Morsi, hung by his own petard

Self-inflicted discomfiture of the so-called political Islam in Egypt

The military coup that overthrew the first elected government was a setback for Egypt. The barbarous killing of over 1,000 civilians in the wake of the putsch was an unpardonable act.

So complete was the Morsi government’s isolation in the Arab world however that none other than Tunisia condemned the coup. The Arab street remained silent. Saudi Arabia endorsed the military’s ruthless suppression of the protesting Muslim. Brotherhood. Bahrain maintained that the crackdown was necessary to “restore security, stability and public order.” The UAE handed down $3 billion to the new government while it condemned the Brotherhood protestors.

The Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki expressed support for the Egyptian people’s ‘choices’ and congratulated Egypt’s interim president. Syria’s beleaguered Bashar al-Assad gleefully observed, “What is happening in Egypt is the fall of so-called political Islam… This is the fate of anyone in the world who tries to use religion for political or factional interests.”

In the rest of the Muslim world only Turkey, where the military coup revived bitter memories of the past, came out with a strong condemnation of the overthrow.

In Pakistan no religious party with the exception of Jamaat e Islami expressed solidarity with Morsi. The protests organized by JI however failed to mobilize the general public.

The policies pursued by Morsi had made his government unpopular at home and abroad. Had the opposition let the government complete its tenure, the Brotherhood would have lost badly in the next elections.

The problem with the parties professing political Islam, be they in Pakistan, Turkey or Egypt, is that their members consider themselves the chosen people or, as Jamaat e Islami puts it, the swaliheen. The self-righteous posture makes it difficult for them to work together with other political forces, particularly their opponents. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood considered the election victory a licence to rule unchallenged.

Give and take and reconciliation which constitute the lifeblood of democracy were thus alien to Morsi. It soon transpired that the promise of inclusiveness made by him was no more than bluff. While holding dialogue with the opposition leaders over the constitution in November, the government arbitrarily issued the decree that protected the contentious Constituent Assembly. This called to question the President’s credibility, leading the opposition to conclude that the offer for talks was meant only to buy time.

Within months of coming to power Morsi was not only in confrontation with the opposition but had developed strong differences with some of his rightist allies as well.

First was the confrontation with the liberals represented by the National Salvation Front (NSF). When later was invited by Morsi for parleys, the main opposition alliance refused, maintaining that it did not like to waste time on a ‘fake’ dialogue.

Morsi did not care to consult his allies from the extreme right like the Salafist Nour party either. This led the NSF and the Nour Party to join hands and demand for the formation of a national unity government, constitutional amendments and dismissal of the Morsi-appointed prosecutor general. They also called for launching immediate investigations into the bloodshed that led to the killing of more than fifty civilians.

Morsi concentrated on strengthening the Brotherhood’s grip over state institutions. In yet another cabinet shake-up, three more Brotherhood members were given ministerial portfolios. A month later Morsi appointed seven Brotherhood governors among sixteen newly-appointed governorate heads. The moves caused widespread worries among the opposition.

A democratic system can work only in the presence of checks and balances that include the parliament, an independent judiciary and free media. Morsi tried to turn all the three into handmaidens.

Both the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council were already dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies. Soon there were resignations and boycotts from the Constituent Assembly amidst complaints that the large Islamist group within it was monopolizing the drafting process.

A row developed between the Islamist dominated legislature and judiciary as the former tried to limit the powers of the courts, which was challenged by majority of Egyptian judges. This generated protests by the Islamists demanding a ‘purge’ of the judiciary.

In November Morsi issued constitutional decrees which provided him immunity from judicial overview, sacked the prosecutor-general and shielded the Islamist-dominated Shura council and the constituent assembly from dissolution.

The new constitution gave wide ranging powers to Morsi. The way the constitution was hurried through also caused widespread reaction. In a 19-hour long sitting the Brotherhood dominated assembly approved 234 articles of the draft, covering presidential powers, the status of Islam, the military’s role and human rights. It also extended the president’s tenure to eight years. The presumption was that the majority could take vital decisions about the country’s direction by steamrolling the opposition if necessary. This was bound to send a negative message.

Morsi called for a constitutional referendum on 15 December. The opposition rejected the referendum on the plea that the proposed constitution was not based on consensus. Soon after Morsi announced dates for elections to the lower house of parliament, again without taking neither the opposition nor his allies into confidence. The president was in haste and did not care for the consequences of alienating opponents who had been defeated in the presidential polls only by a wafer-thin margin.

Morsi’s solo flight provided an opportunity to the courts to step in. Egypt’s Administrative Court overturned the presidential decree calling for parliamentary elections in April.

Attempts were meanwhile made to muzzle the media. The Brotherhood demanded to investigate media persons on charges of “insulting the President.” Popular Egyptian satirist Bassem Youssef was questioned by prosecutors regarding allegations that he had defamed Morsi. It was quite late when Morsi finally realized that the cases against journalists had made him unpopular.

Inspired by the government’s insistence on introducing Sharia in the country a local prosecutor in Egypt ordered eighty lashes for a drunken man. The government canceled the order, but the incident added to the country’s religious tensions.

As Morsi single-mindedly followed his agenda of what came to be called “Brotherhoodisation” of the state institutions, he ignored the real problems faced by the people. Consequently Egypt’s already ailing economy deteriorated. Incompetence added to autocratic rule compounded the ills faced by economy. Increasing power cuts, petrol shortages and soaring food prices brought the crisis into millions of homes.

By the third week of March anti-Morsi sentiment was on the rise across Egypt. There were numerous attacks on offices of the ruling Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political wing of Muslim Brotherhood, and clashes between supporters and opponents of the president.

Soon an anti-Morsi signature campaign called Tamarrud, or ‘Rebellion’, began to gather support from the Egyptian masses. Tamarrud aimed to force Morsi out of office by collecting fifteen million signatures, two million more than the votes cast for him in the elections. Once it ended up getting 22 million signatures, Tamarrud announced plans for a mass demonstration and sit-in at the presidential palace on June 30, the first anniversary of Morsi in office, to press for his resignation. The protest received unprecedented support.

Morsi’s isolation provided the army an opportunity to enter the scene as arbitrator. It issued an ultimatum to all political parties to reach a settlement to end the ongoing confrontation.

On the D- day hundreds of thousands of protestors took to the streets calling on Morsi to step down. On July 1 the central command of the army gave an eight-hour ultimatum to the president to accept the demands of the opposition. Next day at midnight, a defiant Morsi addressed the nation in a forty-five-minute speech in which he insisted that any attempt to overthrow a legitimately elected president would be resisted with his own blood if necessary. The speech shocked the opposition because of its unrealistic defiance. The army decided to move in.

The Egyptian liberals may soon find that the army has come for the long haul. The Brotherhood might revert to terrorist activities. The people will meanwhile have to struggle again for the restoration of democracy. A more inclusive mindset and a policy of conciliation which are alien to parties professing political Islam could have saved the system as well as hundreds of lives.

The writer is a political analyst and a former academic.