The Afghanistan factor

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Last year was terrible for Pak-US relations which are in a state of free fall since a US contractor, Raymond Davis, gunned down two people in Lahore in January. Killing of Osama bin Laden in a covert action in May added insult to injuries. As it was not enough, NATO air strikes in Mohmand killed 24 Pakistan soldiers. One can hardly think of a tally of issues ripping the two allies apart and endangering their “common” fight against violent extremisms. With this heavy baggage and decades of mistrust, the new year can prove as difficult as 2011 which has slowly slipped into history.

Leaving aside the historical problems since Pakistan embraced the US in mid-1950s, let us concentrate on the more compelling realties of immediate past and future, which are more important.

The basic difference is over the future of Afghanistan. Pakistan considers its western neighbour as its backyard and fears that a non-friendly government there will pose a permanent threat to its national security. Its apprehensions are partially historical when it had to face a hostile government in Kabul soon after independence in 1947.

That is why at the first opportunity after Soviet invasion in 1979, Pakistan looked for allies in Afghanistan, picked whosoever was available and wholeheartedly supported them in the jihad of ’80s. It made repeated efforts to install a government of choice after Soviet pullout but failed. Frustrated, finally it helped create Taliban and put them in the saddle at Kabul. It was ironic: Pakistan had done what British and Russians could not do, and the American are finding almost impossible to do.

Pakistan’s love for hardliner Taliban was not simply due to any pious reasons; it was just realpolitick as part of efforts to bring pliant rulers in Afghanistan to secure the western plank in case of war with India, which over the years remains the main source of paranoia. Pakistan felt quite secure after Taliban regime and began the next part of the strategy to force India for deal on Kashmir by extending support to Islamic fighters in the occupied territory.

Before the new policy could bear any fruits, the 9/11 happened and everything changed. I doubt that the planners in Rawalpindi have had thought of any such eventuality, otherwise they had some backup plans to save the Taliban government. Later, when Pakistan was forced to join the war on terror, it conveniently forgot the mullahs in Afghanistan, till the new twist in the events due to US invasion of Iraq and fierce resistance by the militants also provided encouragement to the militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Pakistan and US were on the same page in the early years of war against terrorism, but the problems started when US started thinking about the future setup in Afghanistan. In addition to many other elements discomforting for Pakistan, like creation of a sizeable Afghan National Army and other institutions of national security, the new plan had carefully carved out a sphere of influence for India.

Given Pakistan’s apprehensions about designs of its eastern neighbour, it slowly started reacting in its own way. The following years saw Pakistan and US slowly moving away and then blaming each other. Now, after over ten years of war and destruction in Afghanistan, the main bone of contention between the two is who will get what in the spoils of government after the US hands over the country to the locals, and how much influence India will enjoy over the new rulers of Kabul.

The US strongly feels that leaving Afghanistan at the sole mercy of Pakistan after the withdrawal of western troops will move things back to pre-9/11 days which will not only be dangerous for the world peace but it will give undue leverage to Pakistan over its weaker neighbour. There is a strong feeling in the US administration that Pakistan’s future influence should be checkmated for stability in the region and only a country with the Indian size and stature can do the job. So, they took great pains and spent a lot of energy during the last many years in building Indian image as a rising power with legitimate interests in regional stability and Afghanistan security.

Unfortunately, Pakistan has done little to improve its image and finds not many buyers of its argument about interests in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the US interests in Afghanistan and its mistrust of Pakistan remains unchanged.

Same is true about Pakistan’s feeling towards Washington. The new year can bring a change in the ties if both sides create space for each other by showing sensitivity towards real interests. Otherwise, let us brace for another terrible year of relations and who will be happier than the militants, which once both the countries had joined hands to eliminate.

The writer is Islamabad based senior correspondent for a foreign newswire and PhD scholar at NDU. He can be reached at [email protected]