US subverting Pakistan’s war on terror

Last Wednesday’s drone strike in South Waziristan (SW) that killed Mullah Nazir has deepened suspicion that the ISI and CIA often work at cross-purposes, besides stimulating debate regarding good and bad Taliban in the local press.
Nazir typified the good variety, whom military intelligence has persuaded into not attacking Pakistani targets, regardless of their activities in Afghanistan. He was instrumental in driving Uzbek militants out of SW in ’07-08, with reported support form the army, and often served as a bulwark against the viciously anti-Pakistan TTP, even though he continuously sheltered numerous high-profile al Qaeda operatives in his area.
The timing
Though Nazir had survived two drone strikes, the third and successful one came just when another assassination attempt (on Nov29) led him to suspect rival Mehsuds dominating the TTP. He had just expelled all Mehsuds from Wazir areas in SW, disturbing TTP coordination and logistics just as winter set in, while also aggravating the IDP situation in Bannu and Tank areas.
Discontents of tribal chiefs like Nazir, coupled with successful military operation and drone strikes in the tribal area, were seen as key elements behind TTP chief Hakimullah Mehsud’s measured offer of talks recently. And US intelligence’s decision to ‘remove’ Nazir at this point will provide precious room to regroup to the TTP, according to analysts and intelligence officials familiar with the insurgency. It is also expected to stoke Mehsud-Wazir enmity, which will play into TTP’s hands, and undo years of military planning that finally brought peace to SW.
“It seems the US wants to keep the war alive on the Pakistani side at least until ’14,” said Mansoor Khan Mehsud, executive director for research at the fata research centre, an Islamabad based think tank.
The timing is also important because of rumours that Nazir was in the process of leveraging the shura-e-muraqeba to engineer a strategic truce with the TTP ahead of the American drawdown.
“We have unconfirmed reports of a Jirga meant to bring the two together,” said Rasheed Safi, head of news at Radio Burraq, a trusted news source across fata. “If true, this could have meant Nazir’s condition of no attacks inside Pakistan finally being accepted by Hakimullah”.
Events like Nazir willing to allow IDPs back to Wana (though leaving militants out) and Hakimullah offering talks (even if with unreasonable preconditions) lend weight to such assertions.
Understanding good Taliban
Local editorial reaction to Nazir’s assassination has largely debated the good Taliban phenomenon, exposing a sharp cleavage between the understanding of intelligence agencies (who run the counterinsurgency campaign) and the intelligentsia (who shape public opinion).
While arguing that neither good nor bad Taliban have a place in progressive society, they seem to overlook imperatives of counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, which invariably figure maneuvering militant outfits against each other. There are also important non-military elements to the strategy.
“Besides not attacking Pakistani targets and helping security agencies, the good Taliban also help expel foreign militants and negotiate peace with more violent groups like the TTP,” added Rasheed. “They also allow social uplift and reconstruction projects”.
These projects are crucial not only for improving quality of life in the tribal area, but also for providing people-to-people contact with the outside world in an area that has long been cut off from progressive advances in society. Such exercise is central to COIN strategy, raising social awareness and minimising ‘acceptability’ of regressive groups like the TTP.
For the military to treat all groups alike, as the liberal press suggests, would amount to broadening the insurgent base, unifying them into a larger and more effective force, and further compromising the state security apparatus.
There is also the growing unease about post ’14 Afghanistan, where only the most unnatural political alliance can avoid a brutal civil war among warlords. And just like all other countries in the region, Pakistan too would rather observe developments than act prematurely.
US concern about cross border activity is not very different from Mulla Fazlullah and the like operating from Kunar and Nooristan on the Afghan side of the border, which nato/isaf have long abandoned. There are also reports of British troops in Helmand bribing the local Taliban to minimise casualties.
The Taliban insurgency, in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, is a long drawn phenomenon. And security agencies will do what is necessary to reduce the potency of the threat on their respective sides. In Pakistan, lumping all elements of the tribal rebellion together at present amounts to gravely undermining state security. The immediate concern is controlling armed rebellion at home, and propping the so-called good Taliban against bad is vital for preventing increased violence and possibly civil war.
Whether or not Nazir’s assassination was timed to deliberately wrongfoot Pakistani intelligence remains to be seen, but eliminating him has no doubt set back Pakistani efforts to subdue the insurgency.