Interior Minister Rehman Malik’s insistence that a voluntary disarmament by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) must precede peace talks may actually be the biggest hurdle in the way of meaningful negotiations, Pakistan Today has learnt.
TTP chief Hakeemullah Mehsud broke from his long-held position of no discussions with the government last week, even as he ruled out giving up arms and added pre-conditions the government was sure to reject. Yet increased flexibility from both sides is a sign of the realisation, analysts say that only dialogue can bring an end to the insurgency, which has drained military resources and brought unprecedented hardship to the tribal area.
Throwback to black cap days: The Taliban have a history of not responding well to conditions that interfere with the tribal setup, even if certain issues hold little relevance to the insurgency.
“The disarmament precondition is a throwback to the black cap days,” said an analyst familiar with the insurgency, referring to the time when observers faulted the government’s failure to leverage a peace initiative from Bajaur Agency strongman and former TTP number 2 Maulvi Faqir Mohammad in ’10.
Taliban wore black caps and turbans in those days, and the government’s repeated demands to end the practice (of displaying Taliban symbols) typified official focus on issues that were not central to the militant rebellion.
“If only the government overlooked the black caps, they would most likely disappear themselves,” Maulvi Faqir was quoted as saying.
Faqir’s maneuver failed, and Hakeemullah disciplined him by demotion to ordinary foot soldier. The possibility of exploring an alternative to the confrontation was lost even as black caps slowly fell out of favour.
Significantly, Hakeemullah’s hint at talks comes at a time when military action and drone strikes have considerably downgraded al Qaeda and TTP sanctuaries across FATA. There is also talk of a leadership tussle in the TTP, though with little documentary evidence.
“Even the urbanisation of the insurgency points more to desperation than a planned expansion of operations,” said intelligence officers on condition of anonymity. “These are hit and run tactics that feed on impact value. The Taliban know they invite strong military backlash, and also provoke revulsion in the public. In the long run they work against the TTP”.
Enough blood spilled: The TTP insurgency is in a state of temporary stalemate, at least until a possible military incursion into North Waziristan, or a wider, more coordinated militant push into main cities.
For the Taliban, this is a watershed moment. In recent years of fighting, they have been deprived of the usual al Qaeda patronage – some killed, others driven away – and the resulting funding squeeze has led them to turn to kidnapping and extortion to fund most of their activities. Beaten in the mountains, they seem turning attention to commercial centres, even as the strategy risks military reaction than will certainly wipe out their remaining sanctuaries.
But such action, if untimely, will expose the civilian population to savage retribution attacks from a dying guerilla force. With the military heavily involved in FATA, and an eerie status quo establishing itself ahead of the American drawdown from Afghanistan, the government wishes to avoid driving the Taliban into a corner.
There is also the feeling, on both sides, that enough blood has been spilled. Even military officials acknowledge the heavy civilian casualties incurred in the tribal area, spawning a hatred that stems from a culture of vendetta, and finds an accommodating voice in the TTP rebellion.
The ultimate choice, it seems, is between being drawn into renewed violence in our main cities, and a compromise that factors in, and accounts for, losses on all sides. And that will happen by engaging with commanders that are more open to dialogue than the hardline bunch that has so far dominated the TTP, not by the interior minister’s preferred approach, which amounts to discouraging real progress.