Moving forward
Some reason, finally. Pakistan is presumably set to reopen the Nato supply lines. And the Americans have extended an “unconditional” invitation to President Zardari to attend the Chicago moot.
This has been a most uncomfortable impasse. The deep state wanted to play a game of chicken with the Americans and they saw right through it. One reason for their sure attitude was the fact we has used up all of our leverage. In effect, this gave them a carte blanche to do whatever they wanted afterwards. What would we have done at the next possible instance of American adventurism? How could we have upped the ante then? Blocked their air routes as well? Hardly. They could always violate the no-fly zone at will, the way their drones strike deep within Pakistani territory despite resolution after resolution by the parliament against the same.
If the reader were to excuse the tired analogy: Pak-US relations, like any bad marriage, is marred by both sides knowing each others weaknesses. The Americans called this bluff; the Pakistanis blinked and a resumption of the supply routes is imminent. The Americans have weaknesses of their own, however. The best that they have been able to do in Afghanistan is reach a stalemate. They can’t do any better without the support of the Taliban. And for that, they need Pakistan to use all the leverage it has got with the militia.
The mistakes that Pakistani ‘defence analysts’ (the best gig around) make is thinking that the Pak-US dynamic is an equation. It isn’t; it is an inequality. Pakistan has more weaknesses than the US. What if the Americans plan, now, to give us enough rope to hang ourselves? The Americans can very well leave Afghanistan. Where, exactly, will that leave us? Is it a foregone conclusion that a (possible) Taliban regime in Afghanistan will do the Pakistani government’s bidding? Even if it does, what if the spread of the militants’ networks throughout the country continue to go about their business regardless of who is running the government in Afghanistan or, perhaps, even be emboldened by it?
Even if we achieve what we desire in Afghanistan and perhaps even beyond, it would do us well to realise that it would be a pyrrhic victory. What good is any possible foreign leverage if it tears asunder our very social fabric?
