The killing of Tehreek-e-Taliban chief (TTP) Hakimullah Mehsud in a US drone strike on Friday has unleashed a wave of speculations about its implications on the TTP, Pakistan and beyond.
Pakistan’s most important insurgent organisation TTP is now facing a succession challenge as Mehsud’s deputy Abdullah Behar was also killed in the strike while another key figure Latif Mehsud was captured three weeks ago in Afghanistan by US special forces.
On the other hand, political scientists have turned to studying these so-called decapitation strikes and their effect on targeted organisations and war outcomes. A study of 298 incidents of leadership targeting concludes that such efforts are generally ineffective and are unlikely to work against long-lived religious organisations. A research based on evidences from Afghanistan suggests that airstrikes actually increase insurgent attacks and that if these patterns hold in Pakistan, we should observe TTP retaliation in the coming days and weeks, Washington Post said on Saturday.
However, another study concludes that the successful decapitation not only shortens wars but also lowers their intensity.
University of Chicago political science Assistant Professor Paul Staniland said that the TTP’s structure will play an important role in determining its future. He identified that the TTP as a parochial group lacks a strong central command, and instead it is made up of powerful factions based on local networks. He said despite having prominent individual leaders like Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Mehsud, the TTP has acted more as a militarised coalition than a well-oiled war machine. Unlike integrated groups like Hamas, there does not appear to be a coherent institutional command that can quickly recover from decapitation or create and implement strategy throughout the organisation. Paul said as the TTP’s tumultuous 2009 leadership succession after Baitullah’s death showed, the death of a top leader opens the door for in-fighting and factional rivalry but because the top leader has limited power, decapitation alone is unlikely to destroy these groups.
He said the TTP will experience a complicated succession process in coming weeks. In the longer term, it seems unlikely that there will be any unified organisational response to Hakimullah’s death. The autonomy of local factions in a parochial group may allow some to cut their own formal or de facto deals with the Pakistani state. Even if this occurs, however, it is no panacea. Pakistan’s deals with armed groups often create spheres of influence rather than consolidating state power. The terms of any deals with the TTP or individual factions will need to be carefully scrutinised to understand their actual impact.
At the same time, other factions may become more aggressive and intensify their attacks in revenge against the US and its perceived proxies in the Pakistani government. The comparatively weak TTP central command means that local units are not devastated by leadership decapitation. Killing Mehsud alone will neither shatter nor unify the TTP. As a result of its structure, there will be different reactions across the various parts of the group, further complicating the battle space in the northwestern Pakistan.