And their role in the changing scenario
Islamic states of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia were arbitrarily and hastily crafted as the World War ended. Now as a result of factors such as the war against terror and the Arab revolts, the states and societies of these regions are clearly entering a new phase. It is clear that the liberal and secular influences are consistently shrinking as the Islamists gain strength. This has implications for the institutions of the democratic system that are already behaving erratically from Egypt to Pakistan.
Three key pillars represent the democratic system of governance: the Parliament (Congress in case of the American system), Judiciary and the Executive. At different points in western history, one or the other branch has exerted disproportionate influence. The American experience provides ample illustration of how these encroachments have historically played out, especially when the President’s party looses majority in the House or the Senate or in dealing with complex issues like abortion, on which the liberal and conservatives have diametrically different stances.
The unfolding economic recession and banking crisis in the West has revealed the connection that money and the politics are able to corrupt the system, and that greed did manage to overcome checks and balances. Aristotle had forewarned that for a constitutional democracy to work, a large middle class and reasonably fair distribution of property is required.
“Where some own a very great deal of property and others none…there comes about either an extreme democracy or an unmixed oligarchy, or a tyranny may result from both of the two extremes, for tyranny springs from both democracy and oligarchy of the most unbridled kind…”
Other parts of the world experimenting with democracy are facing the same threat that has shaken the credibility of the western system. The challenge remains, how to manage the influence yielded by the powerful to mold policies and laws in their favour, and against the interests of the people.
Since the end of World War II, the liberal, socialist, and conservative forces in the Arab world have had their ups and downs. For the most part, their political maneuvering reflected the tensions between the socialist and capitalist models that were playing out globally as part of the Cold War.
Generally, the nationalists in the Arab world were more accepting of socialist influences. The conservative religious influences, on the other hand, have had an uncomfortable political existence. Although religious groups had their utility during the Cold War era, they were otherwise looked upon with distrust, as waiting in hiding for their chance to revive the Ummah and the Khilafat. On the other hand, to maintain their hold on power liberal dictators exploited western fear of conservative forces. At the same time, the interests of western powers also lied in supporting the secular groups to tackle the extremist’s forces.
The institution of the military has traditionally played a pivotal role in balancing these different influences and continues to in places like Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan. In Turkey, the army was the protector of the secularism that was adopted under Ataturk. In Egypt and Pakistan, the military usually balances the liberal, socialist and conservative responses, so that they do not get significantly out of line from what would be acceptable to the global powers. However, due to factors like the war on terror, Arab awakening, corruption and lack of governance, the political landscape has changed considerably. For the first time, the institution of military itself is under threat and pressure to adjust itself to the change in public sentiments.
This change in the worldview held by a majority of the people is producing pressures on the usual functioning of the key institutions and pillars of the democratic system. The institutional tussles emerging in Pakistan and Egypt are more about change and status quo and different from the issue and turf oriented battles that are normally witnessed in the West. For example, the judiciary in Pakistan has evolved to become the champion of change, while in Egypt it is still acting as a facilitator of status quo being used by the military. On the other hand, the executive and the parliament in Egypt have gained credibility as a symbol of change, while in Pakistan the parliament and the executive are losing credibility and are being perceived as ensuring status quo.
What the status quo and change have come to represent in these parts of the world also needs to be looked at. In Pakistan, the liberal forces, and the mainstream religious parties that have long enjoyed western backing, have proven to be ineffective in governing and are often corrupt. They are also blamed for lending support towards the war on terror that has destabilised the country and the economy. The democratic system is perceived to work well for the elites and western interests but not for the people.
This dynamic is similar to the Middle East; the status quo there could not have persisted without western support. In Egypt, change would not have come as quickly if President Obama had not turned its back on Hosni Mubarak. However, now that Muslim Brotherhood is in power, the challenge for the West is how to ensure its interests in Egypt. If the military attempts to circumvent the Brotherhood dominated parliament and executive, as it has, the rage of the street could very well turn against it at some point.
Thus the question is how will the Islamist party, whose very ideology is premised on the rejection of man-made law, charts its path within a democratic system. Egypt may prove to be a test case for the rest of the region. How it now reconciles working in the interests of its people and the West will perhaps determine the fate of democracy in other Islamic states as well.
The writer is the chief analyst for PoliTact (www.PoliTact.com and http:twitter.com/politact) and can be reached at aansar@politact.com