Difficult but necessary
Soon after the Kayani-Mattis meeting on August 16, it became clear that the government had finally decided to launch the long awaited operation in North Waziristan. Further, that it would be a coordinated rather than a joint operation with the Nato forces. As the issue had been under discussion for a fairly long time, it was expected that the GHQ would have already worked out a plan for the operation and it would begin soon.
What one sees happening is a lot of talk in all concerned quarters from Washington to North Waziristan without any action on the ground. Why has the army deprived itself of the benefit of a surprise attack? A media report tells of numerous outfits, foreign as well as local, having either left the Agency to alternate sanctuaries or preparing to do so. This could create more problems for the army than it currently faces. Unlike Swat and South Waziristan which do not share border with Afghanistan, the Agency has scores of entry points into the neighboring country. Some of the militant groups could thus cross over to the Afghan side and like Mullah Fazlullah continue to launch attacks inside Pakistan’s tribal areas. The best way would have been to launch a surprise attack and get rid of most of them. What is needed now is a hammer and anvil type coordinated operation to ensure that those crossing over to Afghanistan are netted by the Nato and Afghan troops.
The operation in North Waziristan has peculiar problems. There is a peace accord between the government and the non-TTP militant commander Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Attempts have therefore to be made to undertake a targeted operation that ensures that “friendly” militant groups are not drawn into the fighting. As Pakistan does not have access to the drones, it has to depend on ground intelligence which is of crucial importance in any targeted operation. On account of the peculiar terrain of North Waziristan, and because the militants are increasingly relying on IEDs, troop movement would have to be slow and increasingly hazardous. Air attacks would have to be rare to avoid casualties among friendly tribes.
The operation would, thus, get prolonged both on account of political considerations and geographical realities. The operation however needs to be urgently initiated because virtually all TTP groups, Al-Qaeda remnants and foreign militants are currently using North Waziristan to plan attacks inside Pakistan and abroad. A successful operation would hit the militants at the most sensitive and crucial point and impair their ability to conduct terrorist attacks.
