Speculation about a possible TTP leadership change is all the rage in the international press after two foreign news sources – Reuters and Long War Journal – differed last week in their assessments of latest developments, even as neither factored in developments crucial to the tribal insurgency.
Reuters citied military sources in South Waziristan in its Dec6 report claiming Hakeemullah Mehsud had lost “operational control” of the TTP, and the off-and-on tussle with his present deputy Waliur Rehman might now go in the latter’s favour. It also stressed Wali’s ascent would soften the group’s hardline tactics towards Pakistan, concentrating energies on the Afghan campaign ahead of the American drawdown in ‘14.
LWJ rebutted the claim, accusing the Pakistani military of spinning events through its media contacts to portray divisions in the Taliban. It points to clear factual errors in Reuters’ report – regarding Hakimullah’s involvement in high profile operations – and refers to the ’09 TTP succession debate, when Reuters was prominent among international media outlets claiming a bitter rivalry between Hakimullah and Wali, with little documentary evidence.
While Hakimullah’s leadership has often caused concern among numerous splinter groups that comprise the umbrella organisation, the reason has been the commander’s strategic and tactical decisions, mostly related to alliances, not because his “extreme violence has alienated enough of his fighters to significantly weaken him” (Reuters), a Pakistan Today investigation has revealed.
Complicated structure
As head of the TTP, Hakimullah sits atop a complicated web of alliances brokered and (more importantly) funded by al Qaeda as the Pakistani tribal area became the main focus-area of the AfPak insurgency. For appearances it is an extension of the Afghan Taliban, as the name suggests, and owes allegiance to Mullah Omar, but in effect the group leans more towards al Qaeda’s expansionist agenda that features Pakistan as a crucial theatre of war. Despite repeated calls from Omer not to engage with the Pakistani military, and restrict the jihad to the NATO invasion of Afghanistan, the TTP has incrementally intensified its efforts inside Pakistan.
Hakimullah helped widen the Omer-al Qaeda cleavage when his brutal tactics and disregard for civilian casualties stood the tribal area’s political and civic structure on its head. Yet there were little disagreements within the grouping, and al Qaeda largesse followed the more TTP operations resembled AQ’s in Afghanistan, Iraq, etc. But as the military operation intensified and strategic strongholds were uprooted, Hakimullah made a series of decisions that later turned out strategic mistakes.
“With the military operation on one side and drone attacks on the other, he made a number of blunders that alienated some important partners,” says Dr Ashraf Ali, president of the FATA research centre, an Islamabad based think tank with special focus on the insurgency. “The sacking of Bajaur commander and former TTP number-2 Molvi Faqir Mohammad earlier this year, for example.” There was no formal charge on Faqir, but his inclination towards talking to the military did the rounds in the press. Similarly, just before the Kurram Agency operation in June ’11, he replaced Fazal Saeed Haqqani with Sajjad Afghani. Fazal was furious, and left the organisation, forming his own TTIP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Islami Pakistan, which publically fell out with TTP over civilian casualties, but continued with brutal targetting of the Shia community in Parachinar). He also planted the notorious Mullah Toofan in Orakzai Agency, which fuelled vendetta wars with former comrade Mullah Nabi, who had fallen out with Hakimullah over strategic deployments, and left the party.
These tussles harmed the party, adds Dr Ashraf, and resulted in power vacuums in strategic locations with dependable commanders, and their militias, not always available.
Cycle of insurgency
Matters seemingly came to a head with the Nov29 assassination attempt against pro-government Wana strongman Mullah Nazir. Going by the popular account, Nazir had caved into official pressure demanding expulsion of Mehsuds from Wana and Wazir areas. And preempting such complications, Hakimullah overreached and failed. Nazir has now driven away all Mehsuds, complicating the IDP situation, and another internal feud seems imminent.
Waliur Rehman’s more balanced reputation comes from his flexibility regarding negotiating with feuding partners that is central to an organisation like TTP, not an apparent desire to minimise civilian casualties in random suicide hits.
“He was one of the most brutal commanders in the Waziristan area,” says an officer who served in SWA two years ago. “He made ordinary people watch public beheadings, and punished those that wouldn’t”.
It is unlikely that anyone from the ‘good Taliban’ variety, who do not attack Pakistani targets, can ever establish himself as the TTP head. While bolstering the Afghan effort is an essential part of its mission, so is expanding the war inside Pakistan. It is for these twin purposes that al Qaeda built and financed the organisation since its beginning.
Yet much has changed in the tribal insurgency since Baitullah Mehsud introduced TTP’s campaign of terror.
“Every insurgency has a cycle,” says Amir Rana, director at the Pak Institute of Peace Studies and a noted expert on the tribal area. “It seems the time is coming for parties in this particular insurgency to soften hard positions taken initially and exhibit more flexibility”.
Military operations and continuous drone strikes have dealt some savage blows to the insurgency. Their operational capacity has been considerably downgraded, according to officers familiar with recent operations. Much of their high command has been eliminated, and the bulk of al Qaeda has shifted focus to Syria, depriving the movement of strategic thinkers and technical minds.
Resultantly, the movement is starved of cash. And with al Qaeda leverage no longer greasing Mehsud palms like before, the party has apparently shifted focus to kidnappings and extortion to fund most of its activities. At such a time, Hakimullah’s stiff positions no longer suit the most pressing demands of the insurgency, which require compromise and flexibility, and the question of pure survival may well necessitate change at the top. But, again, that would be to live to fight another day, not a toned down approach to Pakistan, and expectations of the TTP being any less fanged under Wali seem unfounded.
Leadership change in the TTP?
