The underlying problem

On dharnas, military solutions and everything else in between

Tragedy strikes our nation once again. It is almost as if we are not being allowed to forget the trauma of a few weeks ago when twin bombings in Quetta led to hundreds dead and many others injured. This time, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) has struck again killing at least 80 people and injuring 200 more, through a massive bombing at a market in the Shia Hazara area of Quetta.

We, as a nation, must rightly grieve and mourn for the loss of lives. We are also entitled to anger at this monstrosity. Indeed, Pakistan is at a point where it must unite once more and take decisive steps to put an end to further targeting of innocent civilians regardless of their ethnicity, religion or gender.

But as the nation prepares to stand in solidarity with the families of the victims of the recent attack, one must pause and ask themselves; what are they demanding? And if their demands are met, will that mean a permanent solution to the underlying problem?

The victims of the families gave a 48-hour deadline to the government to arrest the perpetrators of the attack and to launch a full-scale army operation against the banned outfit in Balochistan. They also refused to bury their dead until their demands were met, and mind you that’s the second time they had to do so in a period of a month or so. Amidst the chaos, the Supreme Court has issued a suo motu notice of the incident.

The PPP government and Balochistan go way back to 1970s, when Zulfikar Bhutto dismissed the provincial government in Balochistan when arms were discovered in the Iraqi embassy for the aid of Baloch rebels. Then came the army operation that lasted between 1973 and 1978 – with the removal of Bhutto in between. By the time ceasefire was declared, at least 3,300 troops, 5,300 Baloch fighters and thousands of civilians had been killed. The lasting conflict has left a deep divide between Islamabad and Pakistan’s largest province even today, when PPP is back in power.

Will PPP-led government call in the army to meet the demands? Given the effort that the current government has made over the last five years to distance itself from the army, for whatever convoluted reasons, it is doubtful that the army will be called in at this critical juncture – just when the elections are around the corner. A full scale army operation, one that would undoubtedly last many months – well after the interim set-up is in place, and probably beyond the time when a new government is elected – let’s face it; it is not only impractical, it is something the civilian government is unlikely to agree to.

Let us assume for a moment that the government calls in the army and an operation is launched against LeJ. Then what? Does that operation solve the underlying social problem?

The Shia Hazara community has been persecuted since the late 1970s, as an immediate by-product of Zia’s Islamisation. This targeted persecution is also the love child of Shia-Wahabi proxy wars of the era. Over the last few years, especially, the Shia Hazara community has been systematically targeted. Hundreds have been pulled out of buses and shot. Hundreds more have been bombed out.

As with all kinds of oppression, this sectarian divide also has economic undertones. The Hazara community in Balochistan may be a minority, but a closer look also reveals that the business acumen and resources also reside with them – at least much more than their Pashtun rivals in the area. Over the years, the Pashtun influence over landholding has diminished, while the Hazara community has evolved its presence in other fields, that is, business and real estate. So while the Pashtun community deviated towards smuggling and maintaining their landholdings, the Hazaras invested in education and entrepreneurship.

So, then, the underlying problem is hostilities along socio-economic, ethnic-religious lines. In that case, a military solution that some of our leaders have been so quick to back may not be the best idea. The LeJ networks may be pushed back but given how large Balochistan is, the LeJ networks would never be permanently broken, especially because the LeJ is a lasting legacy of the collusion of various security agencies in the 1980s to counter Soviet presence in Afghanistan and to trump the growing Shia influence in Iran. One must also not forget that LeJ is not the only banned outfit in Pakistan. There are dozens of others in various parts of the country mostly fighting for the implementation of what they believe to be is the Shariah law. Then there are those outfits that are waging “war” against the “haraam” government. The problem is much, much deeper and a military intervention is like putting band-aid over a wound with a bullet still inside.

This argument further sees its roots in the imposition of Governor’s Rule in Balochistan. When the families of the previous dharna ended their protest, it was with a small victory that their protest had been registered with the right authorities and their demands heard. But how far did these demands go to protect the Hazara citizens, when just a few weeks later, they are back on the streets, staging the same dharnas? Short-term solutions don’t work. They are never meant to. And a military solution is no solution at all, especially for the civilian government that cannot afford such an operation just before the election and the announcement of an interim government.

What might qualify as a step in the right direction is a gesture by the PPP government that has had a sad history in Balochistan. Instead of passing condemnation resolutions in the National Assembly, and passing statements at press conferences, perhaps the Hazara community in mourning could be pacified with the prime minister visiting the grieving families at the dharna.

In order to make Governor’s Rule effective, there should be a review of all civil administration appointments in the province to remove political appointees and bring in people on merit. The governor could chair conferences of all agencies and forces including the military operating in the province to develop a consolidated intelligence picture and based on that a plan for implementation as well as a security plan with special focus on the Hazara community.

They could also move to establish the same security structures that have been working for Punjab, which has remained relatively stable and secure over the last few years. Again, the attacks on the Hazara community of Balochistan point to the government’s neglect of the province. A final effort, an extension of support and solidarity on the part of the government may go a long way to appease the angered crowds – not just in Balochistan, but also all over the country.

The anger is justified. It is rash decisions in the same anger that should be questioned.

The writer is a research analyst for Spearhead Research and tweets at @aimamk. This article was also carried by Spearhead Research.