the religious parties happy and relatively off the street.” When the Americans pressed him to do something about Al-Qaeda, Sharif asked them to train an ISI team secretly in order to hunt down bin Laden—a plan that did not materialize.”
“I was on my way to Islamabad from Washington via London and Dubai on the evening of May 1, 2011, when US Navy SEALS conducted their clandestine operation to kill Osama bin Laden in his fortified compound in Abbottabad. The Americans had kept their plans secret from Pakistan, and no one in our government had any clue about the commando mission. I first learned about bin Laden’s death when I turned on my cell phone upon landing at Heathrow airport in the early morning of May 2. Among the many messages waiting for me was one from the foreign minister, instructing me to turn around immediately and return to Washington.”
“By November 2011 I myself had become a victim of the mistrust and misunderstanding between the two nations. A US businessman of Pakistani origin, now residing in Monaco, claimed in an article that I had asked him to deliver a secret memo to Mullen, seeking US help in thwarting a military coup right after the US operation that killed bin Laden. Kayani and Pasha claimed that their inquiries supported my accuser’s claim. The Pakistani media dubbed the affair “Memogate.” To prove my fidelity to Pakistan, I returned to Islamabad and resigned from my position as ambassador.”
Magnificent Delusions
Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding
By Husain Haqqani
Publisher: Public Affair
Pages: 415; Price: Rs1599