The need for a cohesive counter-terrorism policy
According to media reports the US and the Pakistan military engaged in a prolonged and arduous process of negotiations that led to the roadmap for the peace process in Afghanistan – the roadmap that is now being followed through Doha. President Hamid Karzai’s objections to some preliminary steps in Doha seem to bear out this assertion – he wanted to be recognised as a party and not sidelined. If all this is true then the perception that it is the military in Pakistan that calls the shots on national security issues gets reinforced.
This will continue to be the situation till the newly elected government gets structures in place that coordinate intelligence to get a finished national intelligence estimate that can then be used to develop options for a national coordinated response. How this is done is a challenge for the government but it can be and should be done as soon as possible because the simultaneous problems that the country faces simply cannot be resolved by meetings and ad hoc measures. The need is for decision making and policy formulation and policy implementation.
The discussions with the Taliban are with the Afghan Taliban – the segment that is fighting the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan. These discussions will revolve around the prisoners in Guantanamo, the Constitution of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces and the make-up of the political and other institutions in Afghanistan. A successful conclusion of the dialogue could lead to a smooth exit for the US/ISAF from Afghanistan and political space for the Taliban. How this arrangement endures over a period of time will be an Afghan problem but it could have considerable impact for Afghanistan’s neighbours and those with economic interests in Afghanistan and beyond. The post-2014 US policy for greater South Asia will be an important factor – as will be Pakistan’s stability.
Pakistan’s problem is the insurgency in its western areas spearheaded by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but also being waged by a multitude of other smaller groups with their own interests and agendas. The TTP combine gets inspiration and support from others that see a destabilised Pakistan with exploitable vulnerabilities as being in their interest. Militant groups with sectarian, ethnic and separatist groups based within Pakistan have loosely aligned themselves with the TTP as well as politically sponsored criminal mafias within Pakistan. The result is a pattern of violence that defies any rational interpretation and that creates the image of Pakistan as an unraveling state incapable of cohesive focused action that cannot be economically viable unless its internal security problem is decisively addressed.
Like most such situations this is basically a struggle for control and power using religion and social divides to further a strategy. Pakistan has to face its demons and eschew the mindset that they feed upon. This brings us back to the question of a national response based on the threats identified in a national intelligence estimate. A successful reconciliation process in Afghanistan may help but will not resolve Pakistan’s problems. Pakistan has to do this on its own.
To do this Pakistan’s foreign policy must reduce external threats including support to those destabilising Pakistan internally. The economic policy must address the energy issue and give the nation a blueprint for recovery. The internal security situation must be addressed through a thought out strategy that has all the stakeholders on board and works to integrate the country. This will require some bold and drastic decision making. This can only happen if the downgraded National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is made into a National Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Authority that has the mandate to coordinate all intelligence activity to produce a National Intelligence Estimate. A National Security Adviser (NSA) in the absence of a National Security Council and a secretariat of experts is of no use. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) could be upgraded into a National Security Committee of the Cabinet (NSCC) with prime responsibility for decision making based on the response options developed by the NSA and his secretariat staff. The military will have to support this structure with its own organisational strength. These steps will give the civil-military relationship much needed stability and institutionalise policy formulation and implementation.
Spearhead Analyses are collaborative efforts and not attributable to a single individual.