Pakistan Today

Taking stock of Pakistani Taliban: JUI-S ready to mediate, but with who?

Mulana Samiul Haq, the chief of Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islam –Samiul Haq (JUI-S) has expressed his zeal to negotiate with the Taliban in Pakistan. The religious scholar who heads the Darul Uloom Haqqania, on the Grand Trunk Road in Akora Khattak, has recently seen his political acclaim rise despite the defeat of his son on a national assembly seat.

“The Taliban consider me their father”, Samiul Haq declares. “The Afghan Taliban.”

The religious institution created by Sami’s father, Maulana Abdul Haq in Sept 1947 includes boasts famous alumni, including the likes of Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and the head of the Haqqani network, the veteran Jalaluddin Haqqani.

The Afghan Taliban have influence but no control over the Pakistani Taliban. Personally Samiul Haq does not even know the Pakistani Taliban, yet insists on his usefulness as a negotiator.

The 76-year-old Maulana from Akora has become the fifth politician to jump into the fray to help end Pakistan’s over a decade-long violent militancy. Although there is a general consensus amongst the newly elected representatives of the people to make peace with the militants, there appears to be little understanding as to ideological and social background of the myriad of groups that call themselves the Pakistani Taliban.

Who constitutes the Pakistani Taliban?

Broadly speaking, there are three categories of militant groups — foreign, national and local — operating in Pakistan.

  1. Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan: Led by its ameer, Hakeemullah Mehsud, this is the largest network. Having been displaced from its native South Waziristan, the TTP, now headquartered in North Waziristan, serves as a platform for several other groups with cells and operational capabilities across Pakistan. It has a national agenda but collaborates with other groups, across the border as well as inside Pakistan. It boasts of several affiliated groups, which though independent in operational matters, have ideological and operational linkages with the TTP. These include the Tehreek-i-Taliban Mohmand, Tehreek-i-Taliban Bajaur, Tehreek-i-Taliban Swat, Tehreek-i-Taliban Darra Adamkhel, Orakzai and Khyber. The TT(B) and TT(S) have in the past had separate peace talks with the government.
  2. Hafiz Muhammad Gul Bahadar Group: The Miramshah-based Hafiz Mohammad Gul Bahadar has also had a peace agreement with the government since 2008 (revived), the terms of which have never been implemented amid attacks on security forces and counter-artillery shelling. Authorities in North Waziristan’s regional headquarters have no writ in the area.
  3. Smaller & Independent Groups: These are all based in Khyber tribal region and include Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-i-Islam, Nahi-wa-anil-Munkar, pro-government Ansarul Islam and another relatively smaller group.
  4. Pro-government group: The Wana-based late Maulvi Nazir Group is the only so-called pro-government militant group, whose interests lie across the border in Afghanistan and has so far refused to be drawn into conflict with the Pakistani security forces following an agreement in 2007. That agreement still holds. Authorities in South Waziristan’s regional headquarters, therefore, enjoy some administrative control.
  5. The Punjabi Taliban: There are at least nine known groups called the Punjabi Taliban, many of them disillusioned by what they saw as retired Gen Pervez Musharraf’s betrayal of the Kashmiri freedom struggle. Others have stridently violent sectarian agendas — all based in North Waziristan.
  6. Foreign Groups: In terms of strength, chief among the foreign groups operating from North Waziristan, are the Haqqani network, followed by militants affiliated with Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Al Qaeda Central, the Islamic Jihad Union, Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Turkish Gamaat, Dutch Taliban, DT Mujahideen, Islamic Movement of Turkestan, Azeri Jumaat, Taifatul Mansurah etc.

What do they want?

Their demands are diverse, and complex, just as their origins. Briefly put, the following constitute the salient features of TTP’s agenda:

  1. Establishment of caliphate and enforcement of Sharia to replace the existing “infidel” democratic system and the Constitution.
  2. Pakistan pulls out of the US-led war on Terror, end drone strikes, sever ties with Washington and foreign policy should be within the dictates of Islam
  3. Pakistan Army’s withdrawal from tribal areas, relocation of security checks posts and handing over security to the Frontier Corps.
  4. Release of all TTP prisoners.
  5. The TTP will not lay down arms.
  6. Support the Afghan Jihad.
  7. Compensation and war reparations.

The government on the other hand has time and again refused to accept these demands, even on the negotiating table. Instead it has called for the groups to renounce arms, give up hopes of a parallel administration, respect the law of the land and expel foreign elements.

The peace agreements wrought to so far have failed because they aimed at buying peace by maintaining the status quo. The terms were not implemented, and the militants continued to run parallel administration. The local tribal system, weakened by years of state and militant assault, could not regulate the militants. Lack of trust between the parties, little understanding of the ground realities in the tribal areas, and absence of a unified strategy across the state organs also paved the way for failure.

At this point, one of the important questions for the newly elected government is a legal one. Post the enactment of the Anti Terrorism Act 1997, militant groups have been “banned” and the law would need to be tweaked if not overhauled before any negotiations can legally take place. Moreover, it is probably high time for the government to learn from past mistakes and weigh all pros and cons before heading to the negotiating table for the umpteenth time.

 For the original report, please see http://beta.dawn.com/news/1014886/jui-s-chief-sami-keen-to-mediate-but-clueless-about-ttp/?commentPage=1&storyPage=1

 

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