Following the general uproar about the Shahzeb murder case, The Attorney General has submitted a written statement, asking for the Supreme Court’s advice on the waiver of Qisas.
In his statement submitted in the apex court, the attorney general posed 18 questions that are directly relevant to the Shahzeb murder case.
The statement asked: “Whether the Supreme Court ought to pronounce a comprehensive and authoritative judgment on the issue of waiver of Qisas and compoundability of offences, under the provisions of sections 309, 310, 338-E, PPC, 1860, and section 345, CrPc 1898, especially since there are a number of authoritative Supreme Court precedents on this issue, or whether the law on this issue should be allowed to develop on a case to case basis?”
It also questions whether the decree of the Supreme Court should be limited to cases of murder by intent or should such a decree also be in relation to all offences involving the waiver of Qisas and compoundability of offences, under the provisions of 309, 310, 338-E, PPC, 1860, and section 345, CrPc 1898, especially since there are a number of authoritative Supreme Court precedents on this issue, or whether the law on this issue should be allowed to develop on a case to case basis?”
He further asked whether the ‘acquittal of the accused’ under Section 345(6) CrPC, 1898, has the same meaning as the ‘acquittal of the accused’ in ordinary criminal vernacular.
The AG also asked whether the condition for the waiver of Qisas is that the offender should admit to committing the offence, show remorse, ask for forgiveness from Allah and from the legal heirs of the victim(s)?
Is the permission of the relevant court a condition preceding the right to waive Qisas and to compound the offence not an absolute right?
In the context of the waiver of Qisas and the right to compromise, what is meant by ‘free will and without fear, coercion, undue influence and undue pressure and what procedure should the competent court adopt to ensure that the right to waive Qisas and compoundability of the offence, or the right to compromise, has been exercised out of freewill and without fear, coercion, undue influence and undue pressure?
Whether it is the duty of the state to ensure that the right to waive Qisas and compoundability of the offence, or the right to compromise, has been exercised out of freewill and without fear, coercion, undue influence and undue pressure? What measures (that is, physical protection, legal aid, etc) is the state’s duty to provide to the legal heirs and victim in order to ensure that it performs this duty?
Whether any judicial finding about Fasad-fil-Arz and imposition of the sentence of either death, life imprisonment and imprisonment of up to 14 years, without substantive due process, would not be a violation of Article 10A of the Constitution 1973. Whether the offences under Anti-Terrorism Act (ATC), 1997, are compoundable, or subject to waiver of Qisas or not?
To what extent are the competent courts powers to impose conditions limited by the consent of the parties? Whether the lack of implementation of Section 338-G, PPC, 1898, (relating to providing finances to poor prisoners to benefit from this right of Qisas and compoundability of offences and mechanism protecting the rights of the victims for the purpose of compensation) is not a violation of Article 4 & 25 of the Pakistan Constitution, 1973.
Travesty of justice unmatched in recent times.
Travesty of justice being defined as miscarriage of justice; an act of the legal system that is an insult to the system of justice.
Supreme Court of Pakistan must act as the main body to prevent making Quranic injunctions becoming a mockery.
We want justice as Pakistani Brothers and Sisters of Shahzaib
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