Religious radicalism in Indian subcontinent

A spider web of colonialism and modernity

Islam’s encounter with the European culture, or as some would say European domination of Islam’s culture, in the form of the umbrella word ‘modernity’, has been of monumental value for the historical development of the religion and its people. Usually, according to various historical narrations of this interactive phenomenon, the whole process can be loosely categorized under three different responses of the Muslims to the Europeans; namely resistance, reform and revolution. However, with the ushering in of the new post-colonial era and as these independent Muslim polities dabble with the democratic, industrial, progressive experiments; an even more critical response in the form of fundamentalism has emerged. This novel response is radically different from the triad of resistance, reform and revolution as it seeks a continuation of the colonial political structures yet makes them instrumental in ushering in a new Islamic polity. This new synthesis of sorts becomes even more critical in the Indian subcontinent as the reliogio-political fundamentalism becomes a valid form of expression in opposition to the liberalist and socialist platforms.

The rise of European dominance and eventually direct subjugation in the form of colonialism in the 19th century signalled significant historical changes for Muslims around the world. Firstly, it led to a reversal of trade in favour of the Europeans in opposition to the Muslim dominance over such areas of human activities. With the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope in 1488 and that of the New World in 1492, the trade routes under Muslim domination became largely obsolete as the nexus of the movement of money (read: silver) changed with the discovery of the Americas. Secondly, apart from the economic defeat, the Muslims encountered a significant political defeat at the hand of the European colonisers as well. Not only were they advanced militarily in the form of better weapon technology, they had proven themselves to be better, politically and administratively as well.

The repercussion of this defeat resounded the largest in the Indian subcontinent that had been ruled over by the Muslims. Starting by the conquests by the Umayyad dynasty in 710 CE in the person of Muhammad bin Qasim, and intermittent domination by rulers like Mahmud of Ghazni in the 10th, 11th centuries CE, the culmination of the Muslims rule in the Indian subcontinent was in the form of the Mughal dynasty which lasted from 1526 to 1757 CE. The Muslims were therefore a ruling minority at the helm of power in the Indian subcontinent. However, complete subjugation by the British after the war of 1857 signified two things; firstly, the Muslims had lost their ruling clout in the region which they had dominated over for such a long time. Secondly, the British, believing that it was the Muslims who had instigated the revolt, started trusting the Hindus more in matters of governance. Therefore, this added to shame to the whole process of defeat as the people who Muslims of the subcontinent had been ruling over got more affluent in the British corridors of power.

Along with the political defeats, with the ushering in of British rule, India and more significantly, life as the Muslims had known to be, changed drastically. Modernisation was at India’s doorstep now. There was the laying down of railway tracks, changes in the Indian legal institutions, the advent of science and in accompaniment with it notions like that of Darwinism. The sanctity of an Islamic culture was being blemished by the British onslaught.

The aforementioned historical reasons were therefore critical in shaping the Muslim response to the British. The first response was therefore that of resistance and was more oriented towards political yoke that the Muslims of the region felt they were undergoing. This mode of interaction is perhaps epitomised by Syed Ahmad of Rae Bareli. He launched an attack against the domination of the Sikhs of Punjab in search for Islamic purity and the imposition of Shar’iah. For this purpose, he sought help of the Muslim warlords from the region of the Frontier but unfortunately could not gather much of the needed support as his cause was wasted.

More importantly, Muslims saw resistance against the cultural onslaught brought about by the British as well. Perhaps the forerunner of all such reactions was the Deobandi Movement in the Indian subcontinent launched by Shah Waliullah in the 19th century. It was essentially a reactionary and revivalist movement in response to the European cultural domination that had dominated the Muslim polity in the form of law, education and collectively in the cultural sphere. The movement therefore aimed at preserving various legal, social, political and cultural tenets of Sunni orthodoxy. The cultural resistance is perhaps substantiated most concretely in the realm of education. Fearful of the new western curriculum being introduced by the British in the subcontinent, the Deobandi Movement established various madrassas across the subcontinent in order to offer Muslims an alternate and truly Islamic form of education which was aimed at dictating their cultural outlook on life as well. It is interesting to note the Deobandi Movement has perhaps been one of the most influential ones in the subcontinent with offshoots such as the Tableeghi Jamaat and Sipah-e-Sahaba.

Another type of response to the British domination was that of reformism led by people like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. This interactionary dynamic sprang from a few Muslim intellectuals who were greatly inspired by the material and intellectual progress that the West had achieved. They believed that for better or worse the Muslims of the subcontinent had to adopt the British way of life. This should not result in the complete eradication of the Islamic basis of the Muslim society. Rather, it would firstly broaden the religious outlook of the Muslims by inculcating things such as Western scientific knowledge. Secondly, such interaction with the British would be desirable in order to achieve a position of relative consequence, such as those achieved by the Hindus in the British Raj.

This mindset led to the development of various institutions with both a Western and Islamic curriculum such as the Aligarh Muslim University and the Scientific Society. This therefore was a phase of Islamic modernism and acquiescence to the West. Under such a modus operandi confidence was sought to be restored in the new generation of Muslims that had undergone Western education as it was endeavoured to prove that things such as the fact that the Quran as a work also fit the rational apparatus that was the hallmark of the Western civilisation. This movement also had various offshoots such as the apologetics like Sayyid Amir Ali and to some extent, as some would argue even the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal.

This leads to the third phase of Muslim reaction in the form of a renewed political vigour. This phase did not preach retreat into the shadows of tradition nor intellectual subservience to the British. Rather, as the colonial yoke of the British was being overthrown in the 1940s, this approach was the most assertive one in opposition to the voice of the Muslim League. Essentially, fundamentalist in its aims and religio-political in its methodology, it is represented by political parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan who believe that religion should not merely be a pressure point like the debate over economic policies. Rather, as written in the prolific works of thinkers such as Maududi, they believe that religion permeated every sphere of life and they therefore imagine a polity of Islamic nationalism.

Furthermore, posing confidence in the political structures gifted by the colonisers in the form of the nation state, they propagate a theo-democracy. However, religion should not be a peripheral concern in the political process. It should rather capture the complete political process itself. Furthermore, this reaction to modernism does not simply subsist simply in the intellectual sphere. Rather, as again substantiated by the Jama’at, this reaction spills out in the form of organisations which at their core are religious but with regards to their aims are political. So such movement do not manifest themselves as a temporary spark and then subside. The longevity of their life is reflected in the bureaucratic structures and the complicated chain of command that dot the organisational structure of such movements.

The writer is an undergraduate

student at LUMS.