Iran’s nuclear ambitions

A reality check

In several write-ups in this space the undersigned has consistently pleaded for Iran’s right to acquire peaceful nuclear technology. This right is underwritten by the NPT and enshrined in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Statute, the so-called nuclear watchdog. In fact to describe the Agency as a “watchdog” is a misinterpretation of its original mandate. Prevention of the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states, popularly seen as its principal function, was not the cause of its founding. Its genesis lay in President Eisenhower’s vision of “atoms for peace”, to harness the miracle of nuclear science to lift the downtrodden masses of the newly liberated colonies from the clutches of poverty. Nuclear technology has several useful applications in power generation, health and agriculture, amongst others. The composition of the IAEA, which included a sizeable technical cooperation department, reflected mankind’s expectations from this body.

The Agency’s role as a watchdog was supplemental to the core objective of promoting peaceful nuclear applications. With this in view a Verification Division was created in the Agency to ensure that the technology made available for developmental purposes was not diverted for military uses. It was within this framework that nuclear power plants were supplied to several non-nuclear countries, including India and Pakistan.

Accordingly, Iran’s right to acquire peaceful nuclear technology is based in law and cannot be questioned. The issue, however, was complicated by the clandestine nature of the programme. This might draw the argument that India, Israel and Pakistan also operate, or operated, clandestine nuclear programmes, so why not Iran. The explanation lies in the fact that as non-NPT states these three had the freedom to allow inspections of only those facilities which operate under IAEA auspices, for instance in our case, the power plants at Karachi and Chashma and a research reactor at Pinstech. Iran, by virtue of being an NPT state, is treaty bound to place its entire nuclear infrastructure, material and plans under IAEA purview. It is contractually obligated to accept full scope Agency safeguards which include timely access by IAEA inspectors to all sites, storage facilities and installations. It is here that its conflict with the international community arises.

It can be said with some confidence that the Western world, out of concern for Israel’s security and its own regional interests, will never allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Their concern does not stem so much from a possible nuclear attack against Israel as that would invite the most devastating reprisals. The Iranians are astute enough to recognise the incalculable implications of first use. In the Western calculus, a nuclear Iran will radically alter the strategic configuration in the Middle East and severely erode Israel’s power monopoly in the region. It would further empower Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran’s acknowledged allies on the Middle Eastern chessboard, enabling stronger resistance to Israeli depredations in the West Bank and Gaza. The freehand which Israel presently enjoys in its dealings with the Palestinians will be curtailed.

The Saudis and other Gulf states have their own set of apprehensions. Apart from the historical antipathy spawned by the sectarian rift, these states saddled with restive Shia populations, would feel a lot more vulnerable in a nuclearised neighbourhood. The prospect of a nuclear armed Iran sitting atop the Straits of Hormuz lends a measure of understanding for their concerns. Little surprise then that the Saudis have volunteered to augment their production by two million barrels to compensate the importers of Iranian crude once the embargo hits with full force in July this year.

Iran’s other neighbours, Turkey and Pakistan would have no interest in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Turkey has serious differences with Iran, particularly on the Syrian crisis whereas Pakistan, already under tremendous pressure in respect to its own nuclear program, cannot afford to empathise with another gatecrasher to the nuclear club, especially when Iran had allegedly been a beneficiary of its nuclear expertise.

Recently, Iranian officials have signaled their government’s readiness to revive the stalled negotiations. This is a salutary development but its success hinges on the willingness of both sides to earnestly seek common ground. Iran would have to convince its interlocutors with concrete and verifiable actions that it is not in the business of bomb making. The Western powers, on the other hand, would need to modulate their demands to demonstrate recognition of Iran’s right to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The argument that Iran’s vast energy reserves disqualify it from developing nuclear power is fallacious and suggestive of malafide intent. If the objective is to pursue a solution within the ambit of the law, on the virtues of which our Western friends never tire of sermonising, then that law must be applied without discrimination.

It would be helpful if the Iranians desist from hurling their trademark threats against Israel and Washington moves decisively to pressurise Israel to pursue a peaceful settlement with the Palestinians. Given the peculiarities of Iran’s domestic politics and the queer dynamics of an American election year, this might be asking too much.

The writer is Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United Nations and European Union. He can be contacted at [email protected]