Bhutto tried to bring Kissinger to Peshawar: Wikileaks

Former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in a bid to blunt Afghan claims on Peshawar, tried to bring the US secretary of state to the city. Henry Kissinger agreed but the move annoyed Kabul, which forced Washington to change the venue.

Kissinger visited Pakistan from October 31 to November 1, 1976, but instead of Peshawar, he went to Lahore.

However, to placate the Pakistanis, the Americans offered their “continuing strong support for the security, independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan”.

Secret diplomatic messages, released recently by WikiLeaks, show how the Americans handled the issue.

On July 13, 1976 former US ambassador to Kabul, Theodore L Eliot, sent a letter to the then US ambassador in Islamabad, Henry A. Byroade, saying, “I have fundamental misgivings about secretary’s meeting Bhutto in Peshawar.

“Peshawar was ancestral home of Afghan president Daoud’s family and it is a city with a sentimental, political and historic significance for Daoud and his family.

“At worst Daoud might attribute Peshawar Bhutto-Kissinger meeting to Bhutto’s machination to underscore American support for Pakistan side in historic Pakistan-Afghan dispute.

“In this event, he would be dismayed at Secretary’s having allowed himself to play in Bhutto’s scenario. This in turn would have negative effect on fragile Pakistan-Afghan rapprochement.

“At very least I think Afghans would regard secretary’s visit to Peshawar as an act of insensitivity.

“In the event secretary’s meeting with Bhutto must take place in Peshawar, I will be grateful to have instructions enabling us to give Afghans reasons behind this selection.

“Even with optimistic assessment of my success at getting Afghans to understand why Peshawar was chosen, present glowing atmosphere for secretary’s visit to Kabul will be damaged.”

Ambassador Byroade responded: “Your instructions will be very difficult and painful to carry out. I am gravely concerned that we may deeply alienate Bhutto by appearing to be overly sensitive to possible Afghan reactions and thereby spoil the atmosphere in which you will address the important substantive issue of nuclear reprocessing which confronts us.

“This hassle over venue, coupled with the language in the proposed joint statement on Pakistan’s security and independence (which Bhutto is sure to read as an attempt to water down our earlier statements of support for Pakistan’s territorial integrity), are bound to make Bhutto think we are considerably less interested in Pakistan than we had led him to believe over the past five years.

“Both Bhutto and Agha Shahi are now in Balochistan and inaccessible today. I believe I must convey the message on Peshawar directly to Bhutto and will do so as soon as I am able to get to him, but I fear this may take another day or so.

“In order to convey something more positive to Bhutto while I attempt to persuade him to give up on Peshawar, I would appreciate authority to tell Bhutto we want to substitute the following sentence in the proposed joint statement for the present language on the security and independence of Pakistan: the US reaffirmed its continuing strong support for the security, independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.

“I realise that this formulation is stronger than what we propose to say in the joint statement with Afghanistan, but our relationship to Pakistan of course has a totally different history and involves commitments we have never made to any Afghan government.

“If I can reassure Bhutto now that there is no change in the substance of our relationship, I may be able to soften the blow on Peshawar. Please advise on para 3 as soon as possible.”

A third message from the State Department, and signed by Kissinger, settled the matter. “Secretary fully supports the substitute formulation that you proposed for the joint statement in para 3 and you are authorised to convey this to Bhutto in the context of your discussion with him on Peshawar,” it said.

“We leave to your judgment the manner in which you present to Bhutto our thoughts on Peshawar. We, of course, wish to avoid irritating Bhutto, but we continue to believe that we owe it to him to tell him candidly the judgment of our ambassador in Kabul about the problems which Peshawar would pose with respect to the overall purpose we had in mind in visiting South Asia at this time.”

He added: “We will, of course, accede to any decision that Bhutto makes.”

Ambassador Byroade met Bhutto and settled the matter as advised.

“I chased Bhutto down in Ziarat, Balochistan. Bhutto and I agreed that Lahore would be the venue for your coming visit.

“In a separate message, which can be read at your leisure, I will give you enough of the flavour of our meeting to allow you to handle this matter in the small talk category while you are here, as I don’t think it will come up in any more formal way.”