A divided approach would work no more
The oft-delayed joint session of the parliament to review the whole ambit of our fractured relations with the US is finally taking place at a very critical time. The deplorable incident of burning of copies of the Holy Quran by US troops, followed by Sunday’s horrific shooting of Afghan civilians in cold blood by a manic US soldier, has forced President Obama to take a good look at his exit strategy from Afghanistan.
How bad things are for the US and its allies in Afghanistan can be gauged from the incident in which an Afghan truck driver amateurishly attacked the US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta on his arrival at a heavily guarded air base. In an unprecedented security precaution in the aftermath of the incident, the US soldiers whom the Secretary of Defence was to address were divested of their weapons.
It is obvious that the much touted counterinsurgency strategy coined by General David Petraeus, even before he was shifted from Iraq to the Afghan arena, has completely collapsed. Coupled with frayed relations with Pakistan it is a recipe of disaster for Washington.
President Obama has put a brave face against heavy odds by claiming that the withdrawal timetable of US forces from Afghanistan will remain unchanged. But ground realities are too grim for the US not to fast track its exit.
The Pentagon perhaps feels that with the consistent and aggressive use of technology coupled with logistic support, major portion of responsibilities to police Afghanistan can be handed over to the Afghans. All this is yet to be fleshed out at the forthcoming NATO summit in Chicago this May.
Before the US considers an improvised cut-and-run policy effectively leaving behind a quagmire, it has to mend its fences with Islamabad. According to official sources, Washington had decided in principal to apologise for the Salala incident in which 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed last November. But the matter has been put on indefinite hold in the aftermath of the burning of copies of the Holy Quran incident.
The CENTCOM Chief General James Mattis and special American envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman are due in Islamabad soon after the joint session of the parliament. The much-delayed apology has to be proffered in order for the visit to take place.
Pakistan-US relations have been on the skids for the past one-year. But the downward spiral was accelerated in the aftermath of the US Navy SEALs attack on the now demolished Osama bin Laden’s compound last May. There is a widely held perception in Washington, both amongst the administration and the Congress, that Pakistan is part of the problem rather than the solution.
Conveniently, Washington and its surrogate Hamid Karzai for setbacks in Afghanistan blame Islamabad. It is felt that the Pakistani military, by providing safe havens to the Taliban, is jeopardising the US interests in Afghanistan. Hence Islamabad is somewhat unfairly blamed for the resurgence.
Despite the urgency, Washington is not sure how to initiate peace talks with the Talban. By allowing them to open a liaison office in Qatar halfhearted attempts were made to bypass the ISI to have direct talks with the willing ‘good Taliban’.
But the improvised strategy has come to naught. The Taliban have imposed tough conditions for talks. In the context of the recent incidents involving US troops in Afghanistan, backdoor negotiations have completely stalled.
The US has been officially informed that Pakistan has agreed in principle to restore supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan. The joint session of the parliament, however, is expected to impose tough conditions on the US to restore the inexorably frayed relationship.
However, unlike the joint session that took place in the post Abbottabad raid, the forthcoming session is taking place at a time when tense civilian-military relations are somewhat on the mend. The consensus on restoring NATO supplies was taken at a meeting of top civilian and military leadership. This is a decision based on realism. According to some estimates, NATO has already diverted 60 percent of its supplies from the North.
The trust deficit between Washington and Islamabad is so huge that it has become virtually impossible to bridge any time soon. Bruce Reidel, who also advised former President Bill Clinton, led a policy review in 2009 for the Obama administration on Pakistan and Afghanistan. He has prepared a campaign 2012 brief on “maximising chances for success in Afghanistan and Pakistan” for the US president.
According to Reidel, whether Obama is re-elected or replaced by a Republican challenger, America needs a new policy for dealing with Pakistan – a policy recognising that “the two countries’ strategic interests are more in conflict than in harmony, and will remain so for as long as Pakistan’s army controls its strategic policy making.”
The paper recommends that the policy of engagement towards Pakistan needs reshaping. It opines that, “the generals who run Pakistan have not abandoned their obsession with challenging India. They tolerate terrorists at home, seek a Taliban victory in Afghanistan and are building the world’s fastest growing nuclear arsenal.”
Reidel counsels to contain the “Pakistani aggression” by holding the army and its intelligence apparatus accountable. More trade and less aid, especially military aid, while strengthening the civilian government is his recipe for dealing with Islamabad.
Hopefully, the US administration will not take such a single dimensional hardline approach towards Pakistan. Already beleaguered in Afghanistan, it simply cannot afford to.
However, Islamabad while resetting its relations with Washington will also need to take a hard look at its priorities. It has internal and external vulnerabilities, which simply cannot be ignored. Hardliners in the US administration, the defence establishment and the Congress are showing impatience and frustration with Pakistan’s preferred strategic priorities. For the Pakistan army to move against the militants safe havens in North Waziristan has become a chorus in Washington. To carve out a role for New Delhi in Afghanistan peace efforts is also on the cards.
All these are challenges cut out for Pakistan, the military as well as the civilians. The perception that the generals and the intelligence apparatus are omnipotent in dealing with security issues needs to be corrected.
The newly appointed ISI Chief Lt Gen Zaheer Islam has his job cut out for him. He has not only to restore the image of his agency so badly undermined in the past year or so. He has also to deal with thorny internal and external issues relating not only to Afghanistan, the US and India, but also the real or perceived role of the ISI in Balochistan.
The writer is Editor, Pakistan Today