We’re not their only contact reference
Is the centrality that Pakistan occupied in the ‘Great Endgame’ in Afghanistan on the wane? If one recalls the time when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, their single ally and aide was Pakistan. Pakistan was the one that enabled them to establish effective control over there. In the Taliban’s war with Northern Alliance, Pakistan matched the covert support given by India and Russia to the latter. After the formation of the Taliban government, it was Pakistan that helped with their international relations. It was because of us that Saudi Arabia and UAE accepted their government and it was also us that became a liaison between them and the US and the Taliban embassy in Islamabad remained active in international relationing on behalf of its government in Kabul.
Thus, there was once a time when Pakistan could be exclusively relied upon to establish any kind of contact with the Taliban. So much so that when the US and its allies became worried about an increase in Al-Qaeda’s activities, they requested Pakistan to convince the Taliban to desist in their support. According to the Musharraf government, they did do that. But as per another conflicting report, the ISI chief who took Musharraf’s message to Mullah Omar told him – as opposed to the original message – to remain steadfast in his convictions and aid Al-Qaeda in their jihad. The result then was against Pakistan’s interest and wishes. Mullah Omer refused to stop supporting Al-Qaeda and gave them permission to operate inside Afghanistan with impunity.
I will relate two anecdotes here to show that Mullah Omar, after establishing control in Afghanistan, gave Pakistan quite the cold shoulder instead of being grateful for its help. A longstanding issue that we have with Afghanistan is the dispute over borders. When the Taliban government was asked about ascertaining the border using the Durand Line as guidance, they gave the same answer that previous Afghan governments had given. Obviously, this answer was not encouraging for us. Later, when the US expressed its concerns about an increase Al-Qaeda’s sphere of activities, Pakistan sent the message to Mullah Omar that Afghanistan’s territory should not be allowed to be used for terrorist activities. At that, Nawaz Sharif was the country’s prime minister and it was 1999. I can personally testify that Nawaz Sharif’s tour of Abu Dhabi on 12th October 1999 was about these activities. On this visit, Nawaz Shari forwarded the US’ concerns to Shaykh Zayd bin Sultan Al-Nayhan and consulted with him about how to convince the Taliban to cut off their support to Al-Qaeda.
Shaykh Zayd was a seasoned leader and fully aware of the movements and ongoings in the Muslim world. He recommended that instead of directly pressuring Mullah Omar at the individual level, he should be prevailed upon by invoking the wishes of the Muslim ummah. Nawaz Sharif concurred with this suggestion and it was decided that the Saudi Arabia would be taken into confidence and a consensus would be tried to be evolved in the Muslim comity. Shaykh Zayd bin Sultan took it upon himself to meet the Saudi ruler and prepare ground for some kind of unanimous resolution. I often think that why was the ruler of Pakistan deposed the very afternoon he met the ruler of UAE to convince the Taliban to stop supporting Al-Qaeda. Even though there were many stories of disagreements between Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf in circulation, I think the decision taken in Abu Dhabi also had something to do with it.
If we analyse the situation in light of the game that Musharraf played after coming into power – the price of which the entire nation is still paying – we can see that maybe Musharraf and his American overlords did not want a peaceful end to the entire Al-Qaeda issue. Because as soon as Nawaz Sharif was gone, there was an escalation in Al-Qaeda’s activities. Then, the tragedy of 9/11 took place and the drive to establish American bases in Afghanistan began the first stage of which was militarily occupying Afghanistan.
The other recommendation of Pakistan (apart from settlement on the Durand Line) that the Taliban refused to accept was ceasing to support Al-Qaeda. Nawaz Sharif told Mullah Omar in his own capacity to stop international terrorist activities being conducted from the Afghan domain and readers will recall that a statement of Shahbaz Sharif had appeared in the media back then to the same effect which exhorted the Taliban to stop terrorists from operating from within their country. Hence, the Pakistani leadership was snubbed by the Taliban, both in the cases of the Durand Line and supporting Al-Qaeda. I have explained this context to explain that we should be ready for such rebuffs and blows in the upcoming days as well.
In my opinion, the US directly negotiation with the Taliban is a big blow for us. The US cannot be complained to because there are reasons enough for the distrust and bad blood between us and them. But Mullah Omar can have no such complaints and reason to distrust us. From helping the Taliban establish control over Afghanistan once to giving sanctuary to fleeing Taliban after the American occupation, we took every risk, even those which could endanger our national security even. We even gave an opportunity to the Afghan Taliban to regroup and rearm. If we look at the first three or four years of American occupation in Afghanistan, it is clear that they had to face no noteworthy resistance. This resistance only started when the Taliban again gained a foothold and started to reorganise themselves. We invited the wrath of a superpower to help the Taliban.
It is our extreme bad luck that some elements within the Pakistani state (whether privately or with approval of high authorities) had given asylum to OBL, an inexcusable act. One reason to do this, if ever there could be in the minds of these misguided elements, could’ve been to curry favour with the Taliban and this must’ve been done in collusion with the Taliban. And this is what became ‘the’ reason for the tension in Pak-US relations. So at a time when we are under great American pressure, the Taliban bypassing us and directly talking to the US is a big and painful blow for us.
If today the US is ready to talk to the Taliban, it is because of countless sacrifices on the part of Pakistan. At this time of crisis, it was incumbent upon the Taliban that they insist Pakistan be included in the process. But, alas, that did not happen. Pakistan has never agreed to a negotiating table without a seat for the Taliban over the past decade. But, the Taliban, at first instance, started talks with the US and subsequently established a Qatar office and got a prominent leader released from Gitmo. This could create many problems for us. This is because the released leader Mullah Muhammad Fazal is responsible for killing the Hazara community and is alleged to have also killed Iranina diplomats. Hence, this could needlessly complicate Pak-Iran ties. I am also disappointed by the fact that some Taliban leaders went for the Bonn conference as well though they were stopped from going to the conference hall by some well-wishers.
There is no doubt that Pakistan – because of its position importance and strategic location – will have an impact on the Great Endgame underway in Afghanistan. The US cannot ignore Pakistan’s centrality. Efforts will be, or rather are, afoot to normalise relations between Pakistan and US and to bring them ‘back on track’. But our policy makers should definitely take a long hard look at how the Taliban have behaved with us and come up with a new policy regarding them in light of experience.
The writer is one of Pakistan’s most widely read columnists.