Will it be picked up?
While Nawaz Sharif and his kitchen cabinet is still grappling over the potentially thorny issue of finding a successor to the outgoing COAS, leader of the Pakistani Taliban Hakimullah Mehsud has thrown the gauntlet. While rejecting ‘talks through the media’ the enigmatic Taliban leader has reiterated demand for implementing sharia in Pakistan, asserting that jihad against ‘kafirana system ‘ would continue even after withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
The prime minister has responded to Hakimullah’s lament by reiterating the government’s resolve to talk with the Taliban. Easier said than done!
Although Hakimullah claims that he does not want to negotiate through the media, it is the Taliban who have proved to be savvier than their adversaries in using the media to their advantage. Thanks to a policy of procrastination, dithering and sheer opportunism of our political elite, the Taliban know that this is the best time to strike – when the Pakistani state is in complete disarray. And ‘dialogue with the Taliban’ lobby is in a tizzy about what to do next?
Despite the fact that we are in a virtual state of war, the question of choosing Gen Kayani’s successor is still hanging in the air. Kayani also known as, ‘the soldier’s soldier’ did the right thing by announcing his retirement once his term expires at the end of next month. Probably the government’s failure to announce his successor and the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), forced his hand.
An unsubstantiated story leaked by a PML-N media mogul to a somewhat professionally inexperienced journalist found its way in the Wall Street Journal. It erroneously claimed that Kayani was lobbying to become chairman of an upgraded CJCSC. The COAS had to issue a statement to clear the air.
The prime minister while claiming that the government is fully cognizant of its constitutional obligations is keeping his cards close to his chest. He has vowed to announce the new army chief and CJCSC simultaneously once a decision is reached on the two crucial appointments.
The political leadership is entitled to take its time if these appointments had come up as a bolt from the blue. The top leadership of the khakis is retiring after completing their terms. Hence as per the norm their respective successors should have been announced much before they had to finally hang up their boots.
Admittedly choosing the right person as the next COAS is indeed a crucial decision. Not only he must not be a Bonapartist or an adventurist – like Gen Kayani’s predecessor Gen Pervez Musharraf – he must be highly competent to handle the job cut out for him. He will have to make choices having far reaching internal and geo-strategic implications for Pakistan.
Gen Kayani was at the helm of Pakistani military for almost a decade. He served as the head of the ISI before becoming COAS in place of Musharraf in 2007. He was a trusted lieutenant of the general who felt comfortable doffing his uniform with Kayani heading the military.
Musharraf unlearnt the lesson he taught Nawaz Sharif the hard way. In Pakistan an army chief’s first loyalty is to his institution rather than his mentor.
To his detriment Musharraf, like the Sharifs before him, was forced to go into exile in ignominy. Now back in Pakistan comfortably ensconced in his Chak Shahzad mansion as a prisoner, embroiled in different cases mostly relating to murder, he keeps himself busy between preparing his defence, and writing another memoir.
Gen Kayani by virtue of leading for two terms is leaving his distinct imprint on the military. He has set a new tradition by strengthening democratic institutions and supporting a smooth civilian transition.
In March 2007, he was present as the ISI chief in the meeting in which Musharraf with his nominal Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in toe sacked Chief justice of Pakistan Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Later as COAS it was also Kayani who forced a reluctant Zardari to reinstate the CJP.
On the flip side Kayani’s record on combating terrorism, fighting the Taliban of different hues and nationalities and dealing with India and the USA is somewhat mixed.
It is too early to judge Kayani’s leadership role on the above counts. History will be the best judge. Nonetheless it is safe to say that Pakistan is a much less safe and secure place now than it was six years ago when Kayani assumed the post of COAS. In Balochistan too, he had an opportunity to make a clean break from Musharraf’s bloody legacy when the PPP was keen to provide the healing touch. He did not, and as a consequence Balochistan is still restive.
There is merit in military’s complaints that in the war against terrorism the civilian government consistently failed to provide ownership or a modicum of leadership role. Even after clearing Swat of the militants, the army has to hold it in the absence of a functioning civilian structure.
However a major (in fact glaring) failing of the military to this date is its constant refusal to revisit its flawed strategic paradigm. An obsolete concept of Afghanistan being our strategic depth guides our war gamers. Despite claiming that terrorism is an existential threat bigger than India-centric doctrines is still being vigorously pursued.
Confusion reigns supreme towards the military’s policy towards the militants and jihadists. The Afghan Taliban is our strategic assets while the Pakistani variety that has exterminated thousands of our troops is our existential enemy. By the same logic anti-India jihadists are our assets while the rest are our enemies, or in some cases ‘frenemies’.
Similarly the military establishment as well as the civilian leadership loathes drone strikes on our badlands. But at the same time the military has consistently refused to launch an operation against the good and bad Taliban (they are the same) holed up there.
The PML-N government pledged in the APC on terrorism a month ago to take the matter of drone attacks to the Security Council, but practically speaking has not lifted a finger to walk the talk. And no civilian leadership including Nawaz and his predecessors dare order the military to do so.
In this milieu it is axiomatic that the successor to Kayani is chosen carefully. But his job description should be laid out for him – to steer the military towards a fresh strategic doctrine more in consonance to deal with the existential threats being faced by Pakistan of today.
Arif Nizami is Editor, Pakistan Today.