Whither the state

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Confusion reigns supreme

 

The debate about the martyrdom or otherwise of Hakimullah Mehsud took a new turn when Munawar Hassan posed in a TV talk show that if the Americans were dying a shameful death, how can a Pakistani soldier killed for the same pursuit become a martyr? The Taliban welcomed this advocacy but the army took a serious exception and called for an unconditional apology from the JI chief and a clarification from JI as a political party.

An ISPR statement issued late Sunday evening said, “Sacrifices of our shuhada and their families need no endorsement… Strong condemnation of his views from an overwhelming majority leaves no doubt in any one’s mind that all of us are very clear on what the state of Pakistan is and [that] who are its enemies.”

It was not a mere off-the-cuff statement. Had it been some loose-tongued leader of another party, giving him benefit of doubt would be fair, but certainly not in the case of MH and JI. The party indeed has a long history of undermining the state for the sake of some delusional objectives called Pan-Islamism.

Maulana Maududi’s JI opposed the creation of Pakistan, calling the Quaid Kafir-i-Azam (the Great Infidel). Yet the JI also took the formation of Pakistan as a Godsend for furthering its interests, and started trying to turn the country into a religious laboratory. And, surprisingly, it succeeded in claiming the soul of Pakistan – ideologically, that is.

Beside other factors, three historical developments made it possible to make Pakistan what it is today – a country faced with serious identification issues with its citizens’ loyalty torn between faith and state:

1) The early leadership’s decision to negate the vision of its founder and lay the foundation of a theocratic state by making religious credentials for citizenship more important than loyalty to the state. The Objectives Resolution was the first formal ‘political’ step that provided leverage to the religious lobbies to dictate and shape the country as they liked.

2) The desire of the army to rule the country and have an upper hand vis-a vis the politicians and its decision to use religion as a tool. Hence, the convergence of interests of the armed forces and religious elements.

3) The role religious parties and the state apparatus played for their own interests and that of the outside powers, particularly after the Ziaul Haq (1977) putsch and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979).

The leadership after Quaid didn’t change the direction of the state due to its love for religion. They did it because they had no constituency in the newly independent state but still wanted to rule it without elections and democracy for as long as it could be possible. So, first class ‘Pakistaniyat’ was stringed to being a good Muslim. They continued their musical chairs till 1958 when an army general finally decided to bring it to an abrupt end.

But the problem compounded. The army intervention gave it a taste of power. The dilemma reoccurred: the generals too wanted to rule for as long as possible. The generals’ desire for self-perpetuation led to the dismemberment of its eastern wing and the biggest defeat in Muslims’ history.

Hard to explain to the people why it lost half of the country, the army went into an informal alliance with the religious lobbies, particularly Jamaat-i-Islami, to propagate that the defeat was not due to the incompetence of the army or its intervention in politics. It was a ‘curse’ from God due to the waywardness of a particular person (Gen Yahya Khan). The Army and JI became ‘trustworthy’ partners because they had very recently discovered good allies in each other while working together in East Pakistan with the JI’s al-Shams, al-Badr militants fighting with the army. This Mullah-Military alliance helped both the parties, it gave JI political room to manoeuvre and it helped the army not only in erasing the stigma of defeat but also to pave the way for any future takeover.

The real bad luck struck the country when a JI-minded general reached at the helm of affairs. He was bereft of any legitimacy so he started using the religion for political purposes. But it was not a long wait when the former Soviet Union blundered into Afghanistan. From then onward, there was no going back and everything exploded at once. The US supported it and the Saudis (threatened by the Iranian Revolution) match every dollar with a dollar. Along the armed forces, religious parties, lobbies and personalities gained from this situation like anything.

But amongst all, it was the JI for which it turned out to be a real boon. The party went shoulder-to-shoulder with the ISI in the US-funded Jihad operations. Dollars and weapons were distributed by the Zia regime through JI. Books propagating Syed Qutb’s and Maulana Maududi’s interpretations were published in the US and sent to Pakistan for onward distribution among Afghan ‘Mujahideen’. Inside the country the JIliterature was gradually made part of the curriculum and Pink Floyd’s bricks started baking in educational kilns. After 30 years of production, those bricks have now become an insurmountable wall for the politicians, the army, the leftover John Lennons in the media.

What Munawar Hasan is telling the nation is exactly what Fazlullah, Hakimullah and other terrorists have been literally using for slitting throats, challenging the writ of the state and conquering its territories in the tribal and other areas of KP for a long time. But this is what Zia started and Musharraf accentuated at the state level during their illegal and unconstitutional stints. It is stating the obvious to say that civilian governments in between were just helpless.

Many said that the rulers (not political) were taking the state on a suicidal course and that what some individuals were patronizing (so-called Islamization, purification of individual, strategic depth policy, etc.) apparently for furthering state interests had to boomerang one day. The very shrewd and misleading question, “Whether you are a Muslim or a Pakistani first?” tells the whole story. This is not a question. This is an explanation of the prevailing great confusion regarding state, religion, terrorism, terrorists, soldier and Shaheed. All Pakistanis feel guilty if they happen to reply “a Pakistani first” or “what has religion to do with my nationality?” Even if they are not alleged of blasphemy, they consider it a sin deep down.

Now, the social and political landscape has reached a point where those fighting and dying for the cause of their country and its people are considered ‘traitors’ or ‘American mercenaries’. And martyrs are equated with dogs killed in US drone strikes. At least this is what leaders of two largest and most influential religious parties of the country are doing these days. But to say that they have found such guts on their own, will be an obfuscation of reality. Ziaul Haq groomed JI (the Afgan Mujahideen), Musharraf pampered JUI-F (the Afghan Taliban) – there was a corresponding change in the face of domestic retrogressive elements vis-à-vis a qualitative change in Afghanistan.

There are people who are still trying their best to turn the debate into a religious one which it is not. This has always been a ploy of the rightist elements and Taliban apologists to give every debate a religious tint when they feel exhausted in logic and reasoning. Till now they have hushed up every important issue under the religious rug. But the severity of challenges to the state multiplied beyond our knowledge and understanding with each such attempt aimed at stopping debates on national issues that challenge their narrative.

In the past Qazi Hussain Ahmad as a senator revolted against the state by declaring that he didn’t recognize the borders of the country. But he got away with it. Then it was Maulana Abdul Sattar Niazi as a minister in previous Nawaz Sharif government who pledged disobedience to the country’s constitution. He also went scot free. Not only these two individuals, groups in the tribal and settled areas were allowed to challenge the writ of the state, subjugate its people and occupy its territory. Younger generation and political narrative were allowed to swing in extremists/terrorists favour. And confusion was allowed to confound on the other side of the river about the real identity and objectives of the anti-state elements because all this was necessary for, a) discrediting the politicians, and b) continuing the flawed strategic depth policy.

The fire now seems to be crossing the river. The propaganda has routed our older and younger generation and new political parties representing youth. Mainstream religio-political parties have sharpened their teeth when they were disengaged from Jihadist projects. Many of our ‘assets’ of the past have turned their guns on us. The remaining are likely to do so in not-too-distant a future.

What do the powers that be want now? Do they still want to pursue some elusive goals in some faraway lands, while losing their own state bit by bit? Or they would like to seriously review their own conduct and try to save the state, if they still can? Will they like to end their ‘confusion’ which is oozing even from the ISPR’s Nov 10 press release when it refers to ‘respected and revered’ Maulana Maududi and when it claims that “strong condemnation of his (Manawar Hassan) views from an overwhelming majority leaves no doubt in any one’s mind that all of us are very clear on what the state of Pakistan is and [that] who are its enemies.”

As far as ‘liberal fascists’ like this writer are concerned, they don’t consider anyone a martyr who stands in revolt against the state, cuts the throats of its citizens, blows them up in bomb blasts, fires upon its soldiers and is then taken out in some drone strike. For them martyrs are those innocent civilians who were killed by terrorists in the name of religion and those soldiers who laid down their lives for the cause of this poor state called Pakistan.

 

The writer is a freelance journalist/columnist and can be reached at: [email protected].