APC dead in the water – but not quite

With the assassination of GOC Malakand division Gen Sanaullah Niazi (along with a colonel and lance naik) and the September 22 Peshawar Church attack (killing 83) immediately following the APC, the option of a negotiated settlement to the insurgency apparently seems no longer viable.
“Unfortunately… the government is unable to move forward on what it had envisaged, on what it had wished for,” said PM Nawaz Sharif in London on Monday, on his way to the 68th UN General Assembly session in New York.
Yet there are signs that in their eagerness to extend the olive branch, the federal and KP governments over-reached – not taking into account the insurgency hierarchy or its financial and material lifelines – implying a position of government weakness rather than strength. And even though some splinter groups opposed to talks can exploit these weaknesses presently, in the final analysis, considering the demographics of the TTP rebellion, there is no viable option for either side but talking, a Pakistan Today investigation has revealed.

Didn’t play it right
“Historically it’s never the right option to let an internal fight linger,” said Gen (r) Hameed Gul, former ISI chief and veteran of the ‘Soviet jihad’, when indoctrinated jihadists were first experimented with. These mujahideen ‘soldier-clerics’ later mutated into Taliban, al Qaeda, etc.
“Locals die on both sides and the military suffers wear and tear of equipment, which can only benefit Pakistan’s enemies”.
Gen Gul is among observers who believe that while the government’s preference for talks was rightly placed, it failed to play out the strategy correctly.
High-profile attacks tend to hide the fact that TTP’s operational capacity has been considerably downgraded since the ’09 Swat operation. Military operations in six out of seven agencies, along with persistent drone attacks, have damaged TTP and al Qaeda networks in the region. Much of its command structure has been disrupted, and most AQ militants have shifted focus to Syria, depriving the insurgency of its best operational minds.
“The rift between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban, too, has grown considerably,” added the retired intelligence chief. “Molvi Zaki, a trusted aide of Mullah Omer, recently led an armed clash with TTP’s Fazlullah group, which is based in the Kunar-Nooristan mountain range on the Afghan side, and masterminded Gen Niazi’s assassination last week. The Afghan Taliban no longer believe that the TTP play by Islamic rules.”
“The government’s haste in posturing for peace deprived intelligence agencies of the right environment to exploit these pressure points. And aware of their own weaknesses, TTP and their AQ patrons gambled on a cold, calculated show of potency to increase their bargaining power, according to security sources.
Most important factor
The 30-40 militant groups that comprise the umbrella TTP conglomerate were initially bankrolled by al Qaeda, and need a bulky and sustained cash flow to finance the jihad, hence the resort to activities like drug smuggling, kidnapping and extortion, etc. But the largest funds are routed through foreign intelligence agencies, which enable hostile governments to finance, arm, and train proxies (as in the case of TTP).
According to information available to Pakistan Today, Pakistani intelligence has traced large funds transfers from Indian, Israeli and American intelligence services to their Afghan counterpart in Kabul. These funds are then channelled to Pashtun and Punjabi Taliban groups in Pakistan.
“The Pathans usually restrict their (insurgent) activities to their areas and agencies. But the Punjabi groups are more outward looking. They carried out attacks like the GHQ and Sri Lankan team,” said counterinsurgency (COIN) officials on condition of anonymity.
Intelligence circles are even more concerned about support some militants enjoy from friendly countries like Saudi Arabia. Though very close to Islamabad, Riyadh continues to finance thousands of extremist madrassas across Pakistan. Their patronage has not wavered even as Pakistan has lost between forty and fifty thousand people to TTP and al Qaeda-related violence.
“The Saudis must be stopped,” said Gen Gul. “They’re funding terrorists and they’re getting very cosy with India”.
Coin officials lament, however, that despite intelligence successes there has been little concrete follow-up from Islamabad. If the government has raised the issue with concerned capitals, the exercise has been kept secret from even security and secret services.
“As long as they have access to arms, money, and high-level training, they will not feel pressured enough to submit to talks unconditionally,” they said, adding that “unless these holes are plugged, discussions should not be approached”.
Yet they also concede that eventually both sides will resort to negotiations. The war has caused far too much collateral damage, and both realise that, for their own reasons, they need the internal front to settle down before the Americans leave Afghanistan next year and the Taliban regain, or at least strongly influence, power in Kabul shortly afterwards.