Nawaz Sharif in Kabul

Peace depends on Afghan factions; Pakistan can only offer assistance

On a one day visit to Kabul Saturday, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif gave appropriate reassurances to his host, the lame duck President Hamid Karzai. “Achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s interest”, and also that “Islamabad desires friendly and good neighbourly relations with Afghanistan based on mutual trust‚ respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.” But the key question – whether peace will be negotiated and restored in Afghanistan before the US and NATO drawdown is completed next year – remains intractable, with Karzai’s personal ambition to stay relevant and extend his influence beyond the April 2014 Afghan presidential election being a stumbling block in itself.

With Karzai making deft manoeuvres to deny the US the comfort of Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) – covering the role of US soldiers who remain in Afghanistan after 2014 –straightaway despite the Grand Loya Jirga having approved it, the post drawdown situation remains uncertain. Among his other demands, Karzai wants direct talks with the Taliban. Pakistan is facilitating it through creating an environment in which these talks between the divergent Afghan groups could take place. In a serious bid to support revival of the Afghan peace process, Pakistan has set senior Afghan leadership free. “The recent release of senior Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar shows that Pakistan is committed to helping bring peace to Afghanistan”, said Nawaz Sharif, adding: “agreement had been reached with President Karzai for a mechanism to allow members of Afghan peace council to continue talks with Mullah Baradar”. Though the PM did not provide any details, Karzai acknowledged, “A few days ago Salahuddin Rabbani, head of the peace council, visited Pakistan to discuss how Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US can work together to bring peace to the region.”

While Pakistan’s role is seen as vitally important for peace in Afghanistan, it is perhaps much overrated. Despite being a major Taliban backer, it held little sway over the regime in Kabul (1996-2001). And in spite of its critical material support, Karzai has mostly found fault with Pakistan – often imitating the US in demanding ‘do more’ in tones similarly shrill and domineering. Essentially peace in Afghanistan depends on warring Afghan factions themselves. And driven by their own motives, persuasion works seldom and even then not quite substantively. In this backdrop, expecting that Nawaz Sharif can either make a recalcitrant Taliban enter into substantive talks with Karzai or Karzai can be influenced to yield and sign the pact with the US, at best remains a point of conjecture.