Pakistan’s foreign policy, right from the beginning
The book is an insider’s view of the development of Pakistan’s relations with major foreign powers and neigbouring countries. The writer also provides the rationale for alliance with the US and the decisions to join the defence pacts, including CENTO and SEATO. It is the establishment’s narrative of the country’s foreign policy.
The foreign policy of a nation follows its overall objectives. Jinnah had visualised Pakistan as a modern, liberal, democratic and welfare state where religion was to be a personal matter having nothing to do with the business o the state. Abdul Sattar takes note of Jinnah’s attachment to democracy and liberalism. “Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan as a Muslim, liberal, democratic and modern nation state predisposed him in favour of close relations with democratic countries.”
Though Sattar fails to underline the fact, the military-bureaucratic elite had assumed real power in Pakistan soon after its creation. The focus thus shifted from the welfare of the people to strengthening the armed forces. This laid the foundation of a system that was to gradually transform Pakistan into a national security state. A foreign policy doctrine suited for the purpose was thus devised.
The doctrine rests on the concept of ‘the tyranny of disparity in the region’ with Pakistan facing a permanent threat from a much stronger India. Pakistan was thus forced to look for allies and to enter into defence pacts. In the 1980s another potent threat was invented, the imminence of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan dictated by its search for ‘warm waters.’
As Sattar puts it, “the contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy were thus shaped by the desperate need for arms to ensure the security of the new state and the funds to finance its economic development.”
The reasons to prefer the US over the Soviet Union given by Sattar are quite interesting. “The Soviet system, however, was unattractive to League leaders because of its restrictions on freedom, atheist ideology, and sponsorship of subversion in other countries.”
The military-bureaucratic elite in fact never displayed any fondness for democracy. The declaration of fondness for freedom was in fact meant to make successive arbitrary rulers and military dictators palatable to the US and the West. The record belies the claims of commitment to democracy. Governor General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed the Constituent Assembly. There were no general elections in the country for 27 seven years till 1971. Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza made a mockery of democracy by sending home one prime minister after another. Under Ayub a highly repressive system was introduced which paid scant respect to human rights, the press was gagged and scores of politicians were incarcerated and debarred from taking part in politics through black laws devised for the purpose. Restrictions were put on trade unions and students organizations, and the natural growth of the civil society was hindered. The Zia regime turned out to be the most repressive of them all.
The way crucial decisions were taken by the elite indicated lack of institutional discipline. This is exemplified by the way the government joined the two defence pacts, the SEATO and Baghdad pact which was later renamed CENTO, which were to have long term effect on the future of the country.
The government, we are told by Sattar, had reservations about SEATO as the treaty did not cover Pakistan against Indian aggression insofar as the US was concerned. Washington had insisted that its obligation would apply only in the event of communist aggression. “…However, upon urging by Dulles, Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan decided to sign the treaty nevertheless. The Pakistani cabinet was surprised and displeased and some of its members were critical of the foreign minister. Zafrullah Khan offered to resign. On reflection the cabinet quietly acquiesced in his judgment.”
Sattar defends Zafrulah’s judgment, arguing that not signing would have “jeopardised the aid Pakistan so desperately sought.”
In the case of Baghdad Pact, the government was disappointed with the promised amount of US aid and was not keen to join the pact. But Ayub Khan who was defence minister-cum-army chief agreed to join the pact. “In June (1955) Ayub Khan was invited to Turkey. Prime Minister Nuri Said of Iraq was also there. He and the Turkish premier, Adnan Menderes, succeeded in convincing Ayub of the advantages of joining the pact, explaining that the United States could be counted upon to support the regional members, and that in any case the pact involved no additional commitments. Ayub agreed to recommend adherence by Pakistan. Within days Pakistan cabinet approved adherence by Pakistan”.
The penchant for foreign aid which predominantly comprised loans that were to be paid back was to turn into an addiction. Once it started pouring in, necessary steps were not taken to use it to put the economy on rails, as a number of other countries like South Korea later did. There were no land reforms as the ruling elite needed the big landlords of West Pakistan for political support.
As Cold War intensified US realized Pakistan’s utility as a link in a chain of alliances meant to ward off communism and contain the Soviet Union. Washington did not take any note of the rights violations in Pakistan as successive administrations were willing to serve the US designs in the region.
The stress on religion was needed to create hatred against India and to justify the burgeoning military expenditure. More funds were diverted to defence budget even if this meant the denial of education and health facilities to the masses and abandoning vital social development projects.
Despite the US making it clear that military aid given to Pakistan was only meant for defence against communist aggression and was not to be used against India, false expectations were built up among the general public. As the US refused to come to the country’s rescue in 1965 and 1971, this was turned into an excuse for making the nuclear bombs. As Agha Shahi put it, “The failure of the allies to come to Pakistan’s assistance and the powerlessness of the UN to restrain India from intervention and aggression in East Pakistan in 1971 convinced Pakistan’s leaders of the need to develop nuclear capability.”
The national security state served the purposes of the Western allies. The billions of aid strengthened the military machine while a portion of it was pocketed by those in power. Several futile encounters with India have cost the country heavily. Dragging Pakistan into Afghan war turned out to be a disaster. The militant networks trained, armed and brainwashed by the ISI to fight in Afghanistan or Kashmir were to turn on its own armed forces and have by now killed over 40,000 civilians and soldiers. State sponsored terrorism has thus become an existential threat for Pakistan. There is an urgent need to fundamentally revise the shortsighted foreign policy doctrine.
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947-2012,
A Concise History
Abdul Sattar,
Oxford University Press, Karachi
Third Edition 2013
Pages: 378; Price: Rs995
Aziz-ud-Din Ahmad is a political analyst and a former academic.
Well Sir i commend you for your article. I am approaching the end of a begyning and have also studied Pakistans foreign policy and experienced it. It is usually said the foreign policy is an extension of the domesic policy. Such was the case in Pakistan. Pakistanis always put all their eggs in one basket namely USA. Whatever negative be said about Ayub he was the one who brought prosperity and stability in pakistan until he started suffering from hubris. He brought green revolution in pakistan which stimulated it's agriculture. He signed the water treaty with India which has stood the test of times but alas like caeser he wanted absolute power and modern day ZAB finished him off. It is surprising the latters role in Pakistan's foreign policy is not mentioned at all. Ask any balding old man like mine what they think of Ayub there is only admiration but then we are a dying breed!
Comments are closed.