The partially hidden politics within state institutions
Hamza Alavi in the essay ‘The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’ tirelessly explains the complex relationship between the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and its subjects – the citizens.
In the alternative history he offers of Pakistan’s complex bureaucratic superstructure, Alavi expounds on the intricate network that has been woven into the fabric of Pakistani state whose ultimate purpose is to serve a class that remains distant from the majority. The face of this complicated relationship has become increasingly obvious: democracy and the idea of political legitimacy. This veneer of a democratic state serves a dual purpose. The complicated structure of the state remains relatively shielded from the masses and it allows the oligarchic structure to maintain its hold on the political, and the so-called democratic, leadership.
As Alavi pointed out, the power pendulum within this structure is constantly swinging between various institutions of the state, with alternate politics lining the very heart of the superstructure.
One of the most potent things that Alavi highlighted in the essay was the fact that when “politicians seek favours from officials for some of their supporters, their relationship vis-a-vis the bureaucracy is weakened rather than strengthened. Politicians are reduced to playing the role of brokers for official favours.”
He goes on to add, “The politician can, however, ill afford to lose the goodwill of the official and this influences the overall balance of their collective relationship. The strength of the bureaucracy rests on the extensive proliferation of administrative controls and the direction of a vast array of public agencies engaged in a variety of activities.”
It is strange, then, that while the discourse of the military has been picked apart by politicians and analysts alike, very little attention has been given to the other superstructure that the general public has immediate access to – the bureaucracy.
An example of the partially hidden politics within state institutions would be Prime Minister Khoso’s three months in power. When the caretaker government was appointed, it wasted no time in reshuffling the bureaucracy to ensure ‘free and fair’ elections. At least 22 senior bureaucrats including Azmat Usman‚ Ahmed Baksh Lehri‚ Raja Abbas, Nasir Khosa and Waqar Masood were transferred from one post to another to make way for the interim government.
Apparently, Azmat, who was a leading figure of the Pakistan People’s Party government in the Establishment Division and had served time as Zardari’s press secretary and federal information secretary, even tried to reason with Khoso that no federal secretary could be removed within six days of appointment. While bureaucrats are theoretically meant to be state officials, Azmat had fared well under PPP and it must have been irksome for him to see his peers and colleagues getting (illegally?) transferred to posts they did not want.
Azmat faced Khoso’s wrath, was appointed as Food Security secretary and then unceremoniously shoved aside. Lehri, who was then the Food Security secretary, took over the Establishment Division.
Irritated by Azmat and also failing to change Islamabad IG Bani Amin, Khoso asked Lehri to prepare a list of aligned top officials both in Islamabad and in provincial governments. A massive posting spree was then unleashed, which also saw Sindh chief secretary being transferred and made Investment Board secretary while Chaudhry Ejaz was made Sindh chief secretary.
This transfers/posting spree resulted in senior bureaucrats filing a petition in the Supreme Court, reminding the country’s senior leadership that Anita Turab had ensured that the civil ‘servants’ remained committed to upholding the Constitution. While the Anita Turab case judgment is relatively recent, these bureaucrats have conveniently used the guise of ‘impartiality’ every single time the military seizes power. Their humble dedication to being just civil administrators is tacitly given the nod of approval when the judiciary says military takeovers are legitimate. Essentially, it gives one the picture of Pakistan’s bureaucracy, judiciary and military run the game while political ‘leaders’ take primetime spots on TV as national distractions.
Khoso’s erratic transfer spree has drawn humor from media circles about an old man quickly using all the perks and powers of his office before his three-month tenure is up. In reality, however, there is nothing funny about the fact that a former judge, who had been appointed prime minister, managed to use his new office as a boxing ring for setting up his favourite bureaucrats and picking fights with those he didn’t like.
If anything, Khoso managed to expose the positions of Pakistan’s senior bureaucrats. The first example was Azmat who enjoyed a close relationship with Zardari. Another would be Nasir Khosa, who is now likely to be the principle secretary to prime minister-elect Nawaz Sharif. While Khosa may be a man of integrity, it is very clear that he is a darling of the PML-N. When ECP had hinted that Nasir Khosa could be a good fit as chief secretary of Sindh, the PML-N issued a warning to the prime minister that he should just stick to his job – holding the elections. No one knows if Khosa himself wanted the Sindh job, but it is clear that in the short time the caretaker government was in place, he bided his time in a senior post, awaiting the return of Nawaz government.
To put a quick end to this increasingly embarrassing display, Judge-Prime Minister Khoso appeared before the Supreme Court and said, ‘Oops! Sorry.’ The angered bureaucrats go back to their routine lives because Khoso took back all orders that were objectionable. The judiciary won’t humiliate itself and one of its own by holding a judge-turned-prime minister in contempt of one of its orders. So all is well that ends well. Khoso was, then, just a little fly that proved a silly distraction for the bureaucratic structure who tolerated him until the next government was appointed.
The achievements of the caretaker government can be summed up as three months of petty squabbling with bureaucrats, worsened load-shedding crisis and a strange IMF bailout plan. Even credit or discredit for the May 11 elections would go to the ECP, since the caretaker setup failed to reign in security threats to political parties and made no real contribution to electoral reforms.
The writer is Web Editor at Pakistan Today and tweets at @aimamk