Violence returns to major cities

Ben West and Kamran Bokhari in an article that appeared on a global intelligence company Stratfor’s website, have pointed out how the violence is slowly returning back to Pakistan’s major cities. The article quotes examples of recent attacks in Lahore and Gujrat by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) among many others.
“The two attacks (along with numerous other attacks and an attempted assassination) came the week after Pakistan formally reopened NATO supply routes through the country to Afghanistan. But rather than an impetus for attacks, the reopening of the supply line is more likely a political opportunity for the Pakistani Taliban militants to promote anti-American sentiment in Pakistan. The NATO supply line is one of the most visible products of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship.”
The article takes a shot at what is the real reason behind TTP’s recent attacks. “It involves a remote geographic region of Pakistan that has been dragged into the 10-year-old Afghanistan War, a struggling Pakistani economy, distrust of Pakistan’s current government and upcoming elections that are seen as an opportunity to address grievances against Islamabad.”
Pakistani Taliban and militants were cultivated in the Afghan jihad period and an attempt to control them after the 9/11 proved not so successful. “The militants made it clear that their goal was to take over the Pakistani state, beginning in the mountains surrounding the Indus River Valley. This led the government to deploy forces to Swat in April 2010. These forces expanded their offensive to South Waziristan later that year and by the end of 2010, they had gone into every single district of the FATA save North Waziristan.
“The US also launched operations parallel with Pakistan’s, targeting Pakistani Taliban militant leaders using unmanned aerial vehicle strikes in North and South Waziristan, disrupting their leadership structure and affecting the group’s ability to organise, train and conduct attacks in Pakistan’s core.
“Although its capabilities might be diminished, the TTP has not disappeared. Fazlullah recently indicated that he and his forces are intent on retaking Swat from the military.
“Between the international economic turmoil and the parallel dynamics of a democratic uprising and jihadist insurgency that led to the fall of the Musharraf regime, Pakistan has been in dire economic straits since 2008. More recently, Islamabad has been forced to return to the IMF for a new loan arrangement to keep from defaulting on the existing loan.
“Moreover, Pakistan’s Supreme Court is challenging Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari on corruption charges. Whether Zardari embezzled the money is somewhat irrelevant, since the case has been elevated to a political dispute between the executive and judicial branches of the Pakistani government over the limits of executive immunity and how much authority the Supreme Court has over the president.
“Even though the TTP favors the adaptation of an extremely austere interpretation of Sharia to Pakistan’s current legal system, it is savvy enough to see a political opening and exploit it. The Pakistani Taliban militants will use Zardari’s case to paint the country’s politicians as corrupt and untrustworthy. Elections are slated for the first half of 2013 but could be held as early as the next quarter of 2012, given the mounting political crisis in the country. The stronger the Pakistani Taliban militants can make their case, the more pressure they can put on any future government to relax military deployments in the northwest. “And as long as there are Pakistanis displeased with the regime and the economic situation, there will be TTP sympathisers in Punjab who support more radical change. These individuals provide the network and motivation for continuing attacks against the Pakistani government.
“Military deployments to northwest Pakistan have kept militants in check for the past couple of years (at least in Punjab state), but that is not exactly a long-term solution. Domestic military deployments are rarely popular and, though sometimes necessary for short periods, eventually become self-defeating and a drain on resources. Should Islamabad’s political will shift and the military lose its advantage in the northwest, the militants could continue their campaign in Pakistan’s core, returning to high-profile, disruptive attacks.”